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ABSTRACT 
PHILOSOPHY AS DIALOGUE: PLATO AND THE mSTORY OF 
DIALECTIC (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE SOPHIS1) 
M. T. PADILLA LONGORIA PH D THESIS 2000 
The connecting thread of this thesis is the idea that philosophy is essentially 
dialectical or a matter of conversation. Plato's idea of philosophy plays a 
pivotal role insofar as one of his main preoccupations throughout his work 
is to defme the essence of philosophy. For him philosophy and dialectic are 
interchangeable terms. Plato's idea of dialectic is that of a philosophical 
conversation. This is not a judgement that is accepted by many other 
philosophers; I consider objections that Aristotle, Descartes and Husserl 
address to this idea of the nature of philosophy. 
In the fIrst main part I discuss the etymology and origins of the word 
dialectic and its possible literary antecedents in Greek epic, lyric and 
tragedy. 
I then offer, in the second part, a historical approach to the 
philosophical roots of dialectic with the aim of grasping its genesis and 
evolution. I deal with the different ancient ideas of dialectic as represented 
by the fIgures of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno (and some Sophists), and the Stoics, 
then moving on to the medieval understanding of dialectic. Finally I 
describe its modem versions through representative fIgures such as Kant, 
Hegel, Marx and Engels. 
Finally, in the third part, I tum to the Socratic-Platonic understanding 
of dialectic. In this part I discuss the nature of the Socratic-Platonic method 
and some different perspectives on Platonic dialectic. As a test case, and 
especially with the aim of showing how dialectic operates in Plato, and how 
he contrasts the fIgures of the Philosopher and the Sophist I focus on the 
Sophist. 
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INTRODUCTION 
§1. PHILOSOPHY AND DIALECTIC 
a) Philosophy as essentially dialectical 
Throughout this thesis, we will propose that philosophy is essentially 
dialectical. The starting point of our reading of Plato is his idea of what 
philosophy is. Our account of Plato's idea (an idea with which we tend to 
agree) recognises the fact that there are many others, past and present, who 
would reject it. "Philosophy is essentially dialectical": this sweet and 
inevitable sentence, according to Plato's approach, implies two ideas. 1. 
Philosophy is intrinsically dialectical or, in other words, dialectic and 
philosophy are interchangeable terms. 2. Philosophy as a dialectical activity 
implies a specific way of carrying on dialogue. Dialectic is dialogue, but a 
specific form of dialogue, a philosophical dialogue or philosophical 
conversation which requires method in order to be developed properly, that 
is, scientifically. The Socratic-Platonic l revolution consisted in making 
explicit the nature of the act of philosophising: philosophy is always a 
dialogic act; it is an unselfish or loving search for the truth, a shared search, 
a shared act. 2 Philosophy, as an unselfish search for the truth, is a 
transpersonal act that implies dialogue. The way to truth is, in our 
judgement, essentially dialogic and depends on communication and that is 
the reason why we regard Platonic dialectic as central. That is also the 
I The relationship that we propose between Socrates and Plato is that Socrates is the Socrates that Plato 
constructs. That is, we will not distinguish between the two. If Socrates is interesting it is because among 
other things he embodies Plato's method even if that method may have its roots in the historical Socrates. 
If sometimes we refer to Socrates and Plato, on the one hand I cannot say where Socrates ends and when 
Plato begins and on the other hand I do not want to refer everything to Plato. 
2 Even when Plato is talking about the act of thinking, it implies for him an internal dialogue. We will 
develop this idea in section b, and see also note 16. 
reason why we regard it as important to follow out the process of its 
gestation, evolution and consolidation. The philosophical exploration of the 
truth is not only a matter involving a subject and an object, it is a dialogic 
act that only becomes completed and reaches its end when a subject 
proposes a philosophical thesis -rationally, objectively, methodically and 
systematically pursued- about an object to another subject or subjects, and 
offers it for scrutiny by them. Philosophy creates and consolidates a 
community: a community of searchers for the truth. 3 
According to the Platonic account of philosophy and its objects, 
philosophy is necessarily methodical because it is a rational and conscious 
process of the interconnection of things discovered in reality with the aim of 
explaining them or giving an account of them. Philosophy is methodical 
because it is a directed inquiry about any object given, with the aim of 
investigating it independently of personal motivations. Philosophy takes a 
second, more careful, look at apparently simple and common things with the 
aim of discovering what they really are and what sorts of connections and 
interrelationships there are among them. Plato thought that the man who 
can make these sorts of distinctions, and who can fmd unity among many 
things, was the dialectician. For Plato dialectic is equivalent to the act of 
philosophising, and of being a philosopher. But if dialectic and philosophy 
are interchangeable terms, all questions and problems related to the essence 
and aims of philosophy can be explored in terms of what dialectic is and 
means, and what the dialectician does. 
When Plato defmed philosophy as an unselfish search for the truth he 
established, at the same time, the metaphysical (ontological, 
3 My notion of the essence of philosophy is partly informed by Eduardo Nicol. On the topic of the essence 
of philosophy it is worth consulting his Metalisica de fa expresion, Nueva Versi6n, F. C. E., Mexico, 
1974; La idea del hombre, Nueva Versi6n, F. C. E., Mexico, 1977, and Los principios de fa ciencia, F. C. 
E., 2a. reimpresi6n, Mexico, 1992. 
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epistemological, methodological) and ethical conditions for doing 
philosophy. 
Ontologically and epistemologically speaking, philosophy is an 
unselfish search for the truth because it implies a permanent duty to take -
as starting point of any philosophical research- the relevant primary 
evidence, that is, the facts of reality as they are in themselves and as 
independent from the subjects who pursue the truth. Philosophy aspires to 
be a genuine process towards knowledge which culminates in a clearer, 
because rational, understanding of things. Plato thought that human reason 
was the ideal tool for this searching process. Plato insisted, throughout his 
work, that rational dialogue (which implies at least two people in 
conversation) is the ideal way to do philosophy.4 On the other hand, it is 
not just dialoglie, but dialogue about objects~ and not just a matter of what 
an individual thinks. The act of searching for the truth is a dialogic act 
which reaches its highest point when interlocutors get some grasp (even if it 
is provisional) of the essence of the object in question and can express it 
clearly. For Plato, to think clearly also implies clarity of expression because 
thinking is essentially a verbal affair as well. 
Methodologically speaking, philosophy is an unselfish search for the 
truth because it is a conscious and systematic path followed with the aim of 
grasping things rationally and objectively. Lovers of wisdom who are proud 
of being such have to submit themselves to a process of "purification" 
which removes all their previous unreflective assumptions and their personal 
or ulterior motivations -except towards truth. Plato's Socrates thought that 
this process of clearing away obstructive elements is essential because most 
of these elements are part of us -because we grew up with them or because 
they were taught to us. The aim of this purification is to liberate us from 
4 For Plato live rational dialogue is the best way to do philosophy. This rational dialogue can be imitated, 
represented or partially recreated in writing. 
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any sort of prejudice which prevents us from having a fresh and direct 
relationship with reality and the possibility of forming in ourselves a critical 
judgement which leads us to re-think and reconsider everything that we 
have been learned and been taught. In that sense dialectic -according to 
Plato's Socrates- has, at fIrst, a negative task which is only propaedeutic. 
Ethically speaking, philosophy is an unselfIsh search for the truth 
because it implies that philosophical truth is an impersonal truth. In fact, 
the whole dialogic exercise -as the dialectical practice that Plato understood 
it as being- is the way in which he showed us that love of wisdom or 
philosophical love for truth implies the absolute priority of grasping what 
things are: the central point is what we (together) objectively seem to 
discover from reality, not who is saying what. The loving or dialogic 
grasping of reality also has its ethical or human benefIts: seeking for what 
reality is provides self-knowledge, knowledge of human nature, and 
therefore, the possibility of self-improvement. For Plato philosophy is 
education because when you are put to the test (or your theses are put to the 
test) through the dialogic process you become a more conscious person, a 
better person who knows what you really know and what you do not know . 
In fact, if we ask the question about the aims of philosophy or why we do 
philosophy the Socratic-Platonic answer is deeply humanist: because we 
aspire to live a worthy life which is equivalent to acting reflectively or 
actively reflecting, leading to a permanent exercise of, or constant searching 
for, self-improvement. The Socratic-Platonic idea of philosophy which is 
portrayed in each dialogue implies the idea that philosophy is a continuous 
exercise in searching and looking for what can be no more than a partial 
knowledge of any object given. Philosophy is presented much more in 
terms of partial achievements than in terms of a complete knowledge. 
When Plato says philosophy is dialectic he is proposing a major humanistic 
project philosophy as a method of life, or the way to form an ethical, 
4 
impersonal criterion of truth which is shown in a continuous attitude of 
inquiring and criticism. 
Because philosophy is essentially dialectical, philosophy is paideia 
par excellence: Plato always insists on his idea of the nature of philosophy 
and his efforts are concentrated on grasping the whole idea in terms of a 
dialogic process. Plato thought that Socrates embodied and personified this 
ideal of philosophy. In the Socratic figure there is a crystallisation of the 
human consciousness as a method of life: to be a man, a good man, a 
virtuous man is a task, indeed, the real task, and philosophy is the vocation 
par excellence that shows us how to become or learn to be a better human 
being. Socrates thought that " ... the unexamined life is not worth living for 
a human being.,,5 It is precisely in this permanent act of inquiring that 
philosophy transforms human life and the world: to think and to become 
aware of oneself and the world transmutes both and gives them a new 
ontological, epistemological and ethical dimension. That is the reason that 
philosophy -as dialectic- is paideia. 
In short, and as Plato said, dialectic as a "science of conversation" -
involving the dialectician as "... the man who can ask and answer 
questions" -6 is the ideal form of communication and teaching. It is in the 
way that Socratic-Platonic dialectic works, as live, systematically organised 
conversation, that is, as a rigorous exercise of testing any thesis proposed, 
by questions and answers, in a process of mutual challenge with the aim of 
discovering its truth or falsity, that the dialectician scatters the 
philosophical-dialectical seed in his pupils. 7 
Some people have attributed to Socrates and Plato a sort of 
philosophical scepticism: a view of philosophy according to which human 
5 Apology, 38a. 
6 Cratylus, 390cll; see also, d5; Republic, VII, 534b3; Sophist, 253d2, e4. 
7 See Phaednis, 276e4-277a5. 
5 
beings and particularly philosophers are necessarily always frustrated in 
their search for the truth, so that they end up searching for the sake of 
searching without achieving anything in the end. 8 The curious point to 
notice is that, according to the Socratic-Platonic idea of the essence of 
philosophy, the real dynamism of it resides precisely in the fact that 
philosophical love is always an aspiration less than totally fulfIlled. Real 
philosophers need humility, which means awareness of the fact that they are 
just lovers or searchers for wisdom, but not possessors of it. Socrates and 
Plato repeatedly advise us against the arrogance of the person who pretends 
to know. This false conceit of wisdom ()0~oaoq>ia)9 represents the death 
penalty for philosophy which is sometimes a result of a) an internal crisis 
within philosophy itself, for instance any kind of sophistry- or b) of external 
pressures. Let me explain. 
a) Plato mounts very strong criticisms lO against any individual who, 
while pretending to do philosophy, just exhibits a false conceit of wisdom 
and disguises his ignorance and personal motivations with dubious and 
deceitful proceedings which are not part of an authentic searching for the 
truth at all. Plato condemns this harmful practice which is to the detriment 
of the honest practice of the philosophical task, according to his idea of 
what love of wisdom has to be. His main criticism of the different sorts of 
sophistry resides in the fact that sophistry transmutes the essence of 
philosophy into mere technical games. 11 
b) Another way to kill philosophy and to pervert its essence is to give 
in to reasons of necessity, or pragmatic aims, which tempt one to pretend 
8 This is perhaps Platonism, or Socratism, as understood by for example, the New Academy and Arcesilaus 
and Carneades. 
9 See Philebus, 49d. 
10 The Parmenides and the Sophist are good examples of such criticism. See particularly in the Sophist the 
passage which refers to the sophistry of "noble lineage", 230a5-232b9. 
II We will develop the idea of the sophist as an impostor and a magician in Part three. 
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that the truth is what is in fact wholly a matter of utility or personal 
ideology. This criticism is addressed to those who in fact to reduce 
philosophy to personal or group interests. Pretending to know everything or 
pretending to possess the whole truth is equivalent to fInishing with 
philosophical love, which ceases to exist, if philosophical love means "love 
of wisdom or love of truth".12 It is another way of asserting that the 
unselfIsh search for the truth does not have either a priority or a value itself, 
or that it is always subject to higher interests. It is also to assume that the 
search for the truth is just a side problem, or something that can be 
manipulated or subject to particular circumstances or pragmatic aims. 
Unfortunately, interest is a form of arrogance, and arrogance is a 
contagious disease which quickly affects others. Actually, it is in the 
present day a natural attitude, a way of life: truth is merely a game of 
interests. Here we arrive at a distressful and disturbing point. Any attempt 
to make of reasoning, in the fIeld of philosophy or the special sciences, 
something merely instrumental to other ends, implies the dangerous 
temptation to infringe the ethical principle or the principle of unselfIshness 
which constitutes the conducting thread of any honest search in this area 
and to corrupt these activities into something different. It is this ambiguous 
link -sometimes disastrous- between reason and power which can be 
expressed in two phrases: "the power of reason" and the "reasons of 
power". 
Regarding "the power of reason": here it is important to make the 
following distinction. It is one thing to talk about philosophy as a rational 
way of tackling reality which implies good faith in the reliability or 
trustworthiness of human reason; it is another thing to postulate the "power 
of reason" as an interested instrument for personal or ulterior motives 
without regard for the truth. This interested use of reason can be applied 
12 See Lysis, 2ISa-b, Symposium, 203-204. 
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positively or negatively, but the important point to stress IS that these 
activities pursue different purposes and have different aims. 
Regarding "reasons of power": here we move into the area of the 
justification of the exercise of any kind of power. There are clearly two 
sorts of areas that attempt to provide the grounds or the "reasons" for the 
exercise of their powers: politics and technical subjects. Both are searching 
for a logos which can found their practice. The problem is that, when any 
kind of power is involved in the process or aims of any activity then the 
principle that is going to rule will be interest and necessity, not unselfishness 
and freedom. Moreover: when the principle of unselfishness is replaced by 
mere personal interest or pragmatic necessity, the implications are 
considerable. It means metamorphosing or changing the nature of 
philosophy and the particular sciences into ideology and technical subjects 
and claiming that knowledge for the sake of knowing does not have any 
value itself. More seriously: that knowing is "having the power to". In 
short to establish interest and necessity as principles of knowledge it is 
equivalent of positing two conditions for real knowledge: usefulness and 
practical outcomes. We do not mean to satanise technical subjects or 
politics, we simply say that it is worth noticing that because both involve the 
exercise of power, their principles, motivations and aims will be different: 
they will move in an ambiguous field which contains many elements of 
irrationality. The real, and often gradual and subtle threat, is the ghost of 
reductionism: the dangerous and pragmatic game of simplifying and forcing 
all human activity to become mere necessity or utility This reductionism 
can be like an epidemic, unconsciously spreading: it is a uniform and 
imposed on pattern of life. Without the free exercise and the vital effects of 
philosophy, the special sciences and the arts, human life becomes 
mechanical and subject to constraint. 
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This invasive, pragmatic concept of life puts into considerable 
jeopardy the Socratic-Platonic idea of philosophy -and the reasons for the 
existence of philosophy in general- as a permanent task or vital hwnanistic 
project of becoming better men through the method of examining 
everything. The success of this omnipragmatism would imply a certain 
death for philosophy. Even sadder, when inside philosophy and among 
philosophers -suicidal philosophers- involved in this spider's web and 
trapped into it try to provide theoretical foundations and justifications of this 
tangle, breaking the ethical principle of loving search for the truth. Plato's 
main criticism addresses tendencies like relativism embodied in figures like 
Protagoras with his motto "1tUV'tIDV JiE'tPOV liv9pID1tOC; Ecrn v,,13 and 
Callicles who states that: " ... philosophy is only for the immature; real men 
do more productive things ... ,,14 Are we in a cul-de-sac? 
Fortunately, there are still faithful philosophers. Philosophy can 
continue with its task that started with Thales and found its climax in the 
Socratic-Platonic project: to ask for the essence of everything, with the sole 
aim of knowing what it is. Philosophy as a disinterested search for truth 
implies in Plato the idea that this search is a shared search. An authentic 
philosophical dialogue also involves in the Platonic system the essential 
feature that philosophical truth is an impersonal truth. Formulating a 
defInition of anything is, the end, part of the main aim, regardless of who 
formulated it. In addition, the vital benefits of philosophy, where the truth -
as a loving search- is important indeed, even persist in this modem world: 
the object of knowledge of reality, of human nature and self-knowledge. 
Philosophy is not pragmatic, but it is just practical, that is, ethical, its sole 
aim is to make better men. But for how long? 
13 Theaetetus, 178b2-4: "Man is the measure of all things". 
14 Gorgias, 484c ff. 
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A question that any sharp reader may put is the following: do all 
philosophers agree with Socrates and Plato that dialectic -as they understand 
the idea- is the optimum way to do philosophy? Throughout the history of 
philosophy we fmd serious objections in terms of form (that is, in relation to 
the way in which dialectic is to be practised) and in substance (that is, in 
relation to what dialectic is). We will analyse some of these objections in 
the next section. 
b) Aristotle's objection 
Aristotle thought that Zeno was the inventor of dialectic, but in the sense 
that Aristotle understood the idea of dialectic. The Aristotelian sense of 
dialectic is different from Plato's. Aristotle resorts to attributing to Zeno the 
origins of his new conception of dialectic because he found in Zeno's 
procedure a historical antecedent for his own conception. Aristotle does not 
have a unitary idea about what dialectic is. But at least there are some 
points that can be made clear; and we will try to make these clear in relation 
to the Aristotelian objection to Plato's idea of dialectic. For Aristotle, 
dialectic is not central any more and neither is it synonymous with 
philosophy. Indeed: for Aristotle conversation is much more susceptible to 
error than solitary thought. Talking about some kinds of fallacies which 
arise from confused thinking and the inability to make distinctions Aristotle 
remarks: 
" ... the deception occurs more commonly when we are inquiring with others 
than by ourselves (for an inquiry with someone else is carried on by means of words, 
whereas in our own minds it is carried on quite as much by means of the thing itself); 
" 15 
15 Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, 169a38-40.(translated by E. S. Forster and D. J. Furiey, Loeb 
Classical Library, Harvard University Press, 1992). 
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As this implies, for Aristotle the scientific act in the ideal case is a 
solitary act; it is merely a matter for an individual who is face to to face with 
things. At the same time Aristotle emphasises that dialogue with others just 
obstructs the direct relationship with things because it mediates them 
through words. 
Moreover, Aristotle states that science does not proceed by question 
and answer and dialectic is not the method of science. 16 The way that he 
shows us what his idea of dialectic is, is as follows: 
" ... Dialectic, however, does proceed by interrogation, whereas, if it aimed at showing 
something, it would refrain from questions, if not about everything, at any rate about 
primary things and particular principles; for if the opponent refused to grant these, 
dialectic would no longer have any basis on which to argue against the objection. 
Dialectic is at the same time an art of examination; for neither is the art of examination 
of the same nature as geometry but it is an art which a man could possess even without 
any scientific knowledge. For even a man without knowledge of the subject can 
examine another who is without knowledge, if the latter makes concessions based not 
on what he knows nor on the special principles of the subject but on the consequential 
facts, which are such that, though to know them does not prevent him from being 
ignorant of the art in question, yet not to know them necessarily involves ignorance of 
it. Clearly, therefore, the art of examination is not knowledge of any definite subject, 
and it therefore follows that it deals with every subject; for all the arts employ also 
certain common principles."l7 
It is important to add also that Plato confronts Aristotle's objection in Phaedo 99d ff.: Plato 
thinks that dealing with things themselves will not give us a final explanation about what they really are. 
The reasons that Plato gives are mainly because the "direct contact" with things is just an approach by 
means of the senses which just blinds us and, without giving us a unitary account about them. We can add 
that natural scientists have to deal with things, but they finally have to express their theories by means of 
words. The only difference is that Plato suggests that the starting-point will be words, but words that refer 
constantly to things. In short: it is clear that Plato's ontology and epistemology are different from 
Aristotle's. 
16 De Sophisticis Elenchis, 172 a 15 ff. and Posterior Analytics I, passim. 
17 Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations. 172 aI8-30, (trans. Forster and Furley): i1 O£ OtaA£K'ttK~ 
£pro'tT)'ttKiJ £cr'ttv. ei. 0' £OE1.KVUEV, Et Kat 1111 mxv'ta, aUa 'tu "(E npiiha Kat 'ta<; otKEia<; ana<; OUK 
av l]pOl'ta. 1111 ot06v'to<; "(ap OUK av E'tt ElXEV £~ rov E'tt OtaU~E'tat npo<; 't~v EVO"'tao'tV. i] 0' ainl1 Kat 
nEtpaO"'ttKtl. 0'00£ yap 1] nEtpaO"'ttK11 'tOtau'tT) £O"'tI.V ota i1 YEroIlE'tpia, aU' ilv av EXOt Kal. 1111 ei.oro<; 
'tt<;. E~Eo"'tt yap nEtpaV Aa/3EtV Kal. 'tOY 1111 ei.06'ta 'to npuYlla 'tou 1111 ei.06'to<;, El1tEp Kal. oiorocrtv OUK 
11 
For Aristotle, one can clearly conclude that -at least- four things are true: 1. 
the art of examination does not involve knowledge of any particular subject; 
2. the art of examination deals with every subject; 3. it employs certain 
common principles, and 4. dialectic involves a sort of an art of examination 
which resorts to interrogation and which does not necessarily imply 
scientific knowledge. 
F or Aristotle some kind of use of dialectic and the art of examination 
are common practices for everybody, even for unscientific people: 
everybody tries to test those who profess knowledge. The inaccuracy of 
dialectic and the art of examination resides in the fact that everybody knows 
what the first principles of science are, but with the difference that scientists 
express them accurately and common people do not. On the other hand 
Aristotle gives some value and credibility to dialectic and the dialectician. 
He thinks that everybody can practice refutation, but only unmethodically. 
Only with dialectic can you carry out this task methodically, and the man 
who develops this examination through an art of reasoning is the 
dialecti ciano 
For Aristotle 1t£tpacr'ttK1] has different meanings: it can be either a 
kind of dialectic, or an equivalent to dialectic, or an introduction to 
dialectic. The art of dialectic -Aristotle says- is an art of asking questions, 
and 1tnpacr'ttKll is the same. Il£tpacr'ttKll does not depend on knowledge, 
but is still a kind of 'tEXVll. Dialectic in that sense represents the skilled 
version of elenchos. The dialectician is a 1tnpuO''ttKo<;.18 In short, dialectic 
implies 1t£tpacr'tlX1], but the converse is not true. Previously in De 
ES rov Oloev ouo' ElC 'trov {otoov, aAA' ElC 'trov £7toJ.l£VooV, GO<X 't01<XU'tU EO'ttV a d06't<X J.lEV ouotv 
lCOOA-oe1 J.lTJ E{O£V<Xl 'tTJV 't£XVT]V, J.l1l El06't<X 0' aVUYlCTJ ayvoElv. mo'tE <p<xvepov on OUOEVOe; roP10J.lEvOl) 
it nelp<xo'ttlCTJ E1tlO'tT]J.lTJ EO'ttV. 010 K<Xt nept nuvtoov Eo't1.·niXo<Xl yap <xl. 't£XV<Xl xproV't<Xl K<Xt KOt VOle; 
'tt01.v. 
18 De Sophisticis Elenchis, XI, 172a fI 
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Sophisticis Elenchis, Aristotle has insisted that the type of examination to 
which 1tEtpuO''tudl belongs is part (J.lEp0<;) of dialectic. 19 We can go 
further: the art of examination is a kind of dialectic, but it restricts itself to 
examining the man who is ignorant and pretends to know. 20 In a sense 
examination is a sort of sophistry because it can also be exercised by a man 
who pretends to know, but is really ignorant. In this sense, for Aristotle the 
art of examination can degenerate into mere sophistry. Let me explain. If 
the elenctic process can be achieved by people that are ignorant, but pretend 
to know, the only benefits which Aristotle attributes to this art of 
examination will be lost. The reason is because it will be an exercise in a 
vacuum or a futile interchange of ignorance disguised as wisdom which will 
not lead to anything concrete or clear. That is also the reason why Aristotle 
thinks that, even when the art of examination is employed by a dialectician, 
it is so broad that its scientific status is highly restricted and its position in 
the philosophical hierarchy is low: the dialectician is not dealing with any 
particular object and, for Aristotle, the fmal criterion of truth is based on the 
analysis of particular objects. Indeed, in his Metaphysics Aristotle is more 
forceful on this point: 
" ... Dialectic treats as an exercise what philosophy tries to understand, and sophistry 
seems to be philosophy, but is not.,,21 
In short: for Aristotle when the art of examination is practised by 
unskilful people who are ignorant of the subject-matter under discussion, it 
can degenerate into mere sophistry. The reason is because -in Aristotle's 
judgement- it is just an erratic interchange of unfounded opinions about any 
19 Ibid, VI, 169 b25. 
20 Ibid, X, 171 b4. 
21 Metaphysics, IV,2, 1004 b25, (translated by H. Tredennick, Harvard University Press, 1989): E01:l oE iJ 
OtaA.eK1:lKTt 1tEtpa01:lKTJ 1tEPl. rov 11 <plAooo<pl.a 'YVropt01:lKTt, 11 oE OO<pt01:lKTJ <PatVOflEvT], ouoa o'ou. 
13 
given object. When the art of examination is practiced by skilful people, 
that is, the dialectician, it can lead to the illumination of the common 
principles of science. But, it any case, the art of examination and dialectic 
are not philosophical or scientific activities anymore. Aristotle's project for 
science and philosophy should be does not consider living oral rational 
interchanges essential for searching for the truth any more, as Plato did. 
Furthermore: Aristotle's idea of dialectic is radically different from 
Plato's. That too will have repercussions for Aristotle's idea about the 
proper method of doing philosophy or approaching reality. 
What then will have been Aristotle's main objections against Platonic 
dialectic? I. Platonic dialectic involves the Socratic elenchos which is ad 
hominem and unsystematic. The first charge against Platonic dialectic is its 
partiality, because it resorts much more to the discussion of particular points 
of view than to objective questions. 2. It is not completely clear if elenchos 
can be a real method from Aristotle's point of view because Socrates is not, 
in Aristotle's terms, face to face with things and he cannot therefore make 
clear what things really are and what sorts of interconnections between them 
there are. The second charge against Platonic dialectic is its unscientific 
way of tackling reality. 3. Platonic dialectic, just as an exercise in 
examination, can be practiced even by amateurs, and it can lead to mere 
refutation or sophistry. That is, dialectic does not have any positive 
demonstrative power and it is therefore not a method for discovering the 
truth. The third charge against Platonic dialectic its is inefficaciousness, 
insufficiency and inaccuracy as a scientific method for searching for the 
truth. 4. Platonic dialectic implies a living dialogue or interchange with at 
least one interlocutor. According to Aristotle, dialogue just complicates and 
hampers a direct relationship with things because reliance on verbal 
exchange obstructs link between the subject and the objects. The fourth 
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charge against Platonic dialectic is its epistemological inappropriateness as a 
philosophical method. 
The aim of Platonic dialectic -according to Plato- is to achieve the 
most approximate knowledge about any given object through philosophical 
dialogue and stated in a defmition. This philosophical dialogue sometimes 
involves a process of collection and division. In a way, collection is a sort 
of induction because you have to gather systematically a group of things 
which have something in common. That is, perhaps, the reason that the 
major -and maybe only- two merits that in Aristotle's judgement we can 
ascribe to the Socratic way of proceeding are inductive arguments and 
universal defmitions, both just concerning the foundation of science, but 
nothing beyond that. 22 
What answers can we give to Aristotle's objections? 1. Platonic 
dialectic is not a subjective exercise which aims to test ideas in an 
unsystematic way, that is, it is not a way of talking and thinking 
incoherently about casual views. Socrates is not testing his personal views; 
he is testing his own ideas or other people's ideas or beliefs in a rational and 
coherent dialogue. Socrates' conception of being systematic involves 
having a coherent set of ideas and showing reasons to the interlocutors to 
think about and then, possibly, believe in them. 2. Platonic dialectic shows 
us, through the act of testing approaches to any given object extracted from 
reality by means of rational dialogue, if one idea about this object is 
compatible or incompatible with another idea about it. The methodical 
exercise of testing approaches to any given real object opens the possibility 
of searching for the different sorts of interconnections that this object has 
with everything else. 3. In Platonic dialectic the search for the truth is 
possible because the objects of thought and dialogue form a coherent 
system. Somebody who knows the truth, according to the Platonic Socrates, 
22 Cj MetaphysiCS, 1078 b27 ff 
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does not have gaps in his knowledge. Dialectic is a method for arriving at 
the truth -a method which depends on prior ontological and epistemological 
assumptions- because the whole process of testing things is with the aim of 
getting as clear and explicit as possible about the interconnections and 
disconnections among things. So that at the end, you know what can you 
assert or what can you deny about a given object. 4. Platonic dialectic has 
its epistemological foundation in the idea that rational verbal interchanges 
can give us the best explanation about what reality is. Human language may 
give rise to misunderstandings or misinterpretations, but that does not mean 
that human communication is per se an obstacle to tackling reality. 
Communication among human beings is a fact and an epistemological 
starting point. 
Equally, Plato's method for searching for the truth by dialectic is 
positive because Socrates tries to test (or to give reasons) why he thinks the 
things that he thinks. Plato's idea about what philosophy is implies trust in 
the capacity of human reason to approach things. 
After we have surveyed Aristotle's views on dialectic, it is clear that 
Plato and Aristotle are worlds apart on this subject. With Aristotle's 
response to Plato and his new idea of dialectic, the status of dialectic is a 
fortiori reduced. Dialectic will not be synonymous with philosophy; 
dialectic is not a scientific method of searching for the truth, and particular 
sciences and philosophy do not proceed by a dialogic process of question 
and answer, that is, methodical conversations or indeed conversations at all 
will not be essential to them. The new Aristotelian scientific method of 
searching for the truth requires just a simple individual who is dealing 
directly with things. 
Aristotle transfers to his new idea of what philosophy and science 
have to be -mutatis mutandis- the job that Plato assigned to dialectic. Let 
me explain. Plato's and Aristotle's philosophical concerns are similar in the 
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sense that both think that we can grasp reality by rational means. But 
Aristotle thought that we can grasp particular things and that they are the 
starting point of any improvement or clarification, that is, for generalisations 
and discoveries. Aristotle's main objection to the dialectical method -in the 
way that he understands dialectic- is that dialectic is just a preamble -and 
not a necessary one- to science and philosophy. 23 Its benefit consists in in 
the fact that it can provide access to the general common principles, but it is 
not a way for discovering the truth. In other words: for Aristotle dialectical 
method is neutral in relation to the truth. Another thing which it is 
important to notice is that Aristotle emphasises the import of the inductive 
method as the scientific method par excellence. 24 Deduction always comes 
after induction. The way that one gets generalisations which end in 
universal propositions is through particulars. But Aristotle stresses the 
complementarity of inductive and deductive procedures which leads to a 
proper demonstration. 25 Plato thought that you cannot answer questions 
about particulars because they are changeable. That is, if you have only 
particulars to rely on, you have merely an imperfect concept of things: it 
would imply just asserting that knowledge is equivalent with sensation. For 
Plato, particulars themselves do not give you all the elements that you need 
for achieving a complete knowledge: you need a common principle or 
common link which gives unity to this plurality. The ground of the being of 
particulars, in Plato's judgement, is that they are a collection of properties 
and they are graspable, exclusively in comparison with another collection of 
properties. 26 In short, and as Plato tries to show us in the Phaedo and the 
23 See 1. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept oj Dialectic, Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 49-52. 
24 See, Prior Analytics, 68b15-29; Posterior Analytics, 92a37-38, Topics, 105a13-14. See also, T.H. 
Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, Chapter 2, §§1O-15. 
25 See, Topics, I, 108a-108b. 
26 See Repub/ic V, 476e-477b. 
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Phaedrus: particulars have a use, they may point the way access towards the 
forms; they can remind us what forms are. Plato privileges deduction, that 
is, deduction has priority in relation to proceeding inductively. Yet, one has 
to collect before dividing. 
Despite the fact that Aristotle immediately rejects the idea of dialectic 
in a Platonic sense, he cannot avoid being Platonic and dialogic. Plato 
thought that the ideal conditions for doing philosophy were provided by live 
philosophical dialogue, but his idea is refmed enough to include, as a variant 
of this sort of dialogue, the internal and silent dialogue that every 
philosopher achieves with himself (otavota) in the act of thinking, which 
also means conversing with other past philosophers, in the present, as a 
historical but nevertheless interactive dialectic. When any philosopher is 
thinking or conversing on his (her) own, he or she is not thinking or talking 
in isolation. His (her) act of thinking is only a retreat -proper and in 
consonance with the calm that philosophy needs as an act of reflection. 
Philosophical reflection is also a dialectical act: a conversation. 27 The 
rationality of the philosophical act implies per se a process of 
communication of ideas to other individuals. The act of knowledge is not 
confmed to one individual and an object: it always involves the must clear 
and rigorous expression -verbal or written- of a thought to other individuals: 
the truth is essentialy communicable. 28 
In short: dialectic will not be preeminent in Aristotle thought, but the 
new way that he proposes for approaching to things scientifically implies a 
variation of the sense in which Plato understood dialectic, that is, as an 
internal dialogue with oneself which fmally has to be expressed and 
therefore, communicated. Even more: Aristotle is resorting all the time to 
27 Plato's notion of internal dialectic works because there is a background of external dialectic. See 
Charmides 166 c-d, Theaetetus, 189 e-190a; Sophist, 263 e, Philebus 38 c-39d, Timaeus, 37 b-c. 
28 See E. Nicol, Metafisica de fa ex presion, ed cit., VI, §23. 
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dialectic -ill the Platonic sense- because his methodological style of 
exposition of his own hypotheses and theses implies a blstorical dialogue 
and constant reference to other philosophers' theses. Anyway, he cannot 
avoid being Platonicaly dialectical. 
c) Two modern objections: Descartes and Husserl 
If we can say that Aristotle's objection to Plato's idea of dialectic was clear 
and openly formulated with the aim of illuminating his own philosophical 
project, in the case of Descartes and Husserl it is different. In the course of 
developing their own methodologies they appear indirectly to criticise 
Platonic dialectic. Their objections are implicit: both, because of the sort of 
description that they give of the ideal method of doing rigorous thought, 
present different objections to the Platonic method of doing philosophy. 
If we analyse the Cartesian method, it carries the implication that any 
philosopher needs a deliberate and complete isolation as a condition of 
thinking and, in his particular case, also to identify an evident and 
irrefutable starting point as a foundation of all his system. But the strong 
claim that we make that philosophy is unavoidably dialectical continues to 
be valid in this case. Descartes' methodical enquiry is an extreme and 
explicit exemplification of bUXVOtCX or internal dialogue:29 the absorption or 
mental engrossment that philosophy requires ~ a reflexive vocation in the 
search for the truth. Throughout Descartes' exposition of his method, 
which seems like an anti dialectical position or at least unfriendly to Platonic 
notions of dialectic, we will show that his position in fact goes on keeping 
essential elements of the Platonic idea of dialectic. Our larger claim is, of 
course, that no philosopher can avoid being dialogic. 
29 See notes 2 and 27. 
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What does Descartes propose as the ideal method for doing 
philosophy? To answer this question it is worth noticing first the peculiarity 
of the explicit title of his book devoted to this aim: Discourse on the method 
of properly conducting one's reason and of seeking the truth in the 
sciences. The title by itself reveals the project as a whole: firstly a 
disagreement with previous methodologies, secondly a proposal of an 
accurate and correct way of searching for the truth. 
Descartes' epistemological starting point is that all human beings are 
naturally well endowed with common sense or reason. Because of that, all 
of us have the same capacity for discerning the true from the false. In 
Descartes' judgement the main source of error comes from a mistaken 
application of our thoughts. 30 Descartes insists also that it its better to 
progress in small steps than to try to do it in a flash and fmish totally lost. 
Descartes indicates that his method is just a method and not the 
method par excellence. He insists that he just wants to propose a safe path 
which others can follow without causing any harm: 
"So my intention is not to teach here the method which everyone must follow if 
he is to conduct his reason correctly, but only to demonstrate how I have tried to 
conduct my own. Those who take the responsibility of giving precepts must think 
themselves more knowledgeable than those to whom they give them, and, if they make 
the slightest mistake, they are blamewqrthy. But, putting forward this essay as nothing 
more than an historical account, or, if you prefer, a fable in which, among certain 
examples one may follow, one will find also many others which it would be right not to 
copy, I hope it will be useful for some without being harmful to any, and that my 
frankness will be well received by all.,,31 
30 See R. Descartes, Discourse on the method, translated with an introduction by s. F. Sutcliffe, Penguin, 
1968, I, p. 27. 
31 Ibid, I, pp. 28-29. 
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Descartes describes his philosophical itinerary -mutatis mutandis- in a 
Socratic sort of way. He was a curious child with a longing for learning. 
He became a man of letters and he thought that by this means he could get a 
complete knowledge of any practical subject. But as soon as he completed 
his studies he realised that he was wrong; many doubts and errors assailed 
him and: 
" ... the only profit I appeared to have drawn from trying to become educated, was 
progressively to have discovered my ignorance.,,32 
Descartes thinks that philosophy has been cultivated by the best 
minds throughout its history. However, there is no philosophical thesis at 
all which cannot be called into question. That is, any philosophical thesis 
contains a degree of uncertainty. Descartes realised that because there are 
possibilities of there being different learned opinions about the same object, 
one no more true than another, from now on, he was going to consider as 
equivalent to false everything which before was merely probable. 33 
Descartes' main objection to probable truth resides in the fact that he 
considers that other sciences "borrowed" their principles from philosophy, 
and nothing fInn can be built on this uncertain and changeable foundation. 
He thinks that philosophy needs a real, permanent start which can constitute 
the general and fIrm principle for the whole of science. 
Descartes also rejects what he calls "false sciences", in which he 
includes alchemy, astrology and magic, because they involve false promises, 
superstitious predictions and impostures. He cannot be misled by them just 
because they are practised by people 
32 Ibid, I, p. 29. 
33 Cj ibid, I, p. 32. 
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" ... who profess to know more than they do.,,34 
Finally, Descartes became disappointed with the study of letters and 
abandoned them. He decided to get real knowledge from "the great book of 
life": he was travelling and was mixing with many different ranks of people. 
His conclusions after this mundane experience are as follows: 
" ... For it seemed to me that I might find much more truth in the reasonings which each 
one makes in matters that affect him closely, the result of which must be detrimental to 
him ifhis judgement is faulty, than from the speculations of a man of letters in his study 
which produce no concrete effect and which are of no other consequence to him except 
perhaps that the further away they are from common sense, the more vanity he will 
derive from them, because he will have had to use that much more skill and subtlety in 
order to try to make them seem dialectically probable. And I had always had an 
extreme desire to learn to distinguish true from false in order to see clearly into my own 
actions and to walk with safety in this life. ,,35 
There are some points to make here: 1. Descartes makes a clear 
epistemological distinction between theoretical reasoning, speculation 
proper for the man of letters, and pragmatic reasoning, proper for the man 
of experience. 2. Theoretical reasoning just stays in an abstract world and 
therefore remains very far away from common sense. Even more: 
theoretical reasoning involves a personal dialectical technique which 
pursues useless ends rather than an objective search for the truth, because, 
as Descartes declares previously, probable truths are extremely fallible, and 
therefore, ineffective as a starting-point. Descartes uses the term dialectic in 
a very pejorative sense, that is, as an inefficient method which enables one 
to reach merely probable conclusions by using persuasion and techniques 
34 ibid, I, p. 33. 
35 Ibid, t, p. 33 .. 
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based on verbal skills.36 3. Pragmatic reasoning gives us a sense of the 
epistemological discernment required for distinguishing the true from the 
false, and with its base in this, an ethical criterion for seeing clearly in one's 
actions and for having a safe path in life. With Descartes it is clear that 
theoretical thought does not have any sense in itself. Theoretical thought is 
redeemable in so far as it could provide good pragmatic consequences. The 
new and real epistemological path implies that knowledge is useful because 
it gives us a concrete, powerful and new ethical criterion37 for secure action. 
Descartes' next methodological step is not to believe in those things 
which one has been persuaded to accept merely by means of example and 
custom. He thinks that if you become gradually liberated from this sort of 
learning you will also be free from many of the mistakes which obscure "the 
natural light" of human understanding and cause an inability to reason. 
From this point, Descartes takes a crucial methodological decision which 
will give a very particular mark to his procedure: to concentrate and study 
just by himself, using all the powers of his mind to select the steps which he 
should follow. 
Descartes continues his methodological itinerary by talking about the 
fact that the ideal way to work rigorously is alone. He privileges the solitary 
work which permits him to avoid any sort of distraction. Also, he 
reinforces his position in a metaphorical way by saying that any work that is 
made just by one person is "more beautiful" and "better ordered" because it 
does requires fewer corrections: 
36 Despite the fact that Descartes seems to be here again extremely anti platonic, he continues to resort to 
an internal and historical dialogue. Nevertheless, his new project of a "pragmatic philosophy" is clearly 
very far away from the strict Socratic-Platonic idea of what philosophy must be. 
37 We are referring to a "new ethical criterion" in the sense that, for Descartes, the unselfish search for the 
truth will not be the metaphysical and ethical principle or parameter for a proper philosophical or scientific 
task. More radically put: with this proposal Descartes broke with the ethical criterion of truth which had 
distinguished philosophy as an disinterested task for seeking the truth and for promoting a better human 
life. Descartes' new criterion of truth is based on pragmatic aims. Philosophy and particular sciences main 
task will be adjusted to a new parameter: to get useful consequences. 
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" ... I spent the whole day shut up in a room heated by an enclosed stove, where I had 
complete leisure to meditate on my own thoughts. Among these one of the first I 
examined was that often there is less perfection in works composed of several separate 
pieces and made by different masters, than in those at which only one person has 
worked. ,,38 
Again, this position looks unfriendly to Platonic notions of dialectic. 
To a certain extent that is true in the sense that Descartes is rejecting live 
methodological conversations as an ideal way of doing philosophy. But 
Descartes cannot avoid being dialectical, in a Platonic sense because he is 
portraying in great detail the intrinsic adventures and internal and historical 
dialogues that all processes of thinking involve. As we have shown, he has 
to refer to previous historical philosophical positions in order to defend his 
theses and to give reasons for rejecting others. Equally, even if it is just a 
fictional internal "dialogue", he has to converse with himself and to keep 
before him possible qu~stions, answers and objections which any other 
interlocutors might put to him in his methodological exposition. 
Descartes' main methodological aim is to fmd certainty m his 
foundations. He rejects paths that are more an outcome of chance, custom, 
consensus than a result of reason and certain knowledge. His criterion of 
truth will be based on four rules: 1. Something will be true only if it is 
evident, clear and distinct; 2. he will divide and analyse difficulties into 
many parts with the aim of solving them as well as possible; 3. he will 
introduce a hierarchical system in his thoughts, starting with the simplest 
objects and those easiest to understand. He will ascend gradually to the 
38 Ibid, II, p. 35. 
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most complex objects, 4. he will give complete enumerations and make 
general reviews in order to certify he has not omitted anything. 39 
Descartes applied his rules to the study of algebra and exercised 
himself in the practice of them. Eventually, because he was too 
concentrated on the search for the truth, he realised that he had to practise 
exactly the opposite, that is, a sort of healthy scepticism which allowed him 
to arrive at an absolutely indubitable starting-point: to refuse to accept as 
true anything which he supposes involves reason for doubt. If one 
continues with this process one will get a fmal indubitable result: 
" ... And finally, considering that all the same thoughts that we have when we are awake 
can also come to us when we are asleep, without anyone of them then being true, I 
resolved to pretend that nothing which had ever entered my mind was any more true 
than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I became aware that, 
while I decided thus to think that everything was false, it followed necessarily that I 
who thought thus must be something; and observing that this truth: J think, therefore J 
am, was so certain and so evident that all the most extravagant suppositions of the 
sceptics were not capable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple as 
the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.,,4o 
Descartes proposes methodical doubt as the ideal philosophical 
method. The ego who doubts is the existent ego cogitans. This ego 
cogitans constitutes the indubitable philosophical principle. If the ego 
cogitans is the Cartesian starting-point, who is going to be the guarantor 
that my thoughts on it are true and that you are you and not just a shadow? 
Because Descartes' starting-point is the ego cogitans he has to conclude by 
deduction that God will be the guarantor that my thoughts are not mere 
illusions and that you are you. Descartes' position is one of the most 
39 See, ibid, II, p. 4l. 
40 Ibid, IV, pp. 53-54. 
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extreme cases in which a philosopher tries to test how the internal and 
dialogic act of thinking can give us a starting point that can be presumed or 
taken to be irrefutable. The fact that he arrives at the conclusion that the 
ego cogitans itself is that incontrovertible beginning will give him some 
ulterior ontological and epistemological complications to explain why I can 
be certain that reality is really reality and why I can be sure that you are you. 
Descartes tries to solve these theoretical questions by resorting again to the 
method of internal philosophical dialogues with himself. In the case of 
Plato, the existence of reality and tpe existence of myself and the rest of 
humanity are just primary evidences from which his philosophical work 
starts. Ordinary dialogues with other individuals are for Plato just a result 
of the human condition: we are capable of communication. Philosophical 
dialogues are for Plato the conditio sine qua non for proper philosophical 
work. Plato considers dialogue essential for philosophical activity because 
interlocutors constitute the fundamental and evident epistemological element 
in the search for the truth. Interlocutors always present and represent the 
necessary challenge that any proposed thesis needs in order to be tested. 
The act of testing implies the possibility of corrections, emendations and 
even rejection of the thesis. Plato is convinced that two pairs of eyes "see" 
more than only one pair of eyes. Ontologically speaking, Plato takes 
external reality as a fact from which we begin any possible dialogic 
consideration, that is, reality and what it includes are the objects of our 
philosophical searches. Descartes cannot share these positions; but he still 
has shared the essential elements of Platonic dialectic. 
The case of Husserl is rather similar to that of Descartes'. In fact he 
recogruses his direct debt to Descartes' method. Husserl' s 
phenomenological method is again applied with the idea of getting an 
evident or irrefutable starting-point for his complete system. Husserl was 
working on two main basic principles: 1. Return to things themselves, and 
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2. philosophy must be a rigorous science. The point is that Husserl, in his 
search for a clear starting-point, resorts to his famous epoche or "putting in 
brackets". His aim is to grasp the essence of things, leaving out their 
accidental characteristics. In this process he concludes that the 
transcendental ego is indispensable for the authentic grasping of reality. 
Again, it seems that for him, dialectic as a live dialogue is methodologically 
inessential for doing philosophy. However, we will show how Husserl 
continues to be trapped under one of the senses of the Platonic idea of 
dialectic as the unavoidable way to philosophise: dialectic as an internal 
dialogue with yourself and with other past and present philosophers. We 
will work under the assumption that his methodological itinerary -very 
similar to Descartes' - and his conclusions, are an outcome of the 
phenomelogical theory that he has in mind. Husserl' s starting point comes 
from a deliberate epistemological abstraction because, from now on primary 
eveidences will not be the case anymore. He thought that this 
methodological resort could provide him grasping the "real core" of any 
object. His theoretical proposition may be true or false; the undeniable fact 
is that the process and the conclusion were made in a dialectical process 
based on BUlvoux 41 and historical conversations, that is, an internal dialogue 
with himself and other philosophers' ideas. 
Husserl starts his Cartesian Meditations by acknowledging that 
Descartes' Meditations are a prototype of philosophical reflection because 
they gave a new impulse to transcendental phenomenology. Despite that 
fact, Husserl rejects the content of the Cartesian philosophy. He will 
explain the motives of his formal Cartesian affiliation, in terms of method, 
an9 the motives of his material rejection of some aspects of the content and 
conclusions of the Cartesian Meditations. 
41 See notes 2 and 27. 
27 
Husserl accepts the Cartesian ego cogitans as an indubitable starting-
point. He accepts also Descartes' aim of looking for a comprehensive 
philosophical science which gives the real foundations to scientific 
knowledge. 42 That is, there is a necessity of a radical new beginning for 
philosophy: 
" ... Descartes, in fact, inaugurates an entirely new kind of philosophy. Changing its 
total style, philosophy takes a radical turn: from naIve Objectivism to transcendental 
subjectivism -which, with its ever new but always inadequate attempts, seems to be 
striving toward some necessary final fonn, wherein its true sense and that of the radical 
transmutation itself might become disclosed. Should not this continuing tendency 
imply eternal significance and, for us, a task imposed by history itself, a great task in 
which we are summoned to collaborate?,,43 
Husserl thinks that western philosophy had a unitary history in its 
methods and problems, that there was a sort of clear split in the nineteenth 
century when religion was recognized just as a human and outward 
convention and when modem men of intellect perceived the necessity for an 
autonomous philosophy and science guided exclusively by scientific 
insights. Husserl remarks also the crisis of philosophy in his time that is 
expressed in the proliferation of "philosophical literature" lacking in rigour 
and unity. In Husserl's judgement this "unhappy present" is rather similar 
to the situation that Descartes came across in his time. He suggests putting 
an end to this vast and spurious philosophical literature and starting with a 
new set of meditationes de prima philosophia. 44 
42 See E. HusserI, Cartesian Meditations. An introduction to phenomenology, translated by D. Carins, 
Kluwer, 11th impression, Dordrecht, 1997, Introduction, §1, pp. 1-3. . 
43 Ibid., Introduction, §2, p. 4. 
44 See ibid., Introduction, §2, p. 5. 
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Husserl thinks that in recent times there is a sort of persistent desire 
and encouraging renaissance for a "fully alive philosophy". He adds that 
the real and fruitful renaissance will be that which revives the spirit of the 
Cartesian Meditations: not in adopting its content but in renewing its strong 
and radical spirit of self-reliance to validate this radicalness, that is, the 
essential and inevitable regress to the ego. Only with this regress can 
philosophy overcome the naIvete and aberration of earlier ways of 
philosophising -including Descartes' .45 This purifiying operation is the first 
step which leads to transcendental phenomenology. 
The guiding idea of Husserl's first meditation is based on Descartes: 
the establishment of a completely genuine, fundamental and all-embracing 
science, ridding ourselves of the different convictions that we have had, 
including all given sciences, and, Husser! adds, even of our idea of science 
itself, even of its possibility. We do not have to presuppose anything. In 
fact Husserl criticises Descartes' assumption that the ideal model of science 
has to be based on the deductive and axiomatic scheme of mathematics and 
geometry. Descartes just postulates his axiom of the total certainty of his 
ego and the axiomatic principles inherent in the ego. Instead of that Husserl 
proposes the following: 
"None of that shall detennine our thinking. As beginning philosophers we do 
not as yet accept any nonnative ideal of science and only so far as we produce one 
newly for ourselves can we ever have such an ideal. ,,46 
Following in Descartes' steps, Husserl proposes a process of 
clearness or cognition which allows us to arrive at primary irrefutable 
evidence about what science is, that is, and in Hussed' s terms, becoming 
45 See ibid, Introduction, §2, p. 6. 
46 Ibid, I, §3, p8. 
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. d . a . h ,,47 unmerse m SCIenCe qua noematic p enomenon . With this new 
methodological principle the scientist grounds his judgements and nothing 
will be a matter of "scientific knowledge" until he can corroborate that it 
adjusts to absolute primary and certain evidences. 
HusserI considers that there are grades of evidence. You arrive at 
apodictic evidence when after its submission to critical reflection this 
evidence remams absolutely certain and its not being is absolutely 
. . bl 48 mconcelva e. 
HusserI's next methodological step -agam following Descartes' 
model- consists in stating that the evidence of the factual existence of the 
worId is not apodictic. He considers that the being of the world as a 
universal basis, experience or obvious matter of fact has been a "naIve 
acceptance". F or him it will be henceforth merely an "acceptance-
phenomenon". 49 HusserI mounts the following hypothesis: it could be a 
being that is prior to the world which constitutes the real presupposed basis 
for the existence of the world. 
Taking the Cartesian ego cogitans HusserI makes ~he says- the big 
change of direction in the right manner which leads to transcendental 
SUbjectivity: the ego cogitans will be the ultimate, apodictic and certain 
starting point for judgements and the basis of any fundamental philosophy: 
"Let us consider. As radically meditating philosophers, we now have neither a 
science that we accept nor a world that exists for us. Instead of simply existing for us -
that is, being accepted naturally by us in our experiential believing jn its existence- the 
world is for us only something that claims being. Moreover, that affects the 
intramundane existence of all other Egos, so rightly we should no longer speak 
communicatively, in the plural. Other men than I, and brute aJ}imals, are data of 
47 See ibid, I, §4. 
48 See ibid, I, §6, pp. 15-16. 
49 See ibid, I, §7, p. 18. 
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experience for me only by virtue of my sensuous experience of their bodily organisms; 
and, since the validity of this experience too is called in question, I must not use it. 
Along with other Egos, naturally, I lose all the formations pertaining to sociality and 
culture. In short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-
world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that 
. 50 
IS. 
This transcendental ego considers life as it is for me: the ego who 
philosophises and practises this phenomenological abstention can grasp the 
most "original originality", getting rid of intuitions. Phenomenological 
abstention means that everything is retained in the consciousness, but 
merely as a phenomenon. 
Husserl insists that this "phenomenological epoche" and 
"parenthesising" of the objective world does not leads to a vacuous state. 
On the contrary, Husserl thinks that this process permits us to situate 
everything as it really is from the perspective of the I, that is, phenomena as 
phenomena. Equally the epoche is the proper fundamental and universal 
method for apprehending myself purely: that is, as an Ego who possesses 
his own conscious life which has meaning in the way, and by the way, that 
objective world is presented for me and as it is for me. Following 
Descartes' assertions, Husserl states that the world is the one that exists for 
a conscious mind as a result of his cogitationes. There is a prior being itself 
or a transcendental being of the pure ego and his cogitationes which 
antecedes the natural being of the world: 
" ... The fundamental phenomenological method of transcendental epoche, because it 
leads back to this realm, is called transcendental-phenomenological reduction.,,51 
50 See ibid, I, §8, pp. 18-19. 
51 Ibidem, I, §8, p. 21. 
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H usserl thinks that the next step is whether this reduction really 
makes possible this irrefutable or apodictic evidence of the being of 
transcendental subjectivity and to what extent it is possible that the 
transcendental ego be deceived about himself. In order to answer these 
questions, Husserl addresses some criticism to Descartes. He thinks that 
Descartes' failure was due to his lack of attachment to the radicalism of the 
principle of pure "intuition" or evidence: not accepting anything beyond the 
field of the ego cogitans in epochi. That is the reason that Descartes could 
not grasp the authentic transcendental subjectivity which leads to the 
genuine transcendental philosophy:52 
By phenomenological epoche I reduce my natural human Ego and my psychic 
life -the realm of my psychological self-experience- to my transcendental-
phenomenological Ego, the realm of transcendental-phenomenological self-experience. 
The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and always will exist 
for me, the only world that ever can exist for me- this world, with all its Objects, I said, 
derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, 
from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only with 
transcendental-phenomenological epoche. ,,53 
The concept of transcendental Ego and its correlate, the concept of 
the transcendent, derives exclusively from this state of meditative 
philosophy. My transcendental Ego is independent of the world, and the 
world -including any worldly Object- is not part of my Ego. Nevertheless, 
anything worldly acquires sense just from my own evidence, that is, my 
grounding acts. Therefore all the philosophical problems which emerge 
from this correlation are called transcendental-philosophy. 
52 See ibidem, I, §10, pp. 24-25. 
53 Ibidem, I, §11, p. 26. 
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Recapitulating: Husserl' s idea about what a new real and scientific 
philosophy must be implies an authentic process of exploration and internal 
and historical dialogue, above all with Descartes and some of his 
contemporaries. In that sense he continues to keep the Platonic model of 
dialectic, in one of its possible variants. Husserl's dialogue is with 
Descartes and some of his contemporaries. In that sense he goes on keeping 
a kind of Platonic dialogue, but carried on sequentially. Nevertheless, 
again, as I pointed out in Descartes' case, it is a fact that any philosophy, 
like Husserl's which proposes the ego as starting-point can only with 
difficulty and avoid a solipsism. In that sense Husserl's philosophy is 
deeply antisocratic and antiplatonic. Equally the ontological and 
epistemological split that Husserl proposes between the world as 
phenomenon and the word as noumenon, giving more credibility and 
scientific status to the latter, puts him in a position which denigrates what is 
normally taken as primary evidence as a safe beginning. Moreover: it is one 
thing to try to fmd an irrefutable beginning for your thoughts, but it is 
another to deny primary evidence which constituted by matters of fact and 
basic principles of knowledge and existence. Let me explain: if you deny 
that reality is reality, that it is a fact that there is reality, that we share a 
common space-temporal reality which can be understood rationally by 
human beings it seems that for you any phenomenon has a lesser important 
ontological status -even if it is just a provisional or methodological move. 
In that sense you are giving a particular colouring to your appreciation of 
what reality is. It becomes more important how individuals construct reality 
than how reality is. 
In short: we have been trying to expose the similarities and 
dissimilarities of Descartes' and Husserl' s methods with the aim of 
emphasising the differences in relation to the Platonic methodological 
starting point dialogue which implies the primary evidence of the existence 
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of interlocutors and the world. That does not mean that Plato's position 
shows a naIve attitude in relation to philosophical knowledge. It simply 
means that his ontological, epistemological and methodological starting 
points are clearly different. However, we insist, Plato was refmed enough 
in his idea about what dialectic has to be to include as a variant of this ideal 
live dialogue, the reflective process of philosophical "retreat": the art of 
thinking with yourself and the extension of this dialogue to any other 
philosopher, past and present. 
Descartes and Husserl retain the essential characteristics and 
advantages of Platonic dialectic. Their internal dialogues contain a fictional 
interlocutor which provides us with the fundamental elenctic process to 
which any thesis given has to be submitted. That is, in this internal dialogue 
you will provide an imaginary person who takes part in a philosophical 
conversation and who can put to you different questions, answers, propose 
agreements, make objections which any real interlocutor could make to you 
with the aim of testing your proposed thesis. Also, Descartes and Husserl 
continue to keep up a historical conversation with their predecessors and 
with contemporary philosophers -even if the outcome is the rejection of 
their ideas. 
After this long introduction we are now in a position to start tackling 
two basic points about the idea of dialectic: its etymology and origins and its 
literary antecedents. These are the contents of the following part. 
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PART I. ON THE IDEA OF DIALECTIC 
We will put forward our main thesis by resorting to three sources of 
foundation: 
a) A philological and historical-literary foundation in Greek epic, 
lyric, and tragedy to show the literary antecedents of dialectic and other 
related activities (part I); 
b) A historical-philosophical foundation in the history of philosophy 
to show the philosophical roots and development of philosophical dialectic 
itself (part II); 
c) A theoretical-practical philosophical foundation. This 
philosophical approach will be metaphysical, that is, ontological and 
epistemological, and ethical. The aim is to trace the unity of the Socratic-
Platonic dialectic which can be illustrated in Socrates' elenchos and aporia 
in the early dialogues, the Phaedrus and a sequence of other passages which 
specifically deal, with dialectic particularly in Plato's Sophist (part III). 
The first Part will describe the idea of dialectic in terms of its 
etymological and literary origins. 
First of all we will try to explore the different meanings and the 
evolution of the idea of dialectic as a term in itself and as a concept (§2). 
Secondly, in §3 we will develop some ideas about the literary antecedents of 
dialectic. 
§2. ETYMOLOGY AND ORIGINS OF THE WORD DIALECTIC 
The aim of this general philological exposition is based on the conviction 
that the process of evolution and gestation of any concept involves a history 
which is potentially capable of giving us some clues about its ordinary uses 
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-normal- and also provides some understanding .of. its prephilosophical -
historical and literary- and philosophical uses. We are aware that words and 
ideas only exceptionally have a linear evolution. In short, language typically 
involves randomness and disorder and one cannot resort just to etymologies 
as the only and fmal foundation of an idea. Despite this fact we think that 
in this particular case, etymologies can provide us with some light. 
The second point that we would like to make is that Plato is not 
wholly inventing the concept of C>tUA£YEcr9at because he was using a term 
which already had a variety of uses and applications. We can say that Plato, 
taking advantage of this word invents, perhaps, the term OtUAEK'ttK1l 
('t£XV'T)) (just as he invents the term 1tOAt'ttK1l) and creates with it a new 
philosophical use and a whole systematic conception of philosophy as 
dialectic. In that act of creation consists his originality. 
It is highly probable that the term dialectic, i.e., it OtUAEK'ttK1l 
('t£xvll) would have been invented by Plato on the same model as e.g. 
Pll'toPtK1l. The history of dialectic as a philosophical concept starts with 
Plato. The important point is to try to track down the linguistic and 
conceptual genesis of the notion of OtUA£YEcr9ut. 1 
In Plato the verb OtUA£YEcr9ut and the noun OtUAEK'tO<; mean 
communication, or a certain kind of talking. The word OtUA£YEcr9ut and its 
cognates OtUAOY0<; and OtUAEK'ttK6<; are recurrent throughout his works. 
But as we shall see, we can fmd some antecedents of the Platonic use of this 
group of words in Homer, Herodotus, Archilochus, Sappho, Alcaeus, 
Xenophon and Thucydides 
Grammarians like Meillet-Vendryes, Schwyzer-Debrunner, and Frisk 
conclude that if we analyse the etymological structure of the verb 
1 Concerning to the topic of the etymology and origins of the word dialectic it is worth consulting L. 
Sichirollo, Ala).fycoliaz-Diaiektik. Von Homer his Aristoteles, Georg Olms Verlagbuchhandlung, 
Hidelsheim, 1966, II, pp. 18-33, and his La dialettica, Instituto Editoriale Intemazionale, Milano, 1973, I, 
pp. 13-24. Some of my examples come from Sichirollo. 
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Ot<XAEYEt v/OtaAEYEcr9at it contains the following: 1. the root OW:, 
equivalent to the latin dis which expresses the idea of division into two, of 
distribution and differentiation, but at the same time of complementarity. 
The Attic use of ota expresses the idea of emulation and completion and 
above all, the convergence of two subjects in an action with reciprocal 
influence; so Ota/KEAEU0J.l<xt expresses the idea of mutual encouragement or 
reciprocal exhortation, ot<x/~oaoJ.lat means to shout to somebody in a 
competition. 2 2. The root AEy- originally implies the sense of calculating 
and dividing a quantity. It is only later that the verb acquires its well-known 
meaning of talking. 
The noun AOY<><; comes to express the idea of a thing said or a spoken 
item. A second meaning of AOyOc., gives the idea of a thought that is 
expressed in language. Equally, AOyOc., has the meaning of number, 
calculation, proportion and analogy, and perhaps by a sort of derivation 
from this meaning AOyOc., comes to give the sense of reason. The idea of 
AOyOc., as word or as reason or as both is the most well known throughout 
Greek philosophy.3 It is interesting also that Homer uses the word AOyOc., in 
the plural to express the idea of artful or scheming uses of words when 
Odysseus is talking to Calypso; and the idea of "persuasive words" when 
Patroc1us distracts the injured Eurypylus from his pain.4 
2 See Meillet-Vendryes, Traite de grammare comparee, Paris, 1948, §§455, 521 ff, 782 ff, and 822. 
Schwyzer-Debrunner, Griechische Grammatik, Volume II, Miinchen, 1950, pp. 448-449. Frisk, 
Griechisches Etymologisches WOterbhuch, Volume I, p. 383, 1973. P. Chantraine, La formation des 
nomsengrecancien, Champion, Paris, 1933, pp. 18,20. 
3 We are not trying to claim a fixed sense of the word A6'Yo~ at all. We are aware that this idea is 
untenable. On this topic, see C. Ramnoux, Heraclite au l'homme entre les choses et les mots, Les Belles 
Lertres, lOme edition, Paris, 1968. 
4 Sichirollo (1973), p. 16: " ... Omero, nei due soli luoghi in cui logos ricorre, al plurale, e estremamente 
significativo. Odissea, I 59: Calipso cerca di far dimenticare Itaca a Odisseo con diseorsi artifieiali; 
Iliade, XV 393: con parole abili Patroclo distrae da1 dolore Euripilo ferito. Sono dunque presenti gli 
espedienti oratori della sofistica e gli ulteriori sviluppi razionali. All'alba della sua storia logos evoca un 
caleolo, una stima, conte e profitto . .. 
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The fact that the word AO"(Oc" involves the idea of argumentative or 
rational talk and the idea of a word which somehow corresponds with the 
thing named will be crucial for Plato's dialectical thesis. 5 
Focussing again on the word OtaAE,,(EtV/OuxAE,,(Ea9at: OtaAE,,(Elv 
keeps the original meaning of the verb OtaAE,,(Ea9at, that is, to choose or to 
select from a group, to collect from a previous process of picking out. 
Herodotus uses the word in this sense: 
"Xerxes, having entrusted Artemisia with the duty of conducting his sons to 
Ephesus, sent for Mardonius and told him to pick the troops he wanted, ... ,,6 
Xenophon uses the verb OtaAE"(Ea9at to characterise Socrates' 
approach, that is, the method of deliberation and ending in possible common 
agreement through a process of discernment (OtaAE,,(oV'tac,,): 7 
" ... The very word 'discussion' (OtCXA£YE0"9at), according to him, owes its name to the 
practice of meeting together for a common deliberation, sorting (OtCXAEyoVtCX;) things 
according to their kinds ... ,,8 
Xenophon gIves us, III a passage to be cited below, what may be an 
interesting historical clue. It is a fact that the term OtaAE"(Ea9at implies the 
idea of discussion, but a particular kind of discussion: it is not a polemical 
discussion, but a face to face encounter which has the aim of deliberating 
5 It is also worth noticing that the idea of /...6yoe; with the meaning of to discuss, to consult on a point or to 
realise something appears in Herodotus repeatedly in expressions as Myov E())U'tql OlOoVat and some 
others; see I, 34; I, 97; III, 45; III, 76, VTII, 9. See Plato, Sophist, 261c-263b. 
6 Herodotus, VIII, 107, (translated by A. de Selincourt, Penguin, 1996): :::£p~lle; OE Ox; 'toue; 1tat:oae; 
'Ap'tq.ltcri:n £1tE'tPE'I'E U1t(lYElv £e; "E<pEoov, KaA.toae; Map06vtov £K£A.EUOE Illv 'tile; o'tpanile; 
olaA.tYEl v 'toue; 130UA.E'tat, ... ; see also CXIII, 3. 
7 Sichirollo -see Sichirollo (1973), p. 18- indicates that the figurative use of the verb olaA.tYE08at involves 
the idea of "expressing to somebody", of "discussing and expecting and explanation" with the aim of 
getting a reciprocal understanding from a common starting point. 
8 Xenophon, Memorabilia, IV, 5, 12, (translation by E. C. Marchant and 0.1. Todd, with modifications). 
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carefully about any given subject and clarifying it as much as possible. It is 
clear that Plato developed a very original sense of the term bUXAE,,(E<JS<Xt 
and built on a dialogic idea of philosophy in form and content; here 
(whatever may be the relationship between Xenophon's Memorabilia and 
Plato's dialogues) Xenophon glimpses two of the key meanings of 
bt<XAE'YE<JS<Xt, that is, as partnership or reciprocal discussion and as sorting 
out according to kinds which will be central to Platonic description of 
dialectic. Xenophon's full testimony is as follows: 
"And thus, Socrates said, men become supremely good and happy and skilled in 
discussion (ot<xA£y£o8m). The very word 'discussion' (ot<xA£y£o8m), according to 
him, owes its name to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation, sorting 
(OtUA£YOVta.C;) things according to their kinds: and therefore one should be ready and 
prepared for this and be zealous for it; for it makes for excellence, leadership and skill 
in discussion. 
I will try also to show how he encouraged his companions to become skilled in 
discussion. Socrates held that those who know what any given thing is can also 
expound it to others; on the other hand, those who do not know are misled themselves 
and mislead others. For this reason he never gave up considering with his companions 
what any given thing is.,,9 
We can exemplify the use of bt<XAE,,(E<Jeat in some passages from 
various genres of literature. 
First Homer, in the Iliad, says: 10 
9 Ibid, IV, 5, 12-VI, 1, (translation by E. C. Marchant and O. J. Todd, with modifications): Kat O')'tffi~ 
E<PTl ap1.(J'to~ 't€ Kat €uoatjlOV€o'tU'tou~ avopa~ y1.YVEcrtlat Kat otaAiy€o8at ouva'tffi'tu'toU~. E<PTj OE 
Kat 'to OtaAiYEo8at ovojlao8flvat EK 'tOU ouvtOv'ta~ KOtvfj ~oUAd)€o8at OtaAi'Yov'ta~ Ka'ta y£VT] 'ta 
npuYjla'ta·O€tv ouv 1t€tpU08at on jlUAto'ta npo~ 'to\ho tau'tov £'tOtjlov napaoK€uul;€tv Kat 'tou'tou 
jl<XAto'ta EntjlEAElo8at· EK 'tou'tou yap y1.YVEo8at avopa~ ap1.o'to~ 'tE Kat i]YEjlOVtKffi'tU'tOU~ Kat 
OtaAEKnKffi'tU'to~. 
'Q~ OE Kat OtaA.€KnK(O'tEpoU~ En01.€t 'tou~ ouvov'ta~, n€tpuoojlat Kat 'tOU'to Aiy€t V. 
1:mKpU'tTj~ 'Yap 'tou~ jlEV €i06'ta~, 't1. £Kao'tov EtTl 'twv OV'tffiV, EVOjltl;€ Kat 'tOt~ anOt~ av E~Tj'Ydoeat 
ouvao8at· 'tou~ OE jl1l d06'ta~ O'OO£V E<PTl 8aujlao'tov ElVat a'O'tou~ 'tE o<puAA.€o8at Kat anou~ 
O<pUAA.€lV· rov EVEKa OKOnrov OUV 'tOl~ ouvouGt, 't1. EKao'tov dTl 'twv OV'tffiV, O'OO£1to't' EAT\'YE. 
\0 We emphasise the Homeric use of internal dialogue just to show that there is a literary antecedent for the 
same idea in Plato. 
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"Now Odysseus, the famous spearman, was left himself, and none of the Argives 
stood by him, as fear had taken hold of them all, In dismay he spoke to his own great 
heart: 'What will become of me now? A great dishonour if I turn and run in fear of 
their numbers: but worse if I am caught isolated -the son of Kronos has put the rest of 
the Danaans to flight. But what need for this debate in my heart?('tll1 ... oll::A.E~a'to 
e'\)Jl6~;) I know that it is cowards who keep clear of fighting while the brave man in 
battle has every duty to stand his ground in strength, and kill or be killed. '" 11 
The context of the use of OtaAf.YEcr9at here provides clear connections with 
the philosophical use: the character, in a soliloquy -which implies an 
internal dialogue with himself- is in a personal dilemma of consciousness 
when he has to take a decision which always implies the combination of 
necessity and freedom. In the other example in Homer, the context 
illustrates also these moments of tension, preceding the taking of a difficult 
decision: the importance of the act of self-reflexion of the character, his 
internal dialogue, the consideration of the alternative; the pros and cons: 
" ... When Agenor saw the approach of Achilleus, sacker of cities, he stood his 
ground, but his heart was in a turmoil as he waited there. In dismay he spoke to his own 
great herat 'What am I to do? If I run from mighty Achilleus along the way where the 
others are crowding in terror, he will catch me even so, and butcher a coward. But if I 
leave them to be drive on by Achilleus son of Peleus, and run by another way away 
from the walls to the Ilian plain, until I reach the spurs of Ida and can hide in the 
bushes: then in the evening I could return to Ilios after washing in the river and drying 
off the sweat -but what need for this debate in my heart ('tll1 ... OtEA.t~a'to e'\)Jl6~)? He 
may see me as I make my way to the plain away from the city, and chase after me and 
11 Homer, XI, 401-410 (translated by M. Hammond, Penguin, 1987): 'Oiro9ll 0' 'OOUO"£lx; 00upucAU't6e;, 
0\>0£ 'tte; ai>'tq, 'Apy£1.coV nap£jl£tv£V, EnEl <p6130e; EU~£ nuv'tac;' 6~ei]O"ae; 0' &.pa et1t£ npOC; ov 
jleyaAi]'topa eUjl6v' '00 jlOt EYro, 'tt nu9co ; jl£ya jlEV lCalCov at lC£ <pi;l3cojlat nA9uv 'tap~i]O"ac;' 'to oE 
ptytOv allC£v uAroco jlOUVoc;' 'tolx; 0' uUoue; ilavaoue; E<p6I3llO"£ Kpovicov. aUa 'till jlOt 'taiha <pD .. oc; 
Ot£A£sa'to 9ujl6C; ; oioa yap o't'tt lCalCoi jlEv an01.xov'tat nOAEjlotO, oe; o£ lC' apta't£unO"t jlUxn EVt, 'tOV 
OE jlaAa xP£cO EO"'tajl£Vat lCpa't£p&e;, fj 't' EI3All't' fj 't' E~aA' &.Uov'. . 
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catch me with the speed of his legs. And then there will be no escaping death -he is too 
strong, stronger than any man. But suppose 1 go to face him in front of the city ... ",12 
In accordance with the origins of AOYOC; and AEYEt v the Homeric use 
of OUXAEYO}l<X.t implies the notion of reflexion, of logical discernment, of 
thinking and "calculating" possibilities. It is a ftrst seed that makes explicit 
the rational process that any mature deliberation and decision involve: the 
dialectic or internal dialogue of choosing, of confronting situations. 
In Greek lyric the word Ot<X.AEYEa8at is used rarely. The following 
cases are illustrative but they do not give us any particular clue for our case. 
We have three examples. The ftrst one is in Archilochus: 
"Charilails son of Erasmon, I'll tell thee a droll thing, thou much the dearest of 
my comrades, and the hearing of it shall delight the ... 
to love him though hateful and not talk: with ... ,,13 
The second one is in Sappho: 
"1 talked with you in a dream, Cyprogeneia.,,14 
The third one is in A1caeus; I cite it with some of its context, which 
simply suggests the sense of friendly conversation 
"Come, with gracious spirit hear our prayer, and rescue us from these hardships 
and from grievous exile; and let their Avenger pursue the son ofHyrrhas, since once we 
12 Ibid, XXI, 550-570. See also XXII, 122 and 385. 
13 <ptA.££tV O'tU'YV0V 7t£p EOv'ta ~1l0E Ot<lAE'Y£O"9at. Fragment 107-108 (Diehl) in Greek Elegy and 
Iambus, Volume II, (translated by 1. M. Edmonds, HainemannlHarvard, London/Cambridge, 1979). 
14 134e (L-P) in Greek Lyric. Sappho mld Alcaeus Volume I (translated by D. Campbell, Harvard, 
London/Cambridge, 1994): ~a <'t'> tA£~a~av ovap, KU7tpo'YEVlla. 
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swore, cutting ... , never (to abandon?) any or our comrades, but either to die at the 
hands of men who at that time came against us and to lie clothed in earth, or else to kill 
them and rescue the people from their woes. But Pot-belly did not talk to their hearts; 
he recklessly trampled the oaths underfoot and devours our Cityl5 ... not lawfully ... 
. (?) M '1 ,,16 grey ... wntten. ... yrSl us. 
Turning now to Herodotus' case we may notice that when he starts 
his description of the Ionian region he uses the word OtaAEYEaSat in 
referring to the fact that many people from this place speak the same 
language. This idea implies that talking the same language makes possible a 
reciprocal understanding because a common language gives unity in 
conversation to different individuals. It is not accidental that when 
Herodotus mentions that not everybody speaks the same language, he refers 
to this fact using a different word: 
"These Ionians to whom the Panionium belongs had the good fortune to 
establish their settlements in a region which enjoys a better climate than any other we 
know of It does not resemble what is found either further north, where the weather is 
both too hot and too dry. There are four different dialects of the Ionic language, 
distributed as follows( "(Awacm.v of: ou 'titv aU'tllv OU'tOl VEvOJol.iK:am, aAACx 'tp01tO~ 
'tEO"Cn:pac; 1tapcx"(O>"(EO>V): the most southerly of the Ionian towns is Miletus, with Myrus 
to the north of it, and then Priene, these three being in Caria and speaking the same 
dialect (Ka'tCx 'tau'tCx. olaA£,,(OJ.1£Val crcpim). Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, 
Clazomenae, and Phocaea are in Lydia, and share a common dialect completely distinct 
from (0J.10AO,,(EO'Ocrl Ka'tCx. "(Awcrcrav OUOEv) what is spoken at the places previously 
mentioned. There are three other Ionian settlements, two being the islands of Samos 
and Chios and one, Erythrae, a mainland town. The two latter use the same dialect 
(Ka'tCx 't))'O'to olaAE,,(ov'tal), Samos a peculiar one of its own.,,17 
15 Kl]Yroy 6 cpuoyroy ou ou,:).k~a'to npo<; eU~OY ana j3paw1.ro<; n60w £]~j3at<; en' 6priotat o!Xn'tEt 'taY 
nOA.tY a~~t OEO[.] .. [.] . 1. . at<;. 
16 129(L-P), (M. Edmonds' translation). 
17 Herodotus I, 142 (De S6lincourt's translation). See also III, 50-52. Sichirollo mentions (see Sichirollo 
(1973), p. 22) that Gorgias in his Defence of Palamedes alludes to the idea of discussing when he is 
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In Thucydides the only use of the word OtaAEYEcr8at is in a context 
of persuasion: 
"Next day, alarmed as they were, the Four Hundred still held a meeting in the 
Council Chamber. The hoplites in Piraeus released AlexicIes, whom they had arrested, 
pulled down the fortification, and marched to the theatre of Dionysus near Munychia, 
where they grounded arms and held an assembly at which it was decided to march to 
the city. They did so at once, and halted again in the Anaceum. Here they were met by 
people who had been chosen for the purpose by the Four Hundred, and these people 
came up and spoke to them individually, trying to persuade (avTtp (hopt OtEAEyovtO tE 
Kat E1tEt80v) those whom they saw to be reasonable persons not to proceed any further 
themselves and to help hold back the others. They said that they would publish the 
names of the Five Thousand and that the Four Hundred would be chosen from them in 
rotation, just as the Five Thousand should decide: they begged them meanwhile not to 
take any action which might destroy the state or let it slip into into the hands of the 
enemy.,,18 
This brief philological approach to the use of the word OtaAEyecr8at 
shows us the variety of its meanings and applications in different contexts. 
The point at issue is also that Plato assumed this philological legacy and 
created with it an entire philosophical project. 
referring to the fact of talking to your adversary or the act of demanding an answer. In those cases he uses 
the word ouxA€YEa9m and its cognates; but when Palamedes is addressing to the judge from whom he is 
not demanding an answer he uses the verb EI.1tciv. See Gorgias, l1a (D-K): 6, 11, 15,22,28. 
18 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, VIII, 93 (translated by R. Warner, Penguin, 1972). The 
context and use of Thucydides' idea of persuasion remind one of Plato's Cratylus, specifically 390c-391a3 
in which Plato describes the dialectician as the man who knows how to ask and answer questions, and the 
Socratic task of "persuasion". Hermogenes: "I don't know how to oppose you, Socrates. It isn't easy for 
me suddenly to change my opinion, though. I think you would be more likely to persuade me if you show 
me just what this natural correctness of names you're talking about consists in" (C. D. C. Reeve's 
translation): OUK Elm, 0::. I:ooKpa'tEe;, o1tme; XPl] 1tpO~ ex A€YEt(; Evavnoua9at. tame; JlEV'tOt ou p~t6v 
ean v 01':J'!me; e~at<pvlle; 1tEta9fjvat, aA.Aix o01e& JlOt rooE frv Jlanov 1tEi9E09at, lOt JlOt OEt~Etac; flV'tl va 
<pne; ElVal 'tl]v <puaEt op96't1l'ta ov6Jla'toe;. 
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We have now to clarify the content of the historical literary 
antecedents of Plato's dialectic which -in our judgement- are present in 
Greek epic, lyric and tragic poetry. 
§3. LITERARY ANTECEDENTS OF DIALECTIC: GREEK EPIC, 
LYRIC AND TRAGEDY 
The main thesis of this Section is the following: human beings are 
ontologically and constitutively incomplete, insufficient, relative. Because 
of their essential insufficiency, men try to fmd different means of 
completion, of relationships, of interchanges. One of the ideal means to try 
to make up for this insufficiency is conversation, dialogues. To become 
aware of this incompleteness took time, and so too to grasp it in a written 
form. The first written form of human self-consciousness was poetic. 
Greek poetry was one of the most eminent examples of this poetic 
awareness. Homeric, Hesiodic and lyric poetic consciousness is an heroic 
and tragic consciousness: man is a suffering and mortal being, a limited 
being, but he has the chance of opening vital possibilities to become better 
or to achieve self-improvement. This tragic awareness appears in tragedy as 
a consciousness of the human condition captured in spoken/written dialogue 
which is a literary and dialectical consciousness: we are inquisitive and 
responsible beings. 19 Greek poetic consciousness is a humanistic one which 
reaches its highest point in the crystallisation of an ethical consciousness in 
Socrates and Plato. 
The reason that we have gone so far back in trying to trace the 
antecedents of dialectic is because the Platonic dialogue portrays not only 
what philosophy is but what humanity must be. The Socratic-Platonic idea 
19 It is generally accepted that the Homeric tradition was originally an oral one. The point is that at a given 
moment it became a written tradition and we will take it as that. 
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of philosophy as dialogue is a humanistic project: philosophy is a living 
method of learning how to become a better human being. 
In my judgement we can fmd two sorts of dialogues m Greek 
literature: metaphorical and actual. Both sorts of dialogue show us a kind of 
human search for completion through dialogue. The metaphorical sense of 
dialogue is present in Greek epic and lyric, and answers to a deep need for 
communication, sharing and intemalising values. That is, the need for 
dialogue has its roots in human nature. Actual dialogue is present in tragedy 
and particularly debates in tragedy that resemble those in a law-court. 
Platonic dialogue has its roots in this actual dialogue, but because of Plato's 
humanistic preoccupations, the metaphorical senses of dialogue represent an 
important antecedent of his idea of philosophy. 
a) Epic 
Starting with Homer, we will make four main claims: 1. Homer portrays in 
his poems the tragedy that human consciousness involves and a way to 
transcend it; 2. Homer includes a model of written dialogue. The 
importance of Homer's poems resides too in the poems themselves: the 
poet, who is in dialogue with a reader and the poet who portrays people in 
dialogue.2o The act of completion of human nature is double: in the written 
act and in the effect that its content produces in the community; 3. Homer 
understands and portrays in his poems what an internal dialogue means; and 
4. Homer is aware that two people are better than just one in any human 
enterprise. 
We start with Homeric heroism because it pictures the desire for self-
improvement as an eminent way of overcoming human beings' 
incompleteness. Heroism represents also in its desire to overcome human 
20 Obviously tragedy will be more interesting in relation to this particular aspect. 
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insufficiency a moment of self-awareness. Heroism in Homer has always a 
communitarian context: to be a hero implies the act of being seen by others 
performing great deeds. Homer represents this heroism in two central 
figures: Achilles and Odysseus. 
The Iliad is a poetic presentation of men as the locus of possibilities. 
Achilles is the hero par excellence because he assumes his human condition 
consciously and with intensity as the fact and challenge of life. Achilles 
also has the mark of a man of excellence for his deeds. It is because of 
Achilles' human sense of his own honour ('ttJlll) that he reacts furiously 
against Agamemnon. The reason for his choleric reaction is that Achilles 
feels that this sense of honour has been transgressed: he is losing his status. 
It is necessary to remind ourselves that for the Greeks any word given under 
oath implies honour. 21 Equally, Achilles feels proud of being an authentic 
man, as for him the individual who holds one opinion but expresses the 
opposite is obnoxious. 22 This dialogue between Achilles and Agamemnon 
is central because it is a prelude to what Homer will present throughout his 
poem and what Homer's literary intentions and messages to his audience 
will be. In this initial presentation Homer is portraying his characters in an 
exchange of words which permits us to appreciate their personalities. At 
the same time, Homer is stressing the importance and the force of words 
themselves. The gift of speech is fundamental: 1. it is the way to express 
any thought; 2. it is the way to complete ourselves by expressing these 
thoughts to other people; 3. it is the way to make agreements; 4. it is even 
the way to express hostility. 5. As "entertaining a public" Homer is 
communicating his key message to humanity: the spoken word is the 
strongest power that human beings possess. When it is used well it can 
provide us with the best means of communion with others and of making up 
21 See Iliad, I, 188-219. 
22 See ibid, III, 276-301. 
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for our ontological insufficiency. When it is misused it can bring about the 
worst calamities and isolation among human beings. With the use of words 
man is able to achieve either sublimity or vileness. With the act of talking 
and by contrasting heroic deeds and unheroic actions, Homer is portraying 
with mastery the human moral condition, that is, the perpetual effort and 
risk that any decision implies. We will proceed point by point, and giving 
more examples. 
First we will approach the character of Achilles who contains in his 
dignity values which are not merely individual. In fact, the real force of the 
Greek spirit resides in its communitarian root. The human ideals which 
Homer expresses in his poetry are proper to men who live in, by and for the 
community. According to the Homeric notion of man, if you do anything 
which is to be considered of great worth, somebody has to observe it. A 
hero is appreciated for his achievements, not for his inner qualities. Despite 
this fact it is worth noticing that Homer shows an indissoluble binomial and 
dynamic relationship between individuals and community. He presents 
characters who have clear communitarian ideals, but at the same time they 
are very strong personalities who still manage to be individualist and retain 
very well-defined qualities. In other words: Homer represents human beings 
who are outstanding as individuals, but who also live for the community. 
The "good" man (i.e., the arae6~) of the Homeric epic is essentially 
a man conscious of his communitarian ideals which are taken with pride. 
These ideals provide impulse and dynamism in the community. The ideal of 
the "good" man in Homer is centred in the permanent zeal to be better. This 
idea is very well summarised in Glaucon's words: 
" ... Hippolochos fathered me, and he is the man I spring from. He sent me to Troy, and 
gave me constant instructions, always to be bravest and best and excel over others, and 
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not bring disgrace on the stock of my fathers, who were far the best men in Ephyre and 
in the breadth of Lycia. This is the family and blood I am proud to call mine.,,23 
There is another passage in book XI in which Nestor, after a long 
narration, tells Patroclus· of his meeting with Achilles and how the Peleus 
gave to his son the sound advice of 
" ... always to be bravest and best and excel over others ... ,,24 
In this sense Homer is central not only as a pristine literary creator but 
also as author of moral guidelines which will be important for subsequent 
ethics. It is in the mere act of seeking to be better that any individual might 
try to make up for his constitutive incompleteness. Even more: to become 
excellent has always in Homer a communitarian connotation because it 
means being seen to be excellent. Homer communicates this universal 
message to his audience which is presented in a very particular way in his 
characters. Homer portrays in his poem that this advice to become better 
contains a double effect: 1. it is the soundest that you would have to 
communicate-morally speaking- as the most valued legacy for any 
individual and 2. because becoming better is always a public act the search 
for excellence is the supreme social act. His message is addressed 
simultaneously to any potential audience in his own and any future time. 
Paraphrasing W. Jaeger we can say that the pathos which inspires the 
Iliad is centred on the high heroic destiny of men.25 The pathos of epic 
23 Homer, Iliad, VI, 206 if, (translated by M. Hammond, Penguin, 1987). 
24 Ibid., XI, 784. See also IX 441-443 where Phoenix speaks out in relation to his mission under Achilles: 
" ... The old horseman Peleus sent me out with you on the day when he sent you from Phthia to join 
Agamemmnon -you were a child, with no knowledge yet of levelling war or of debate, where men win 
distinction. So he sent me out to teach you all these things, to make you a speaker of words and a doer of 
deeds." 
25 See, W. Jaeger, Paideia: los ideales de la cultura griega, trad. 1. Xirau y W. Roces, F.C.E., Mexico, 
1974, Libro Primero, III,p. 5l. 
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heroes permits us to know them for their nature: the epic hero is radically 
tragic. If we analyse Achilles as a character we are aware that he represents 
a sort of cognitive monument of human life; he is a sort of vital pathos. 
Homer's heritage resides -in our judgement- in his grasping of a poetic 
consciousness of the vital human problematic which he receives from the 
tradition. To become a hero is so important because it is the fundamental 
path to self-consciousness: that one is incomplete and that one has to 
struggle for completeness. That is the reason that Homer singles out his 
heroes' deeds, keeps their actions within the communitarian bounds of 
"being seen", and contrasts them with other characters who lose the 
perspective on this central human task. 
Homer gives a poetic testimony of what human beings actually are 
and would be. The feeling of his heroes reveals it. A clear example of this 
is the meeting between Priam and Achilles, when the former goes to recover 
his son's body: on the one hand both weep and recognise human 
misfortune, and on the other hand, both accept each other's grandeur. 
Homer shows in the figures of Achilles and Priam his communitarian ideal: 
honour has primacy in human relationships. Also in this scene Homer 
represents two people in dialogue: they are sharing and interchanging 
opinions about the fragility of the human condition. In this act of sharing 
weaknesses Homer portrays dialogue as a key to understanding and to 
overcoming them. The echo of this key Homeric "dialectical" lesson 
reverberates in his audience, with continuing effects in the community. 
This is Achilles' conclusion: 
" ... This is the fate the gods have spun for poor mortal men, that we should live in 
misery, but they themselves have no sorrows. There are two jars standing on Zeus' 
floor which hold the gifts he gives us: one holds evils, the other blessings. When Zeus 
who delights in thunder mixes his gifts to a man he meets now with evil, and now with 
good. But when Zeus gives from the jar of misery only, he brings a man to degradation, 
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and vile starvation drives him ever the holy earth, and he wanders without honour from 
gods or men. ,,26 
From the preceding passage we may also see Homer showing a very 
dynamic relationship between gods and human beings. Achilles' and 
Agamemnon's time is, above all, a heroic age. Men of this time had a very 
close relationship with deities. Deities directly intervened in human 
activities and were linked to men on earth. That means that we can get an 
understanding of the nature, limits and possibilities of human life by 
thinking about this relationship between gods and men. In that sense the 
archetypal Greek maxim of knowing yourself becomes a perpetual tension 
between the divine and the human which can be summarised in a strong 
sentence for mortals: men, do not struggle awkwardly and vainly to become 
a god because it is a fact that you are not. 27 
In Homer, the effect of the opposition of gods' and men's natures is 
that the latter become self-conscious, self-aware. The gods consider human 
events important enough to be worried about, but not to become excited 
about in the same way and proportion as divine events. The truth is that for 
human beings life is struggle: they have to work hard and to make a 
constant effort to get things, while for gods human works are easily 
destructible, just like a mere amusement, like a children's game. Even 
more, as 1. Griffm puts it: 
" ... As the gods need not be dignified unless they choose, so too they need give no 
reason for their attitudes and actions; again we are brought up against the hard fact of 
the supremacy of heaven, which places human life and suffering in the perspective in 
which the poet wishes us to see them. ,,28 
26 Iliad, XXIV, 524-534, (M. Hammonds' translation). 
27 See ibid, XV, 361-366. 
28 J. Griffin, Homer, Oxford University Press, reissued, 1996, Chapter 2, pp. 25-26. 
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The interesting thing to notice is that Homer pictures human beings 
as being in touch with gods and in interchange with them. The result of this 
interchange is again human self-consciousness of our mortal, insufficient 
condition but at the same time of positive possibilities of self-improvement 
through dialogue and community. It is clear that in the act of presenting 
religion as central Homer is giving another moral message to his audience. 
The central question with which the Iliad confronts the reader is the 
same question with which it confronts its characters, that is, in what being a 
hero consists. Homer's answer to this question is highly eloquent in the 
sense that it is realistic and convincing. Through his great descriptive style, 
Homer shows us a coherent development of the action from one scene to 
another. He goes deeper in his thoughts because he touches with mastery 
the capital facts of human life. 29 So long as Homeric heroes stay alive, they 
get the gods' love and favours and they are frequently compared with 
divinities. All of this emphasises the radical contrast between life and 
death. While the hero exists, he is full of vitality and power, he is brilliant 
and a doer of great deeds, but at any time when he has to confront the 
enemy he has to accept that he is a contingent being, with the risk of dying, 
including the total horror and absolute ending that the act of dying implies. 
The epic hero is in principle tragic because human life involves the 
inevitable hallmark which is summarised in that hard and implacable 
sentence: human beings not only have to suffer, but they are mortal. Even 
more: in the case of Achilles, for example, he knows not only that he will 
die, but that he will die young. 
Homer shows us by way of contrast the inseparable union of human 
greatness and fragility which constitutes the heroic nature. Homer also 
plays a game of analogy: gods do not know either of time passing or of the 
29 See ibid. p. 31. 
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expenence of death; nevertheless, they are similar to men. Gods have 
virtues, desires, passions. These similarities pennit Homer to put emphasis 
on his vision of human nature, alluding always to a comparison between 
mortals and immortals. 30 
It is precisely in this conscious recognition of the tragic condition of 
the hero that human nature reaches its highest point. That is, individuals 
become as human as possible and similar to gods. The majority of the 
characters in the Iliad have scarce or null intuition of the essence and tragic 
content of events. Hector and Patroclus are caught unprepared and are 
misled by their own success. They could not discern that they victories 
were merely temporary and that in Zeus' project they just constitute one 
more chapter of his inevitable negative prognosis: defeat and death. It is 
only Achilles and Priam who arrive at an understanding of the universal 
human destiny: being a suffering and mortal entity. In this understanding 
resides the greatness of these Homeric heroes. But it is again in this strong 
contrast that Homer projects the possibilities and boundaries of human life 
that he communicates to his audience what any human being might reach 
and what he can lose. 
We make reference again to the meeting of Priam and Achilles as a 
succinct and conclusive view of the pathetic condition of human beings. In 
Jasper Griffm' swords: 
"... Then Achilles raises Priam to a chair and in a long speech expresses the deep 
humanism of the poet. All men must suffer; that is the way the gods plan human life, 
'while they themselves are free from care'. [ ... J The ending which the poet has devised 
allows his poem to finish, not with a mere heroic triumph, but with great opponents 
meeting at a level from which they see, with deep pathos but without bitterness or self-
pity, the fundamental condition of the life of man. Achilles and Priam recognise their 
30 In relation to the Homeric comparison between human beings and gods, see H. C. Baldry, The Unity of 
Mankind in Greek Thought, Cambridge University Press, 1 %5. 
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kinship in mortality and suffering; [ ... ] This very Greek sensitivity, even at such a 
moment, to beauty, which is present not only in the young warrior but also in the old 
king, gives the last touch to the scene. We see the poet give a concrete example of his 
conception that it is out of suffering and disaster that beauty emerges. Achilles and 
Priam are brought together by the terrible fact that Achilles has killed Hector, and the 
war will go until Troy is destroyed; but their encounter enables them to show a high 
civility, and to recognize in each other both the splendour and the fragility which are 
united in th~ nature of man. ,,31 
The moral heritage of Homer's epic poetry resides in the projection of 
a consciously heroic attitude before the force of destiny. Because dignity is 
the human attribute that is gained and gives excellence, human beings are, 
per se, an object important enough to be treated poetically. The Homeric 
secret was to know how to contemplate human nature. Human beings are 
busy trying to perfonn great deeds and at the same time they are under the 
threat of ineluctable destinies. The characteristic Achillean pathos hinges 
on this perpetual tension. Homer's sublimity resides in his ability to grasp 
the critical condition of any given event and to represent his characters in a 
kind of dialectical tension deliberating with themselves or with others. 32 
This latter point is crucial for our purposes because Homer's message on 
this issue is clear: our human limitation compels us to search for 
completion. This searching implies taking decisions. The search for 
making better ones implies reflective acts. Reflective acts involve internal 
dialogues or conversations with others. In short: dialogue is the best way of 
acquiring completeness and self-consciousness. 
31 J. Griffin, op. cit., pp. 39-40. 
32 This reference to a dialectical tension is just addressed to the internal debate and dialogue that Homer's 
characters show. We are not referring to P. Szondis' line of interpretation (Versuch llber das Tragische, 
1961), that is, talking about "the dialectical structure of the tragic" in the sense of Hegel and other German 
philosophers and poets, i.e . ., as opposition of contraries. For an approach similar to that of Sf:ondis, see 
B. Seidensticker, "Peripateia and tragic dialectic in Euripides tragedy", in M. S. Silk (ed.), Tragedy and 
the tragic. Greek theatre and beyond, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998,377-396. 
53 
There is also a passage in the Iliad which it is important to underline 
because it contains the idea that the act of searching for something in 
company gives you the advantage that one of the searchers can see 
something before the other or discerns things that the other one cannot at 
fIrst. Homer expresses his point in the context of a spying expedition using 
a proverb. But even in this context it is a striking point introducing the 
general idea that two minds "see more" than just one. It is particularly 
striking because it is precisely the key idea which is involved in the Socratic 
and Platonic dialectical method: for Plato dialogue is essential to philosophy 
because the other person have a different approach to things from one's 
own. The passage is the following: 
" ... then Diorriedes, master of the war-cry, spoke out: 'Nestor, my heart and proud spirit 
urge me to penetrate the camp of our enemies the Trojans who are lying so close to us. 
But if another man would go with me that would be a comfort and bring greater 
confidence. When two go together, one is quicker than the other to see where advantage 
lies (ouv 'tE bU' £PXO~EV(o, 1wi 'tE 1tPO 0 'tot> evO"OEV)- a man on Pis own may see it, 
but even so his mind has less range than two, and his resource is not so strong'. ,,33 
33 Iliad, X, 219-227 (M. Hammond's translation). The interesting point to stress is that Plato picks up this 
idea, intentionally misquoting it in Symposium 174 d3-4, where, by implication, it has something to do with 
philosophical conversation: "Socrates said: 'As we two go together further along the way' we'll work out 
what we'll say. Come on, let's go" (c. J. Rowe's translation). The second reference to Homer's line is in 
Protagoras, 348 c-d. This one is more explicit and central for our present preoccupations because it 
shows the importance of the interlocutor in Plato's philosophical conversations. The interlocutor or 
interlocutors provide different elements to the search and they are a sort of guarantor, allowing the result 
of the elenctic method or process of examination of any proposed thesis to be corroborated or validated. 
It is also a strong argument against Aristotle's thesis which privileges solitary philosophical work: 
Socrates.- "It looked to me that Protagoras was embarrassed by Alcibiades' words, not to mention the 
insistence of Callias and practically the whole company. In the end he reluctantly brought himself to 
resume our dialogue and indicated he was ready to be asked questions. 'Protagoras,' 1 said, 'I don't want 
you to think that my motive in talking with you is anything else than to take a good hard look at things that 
continually perplex me. 1 think that Homer said it all in the line, Going in tandem, one perceives before 
the other. Human beings are simply more resourceful this way in action, speech and thought. If someone 
has a private perception, he immediately starts going around and looking until he finds somebody he can 
show it to and have it corroborated. And there is a particular reason why 1 would rlither talk with you than 
anyone else: I think you are the best qualified to investigate the sort of things that decent and respectable 
individual ought to examine ... " (S. Lombardo's and K. Bell's translation). 
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We tum now, briefly, to the Odyssey. This epic poem continues the 
Homeric project 1. to talk and to write about the limitations of human 
nature and 2. to display -through this act of entertaining people- how great 
figures overcome this insufficiency. 
Now the hero is Odysseus. He illustrates men's condition, that is, a 
combination of greatness and weakness. He reflects also a picture of 
individual self-consciousness and an awareness of heroism as the human 
vital task. Homer relates and shares with his audience Odysseus' suffering, 
struggling and fmal overcoming. 
As he did in the Iliad, Homer will represent in the Odyssey an active 
relationship between human beings and gods. The aim is again to put them 
in contrast and in that way to get a better view of their natures. The 
Odyssey begins with an assembly of the gods. Zeus, who presides over the 
meeting starts his dissertation on the present state of things by raising the 
general problem of human suffering and the relationship between human 
destiny and human culpability: 
"Lo you now, how vainly mortal men do blame the gods! For of us they say 
comes evil, whereas they even of themselves, through the blindness of their own hearts, 
have sorrows beyond that which is ordained. ,,34 
The heroism of the Odyssey has very particular characteristics. 
Odysseus is the hero who knows how to confront suffering with 
perseverance. Homer endows Odysseus with all sort of illustrious 
experiences. In relation to this point we can centre our attention on that 
passage which contains a dialogue of great proportions and effect, when 
Odysseus fmds the shadows of his mother and his friends who died at Troy: 
34 Odyssey, 1,32-34 (translated by Butcher and Lang, MacMillan and Co., London, 1887). 
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Odysseus' mother.- "Dear child, how didst thou come beneath the darkness and 
the shadow, thou that art a living man? Grievous is the sight of these things to the 
living, for between us and you are great rivers and dreadful streams; first, Oceanus, 
which can no wise be crossed on foot, but only if one have a well-wrought ship. Art 
thou but now come hither with thy ship and thy company in the long wanderings from 
Troy? and hast thou not yet reached Ithaca, nor seen thy wife in thy halls?" 
'Even so she spake, and I answered her, and said: "0 my mother, necessity was 
on me to come down to the house of Hades to seek to the spirit of Theban Teiresias. 
For not yet have I drawn near to the Achaean shore, nor yet have I set foot on mine own 
country, but have been wandering evermore in affliction, from the day that first I went 
with goodly Agamemnon to Ilios of the fair steeds, to do battle with the Trojans. ,,35 
This passage is particularly illustrative of my mam claims: l. It 
combines two points: a) Odysseus lamenting his condition and b) Odyssesus 
lamenting the human condition. 2. It shows Homer as a writer of a poem 
which contains a main heroic and tragic character in dialogue with another 
character. In this dialogue full of pathos Homer shows Odysseus in 
conversation as the best means for relieving his condition. In other words: 
Homer in his epic fiction represents his characters talking about their 
weaknesses. This mere act of expressing and spelling out one's limitations 
is a cathartic way of overcoming one's tragic condition. 3. It shows Homer 
entertaining his readers and showing how through dialogue we may 
overcome our human insufficiency. 4. It shows Homer's suggestion that in 
the act of talking, sharing and interchanging opinions with others, human 
enterprises might have better approaches and upshots. 
There is also a moral message in the Odyssey: Odysseus overcomes 
his adversities because of his qualities. That is, his search for nobility and 
his honour are shown in his shrewdness way of acting. Odysseus is the 
prototypical hero. His power resides in his astute judgement and shrewd 
35 Ibid., XI, 155-169 (Butcher'S and Lang's translation). 
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attitude. The archetype of the anti-hero is the indolent man, the upstart 
individual who just wants to reap wthout sowing; the man who premeditates 
his trickeries. Homer personifies this indolence in Penelope's suitors: 
"The Odyssey, less intense, more inclusive, with its wide range of interest in the 
world and all its variety, has a different conception of the gods and of heroism. Gods 
and heroes alike need and receive moral justification, of a sort much closer to our ideas. 
Odyssseus, the hero of endurance and guile, replaces Achilles, the hero of openness and 
dash, in a world grown full of treachery, deception, and complexity; and he must 
contend with disloyal subordinates ... ,,36 
In short: the Homeric poems portray human beings confronted by 
their situation. Men assume consciousness of their situation: we are 
suffering and mortal beings, but we can challenge this fact without self-pity 
or evasion. Starting from this permanent and tragic situation, we learn how 
to enjoy and ascend to the heights of the positive things that this earthly life 
can offer to us. Life is worthy enough to be lived with a wise heroism and 
moral sense. Homer has an understanding of the tragic human condition, 
but in the very act of writing he transcends -with his model of dialogue- this 
condition by the act of communicating his ideas to an audience: to act for 
human beings is always to interact. 
Hesiod's poetry retains -in our judgement- a similar importance to 
Homer's in relation to the history of dialectic (in the widest sense): he 
portrays the tragic human condition and at the same time overcomes it by 
the act of writing and communicating to others about human weaknesses 
and proposing an ideal model of humanity. In this act of communication 
Homer and Hesiod transcend human insufficiency. The difference is that 
Hesiod does not portray (for the most part) characters in conversation, but 
he shows his audience a view of men, the world and gods which includes 
36 J. Griffin, op. cit., pp. 77-78. 
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stories and admonitions to help us overcome our insufficiency and to 
improve our lives. Homer writes about great figures or heroes while Hesiod 
creates a model of humanity in a different way. 
We start by stressing that Hesiod' s poems begin by attempting to 
draw the audience in. In the Theogony Hesiod tries to to do this by stating 
that what he will say comes from divine inspiration; that his story is a real 
one.
37 In the case of Works and Days he resorts to asking for divine 
inspiration because in that mode he might tell the truth to Perses. 38 
The way Hesiod presents human beings overcoming their 
incompleteness is similar to Homer's. Hesiod's human prototype is a 
reflective and self-conscious individual who meditates about his own 
condition and aspires to become better. Hesiod portrays this reflective man 
becoming attentive to his constitutional insufficiency and trying to surpass it 
by following the path to apE't11.39 Centrally, Hesiod also represents the man 
who misunderstands his human condition and considers himself as complete 
and sufficient. The consequences of this misunderstanding will be a 
miserable life. In this mere act of contrasting human positive and negative 
possibilities Hesiod communicates his central message to humanity. 
Hesiod is a gnomic and essentially moralising poet. The first sample 
of this morality is shown in his Theogony through the figure of the king, fair 
and equitable because of the Muses' favour. 
"So sang the Muses of Olympus, nine 
Daughters begotten by almighty Zeus, 
Cleio, Euterpe, and Melpomene, 
Thalia, Erato and Terpsichore, 
37 See Hesiod, Theogony, 1-30 (but we should notice that Hesiod represents the Muses as having the 
ability both to speak the truth and to make up convincing lies). 
38 See Hesiod, Works and Days, 1-10. 
39 Nb. apE'tll as social standing, status or esteem. See Works and Days, 313. 
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Polymnia, Urania, and most 
Important one of all, Calliope, 
F or she attends upon respected lords. 
And when the daughters of great Zeus would bring 
Honour upon a heaven-favoured lord 
And when they watch him being born, they pour 
Sweet dew upon his tongue, and from his lips 
Flow honeyed words. All people look to him 
When he is giving judgement uprightly, 
And speaking with assurance, he can stop 
Great quarrels sensibly. Wise lords are wise 
In this: when public hann is being done 
To the people, they can set things straight with ease, 
Advising with soflt words. And when a lord 
Comes into the assembly, he is wooed 
With honeyed reverence, just like a god, 
And is conspicuous above the crowd, 
Such is the Muses' holy gift to men.,,40 
In the Hesiodic vision of the cosmos the world of the gods sometimes 
includes personifications of -what we call- moral concepts like justice, 
prudence, moderation. Some divinities constitute a new range of virtues 
and they have a high influence and power in the human world. 
There is a direct relation between human behavior and natural 
phenomena: if human beings keep themselves firm and follow the straight 
road of justice which Zeus indicates, nature will be prodigal in its benefits 
to them; if they move away from the good way, immediately nature will 
punish them by depriving them of its fruits. In short: nature is for Hesiod 
the wise, ordered and fair will of Zeus. 
40 Theogony, 81-96 (translated by D. Wender, Penguin, London, 1973). 
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Zeus is the powerful and wise god who experiences a metamorphosis 
after eating Metis. The effect that this ingestion has on Zeus is, in my 
judgement, that prudence implies justice, that is, the new way of governing 
requires a wisdom that permits a distinction between good and evil. From 
now on the benefit of Zeus' way of ruling will be Peace and Good Law: 
"Now Zeus, king of the gods, first took to wife 
Metis, wisest of all, of gods and men. 
But when she was about to bear her child 
Grey-eyed Athene, he deceived her mind 
With clever words and guile, and thrust her down 
Into his belly, as he was advised 
By Earth and starry Heaven. In that way 
They said, no other god than Zeus would get 
The royal power over all gods 
Who live forever. For her fate would be 
To bear outstanding children, greatly wise, 
First, a girl, Tritogeneia, the grey-eyed, 
Equal in spirit and intelligence 
To Zeus her father; then she would bear a son 
With haughty heart, a king of gods and men. 
But Zeus, forestalling danger, put her down 
Into his belly, so that the goddess could 
Counsel him in both good and evil plans. 
And shining Themis was his second wife. 
She bore the Horae: Order, blooming Peace, 
And Justice, who attend the works of men, 
And then the Fates, to whom wise Zeus has paid 
The greatest honour: Clotho, Atropos, 
Lachesis, who give men all good and bad.,,41 
41 Ibid, 886-906. 
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Hesiod represents the world of human beings with its positive and 
negative elements: good and bad things -both from divine origins- are given 
by gods in combination.42 In Hesiod there is a coincidence between his 
view of man and bis v:iew of reality. Positive and negative forces cohabit 
but contrast. Human forces have specific moral characteristics: man is ruled 
by a double principle of responsibility and purpose. Thus human beings can 
enjoy a peaceful and ordered life in which evils have precise boundaries and 
are, to certain extent, foreseeable. Hesiod' s message to his audience 
involves the idea that all of us are able to distinguish the good. and the bad 
paths in life. Once one discovers the right path, one must make the daily 
effort of keeping there. 
What are the characteristics of the Hesiodic ideal man? Mainly, he is 
just, that is, he is temperate in conduct, because he knows what he has to do 
according to divine judgement. That will connect us with what is -we 
think- the central aim of Hesiod's Theogony: to show us the divine and 
human genealogical successions as an evolutionary and historic process. 
F or the ancients knowing the name of "things" -i. e., gods, men, and objects-
was equivalent to knowing their nature, origin and characteristics. That is 
important because, here again, Hesiod tries to put his audience on alert. The 
first requirement is to be attentive to whatever surrounds you. The second 
requirement is to look at things carefully. The third requirement is to 
develop a critical attitude in relation to what you see. Once you start 
distinguishing good and bad things you have the opportunity to decide in 
favour of a morally positive life if you follow the voice of what is good. 
One element which it is important to emphasise is that Hesiod tries to teach 
us how to listen to and to take notice of our internal voice. This element is 
crucial for our purposes and main argument because it shows how essential 
for Hesiod too internal dialogue is to being human. 
42 As in Homer's Iliad XXIV, 524-534 which we cited earlier on n. 26. 
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For Hesiod the real and knowable world is a result of successive 
genealogies. This high manifestation is bipolar: rivers, sea, love, but also 
death, hunger, deceit, wars and human griefs.43 It is only through such 
knowledge of origins that human beings can ponder the force which 
negative powers have had in the development of the cosmos, and value the 
meaning of the new order that begins with Zeus' kingdom. In this new 
kingdom, excesses have no room. That is the reason that order will be 
equivalent to justice and disorder will be synonymous with injustice or 
arrogance. Hesiod's Theogony presents the following central values: 1. a 
high concept of divinities, who impose a principle of order which involves 
morality and justice~44 2. justice is the value par excellence and is in a 
relation of complementarity with Zeus: he is the agent of justice. In other 
words: Zeus is the god who exerts his power and produces the effect of 
justice. Hesiod tries to promote moral reform. That is the reason that he 
insists on showing us justice as Zeus' favourite child and therefore with 
noble rank. 45 As we shall see, justice will become the main feature of 
Hesiod's model of man. That is the reason that the main advice that Hesiod 
gives us is to listen to justice and to follow it because to follow justice is 
equivalent to keeping to the good path that the gods indicate. 46 
Under Hesiod's perspective there is a peaceful coexistence between 
gods and men. Freedom and responsibility will be the two new categories 
for measuring the consequences of men's actions. Because now Zeus is 
implacable towards man and: 
43 See Theogony, 223-232. 
44 There are two points to emphasise: 1. Homeric and Hesiodic gods do not behave morally despite the 
fact that they impose it on human beings to behave morally and 2. in Greek epic poetry gods cannot defeat 
fate or the way that things are. 
45 S upra, p. 60. 
46 See Works and Days, 213. 
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"He [man] pays harsh penalties for all his sins.,,47 
It is precisely in Hesiod's Works and Days that he shows us what the 
moral consequences of the kingdom of Zeus are. In other words Hesiod will 
tell us how human and divine consciousness operate in relation to will and 
responsibility. Let me explain. Justice is from now on the regulatory 
principle of the different sorts of human links and relationships with other 
individuals and with divinities. How does justice work? Hesiod thinks that 
the frrst step towards exercising justice is to keep far away from the wicked 
Strife C'EptC; KUKOXUP'tOC;) which enjoys evil and removes you from work.48 
He distinguishes two kinds of Strife: the frrst one that we can call 
productive, because it makes men better since it is a consequence of the 
education that the effort of daily work gives, and the second one which is 
sterile because it is a product of negligence that only knows envy and 
calumny addressed to the man who has been motivated by the good Strife 
(a:yu9it "EptC;).49 This good Strife is the one that belongs to the hard-
working, diligent man who soundly vies with others. 
The people of the present time, according to Hesiod, belong to the 
iron race. They have to struggle for their lives, which are subject to death 
and changeable: 
"Far-seeing Zeus then made another race, 
The Fifth, who live now on the fertile earth. 
I wish I were not of this race, that I 
Had died before, or had not yet been born. 
This is the race of iron. Now, by day, 
47 Ibid, 334. 
48 See ibid, 28. 
49 See ibid, 11-29 (D. Wender's translation). 
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Men work and grieve unceasingly; by night, 
They waste away and die. The gods will give 
Harsh burdens, but will mingle in some good; 
Zeus will destroy this race of mortal men, 
When babies shall be born with greying hair. ,,50 
Even more: men of the iron race will be corrupted~ they will become 
injust and the gods will abandon them. 51 Hence Hesiod's admonition to 
Perses: 
"0 Perses, follow right; control your pride 
For pride is even in a common man. 
Even a noble finds it hard to bear; 
It weighs him down and leads him to disgrace. 
The road to justice is the better way, 
For Justice in the end will win the race 
And Pride will lose: the simpleton must learn 
This fact through suffering.,,52 
The previous verses constitute -in my judgement- the key to the Hesiodic 
reflection in relation to his model of mankind as the way to aquire self-
conSCIOusness. The point to be stressed is in verse 213: ~n TIepcr11, cru 0' 
lh:oUE oi1(11<; ~110' U~PtV O<pEAAE." What Hesiod wants to express to us is 
clearly the advice to be attentive, observant of justice and not to give in to 
U~Pt<;. The latter is the way of excess, and therefore, of injustice. Justice 
and lack of moderation are opposites, but if you cultivate justice you will 
defeat any excess. 
50 Ibid, 174-181. 
51 See ibid, 185-201 (D. Wender's translation). 
52 Ibid, 213-218. 
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Hesiod considers that the way that the simpleton understands this 
central moral message is through suffering, which permits him -albeit 
belatedly- to pass from the state of naivity to the state of experience. That is 
the reason that Hesiod insists in 218 that if Perses does not listen to him and 
ignores his message Perses' learning must be through suffering : " '" 1ta9ffiv 
oE "CE Vll1ttoC; £yvOl." 
So Hesiod concludes, whoever does not go far away from the just 
(OtKuiot) )53 and follows the right, causes productive and peaceful 
relationships among men and with divinities. In short, wherever there is 
justice, there is peace. 54 Justice is considered as the highest divine 
disposition which is given to men. The exercise of justice increases the 
ranks of illustrious men. Hence the act of giving one's solemn word implies 
a relation of complementarity between justice and uttering what is true: to 
give your word solemnly provides the foundations of justice; justice makes 
of the act of giving your word a moral virtue, because the person who tells 
and expresses what is true, discovers what is just. 55 
Justice is also a necessary condition of keeping oneself on the right 
road. This way of behaving requires daily effort. Therefore, the man of 
excellence (1tuvapuJ"Coc;) is for Hesiod the one who meditates and acts after 
such reflection, and follows the most reasonable course; the one who listens 
to and obeys sound advice. The 1tavaptcr"Coc; is the prototype of the 
Hesiodic hero, because becoming the best as an upshot of daily work gives 
moral primacy:56 
53 See ibid., 219-221. 
54 See ibid, 225-230 and 258-285. 
55 With respect to this point R. Lamberton says: "The individual in his relations with others and confronted 
with the whole range of possibilities of human actions must choose justice and at the same time keep 
before the mind's eye the corrective -and intensely imaginatively involving- spectacle of the consequences 
of unleashed absolute and irresponsible power" (Hesiod, Yale University Press, 1988, p. 94). 
56 See Works and Days, 313 fr. 
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"I say important things for you to hear, 
o foolish Perses: Badness can be caught 
In great abundance, easily; the road 
To her is level, and she lives near by. 
But Good is harder, for the gods have placed 
In front of her much sweat; the road is steep 
And long and rocky at the first, but when 
You reach the top, she is not hard to find. 
The man is best who reason for himself, 
Considering the future. Also good 
Is he who takes another's good advice. 
But he who neither thinks himself nor learns 
From others, is a failure as a man. ,,57 
It is also striking to see how Hesiod, with his base in the 
countryman's ethos, derives the inherent human dignity that conscientious 
work involves. This way of acting brings to the agent many gifts: favours 
from immortals and men, glory, wealth and merit. Fame is for Hesiod 
ape't1l, that is, a form of excellence as a result of hard working. 58 Idleness, 
as its contrary, gives rise to dishonouL 
What sort of justice does Hesiod propose? He proposes an equitable 
justice, that is, to give to and to love whoever gives to you and loves you, 
avoiding extremes such as usury or robbery. 59 
The just man is diligent and careful with his work; that is the reason 
of his prosperity: 60 he loves "good order" and keeps measure (JlE'tpa 
<puAaaaea8at) in the right moment (Katpoc;). These elements are the ideal 
57 Ibid, 286-297 (D. Wender's translation). 
58 See ibid, 308-313. 
59 See ibid, 352-363. 
60 See ibid, 412-474. 
66 
conditions in everything.61 In conclusion: the Works and Days shows us the 
Hesiodic model -maybe less spectacular than the Homeric, but equally 
forceful and educative: the one of the man with good habits62 that follows 
the good Strife, constantly and quietly; the man who works and lives in 
justice. 
In conclusion: there is some evidence, strictly speaking, of 
conversations in Hesiod's poems, but we fmd in his works a narrative 
which exhorts us to live a different sort of life: a moral of reflective 
thoughts and acts, based mainly on justice. Hesiod shows us the importance 
of internal dialogues in the model of the reflective or thoughtful character 
who possesses moral ideals and who deliberates about what the good and 
evil moral life imply. He portrays himself as a person giving sound advice 
to others. In the act of portraying this model and the anti-model, Hesiod 
gives a poetic expression of human life, the human condition and a mode of 
achieving awareness of it and of ameliorating it. That is his heritage to 
humanity. 
After having tried to show that epic is a mode of self-consciousness, 
somehow comparable with that involved in Platonic dialectic (dialogue) -
insofar as the function of dialectic for Plato is to reflect effectively, and 
Homer and Hesiod are perpetually reflecting, because they describe human 
beings as incomplete, and therefore as needing reflection- we can tum now 
to lyric poetry. 
b) Lyric 
61 See ibid, 694. 
62 See ibid., 470 ff 
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In line with the conducting thread of this section, we will show the sort of 
human consciousness that lyric poetry contains -in our judgement- and the 
elements that it provides for the emergence of dialectic. 
The first question that strikes us is the following: is it possible to talk 
about a lyric model of man? Our answer is affIrmative. We will give 
reasons for saying this. 
If we go through each lyric poet we notice that they try to portray a 
model of man which is a result of their personal inspiration, but always 
resorting to talk about civic values -proper to a city or region- presented in 
concrete models of people. In that sense lyric poetry gathers together 
concrete archetypes which are more accessible for ordinary people in the 
community to follow. Lyric poetry continues to show the tragic view of 
human life that epic poetry did: human beings become conscious again of 
their limitations, of their mortal, erratic and suffering fate. But despite this 
fact of permanent contingency, human beings get force and greatness from 
weakness. Lyric poetry is still a call to become better in a communitarian 
context; it is a call to human beings not to be tempted by excess or apathy. 
There are some verses -according to Plato 63 -attributed to Pindar and 
some of the divine poets which say: 
"Persephone will return to the sun above in the ninth year 
the souls of those from whom 
she will exact punishment for old miseries, 
and from these come noble kings, 
mighty in strength and greatest in wisdom, 
and for the rest of time men will call them sacred heroes. ,,64 
63 SeeMeno, 81b5-c4. 
64 Frg. 133 Snell, (translated by G. M. A. Grube). 
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Pindar also says: 
"Do not, my soul, pursue the life of gods 
with longing, but exhaust all practicable means. ,,65 
There are three main reasons for emphasising these two passages according 
to our main thesis in this section: 1. to show that lyric poetry contains a 
particular sort of model of man which is based on the poets' view of life and 
their desire to persuade us of the tragic human condition and the way to 
confront or overcome it (as the fIrst passage illustrates); 2. to show that lyric 
poetry implies an evolving understanding of how developing metaphorical 
or fIctional internal dialogues -as we have shown in the cases of Homer and 
Hesiod66 - will be central for the understanding of one of Plato's senses of 
dialectic (as the second passage illustrates); 3. to show that despite the fact 
that lyric poetry tends to express the personal views of the poet, these views 
are normally connected with communitarian ideals that bring us back to the 
idea of communication, dialogue and search for human completion. 
Two of the main characteristics of lyric poetry are its simplicity and 
naivety. These two features are recurrent in its topics: death, descriptions of 
graceful girls, the eulogy of young age, the fleetingness of time, nostalgia, 
love, imaginery descriptions of gods' shapes, etc. What is clear is that with 
lyric feeling there is a stress on expressing common values shared by a city 
or a region but captured in a very personal style. That was due to the 
resistance that cities had to offer against invasions and as a way of showing 
regional pride. 67 It is precisely from this form of consciousness that lyric 
portrays a particular view of men: there is a vital dignity in human beings 
65 Pindar, Pythian 3,61-62 (translated by A. M. Miller, Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1996). 
66 See supra, pp. 44-45 (to recall our main argument); pp. 54-56 (for Homer) and p. 67 (for Hesiod). 
67 The cases of Callinus, Tyrtaeus and Pindar are particularly illustrative. 
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which is shown in any sort of understanding or supportive relationship. 
From the expression of personal views Greek lyric gives a message of 
courage to the community because all of us share the same fragile and faded 
human nature, but as a fruit of this poetic expression and because of this 
communication we get some notion of our completion. 
One of the virtues that the model of "lyric man" stresses and 
considers as the highest in the community is courage. Courage is a poetic 
evocation of the collective consciousness of honour. This consciousness 
opens to the person who practises courage the following vital and moral 
possibilities: the highest honour if he gives his life for his city; the 
achievement of fame as a result of his personal effort, and of dignity as a 
result of his exercise of good and just behavior. Again, as in epic poetry, 
honour always has communitarian connotations, because it implies that 
somebody else has to see you doing great deeds. Callinus gives us an 
illustration of this: 
"How long will you lie idle? When will you young 
men 
take courage? Don't our neighbours make you 
feel 
ashamed, so much at ease? You look to sit at 
peace, 
but all the country's in the grip of war! 
and throw your last spear even as you die. 
F or proud it is and precious for a man to fight 
defending country, children, wedded wife 
against the foe. Death comes no sooner that the 
Fates 
have spun the thread; so charge, turn not aside, 
with levelled spear and brave heart in behind the 
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shield 
from the first moment that the armies meet. 
A man has no escape from his appointed death, 
not though his blood be of immortal stock. 
Men sometimes flee the carnage and the clattering 
of spears, and meet their destiny at home, 
but such as these the people do not love or miss: 
the hero's fate is mourned by high and low. 
Everyone feels the loss of the stout-hearted man 
who dies; alive, he ranks with demigods, 
for in the people's eyes he is a tower of strength, 
his single efforts worth a company's.,,68 
So too Tyrtaeus: 
"But Heracles unvanquished sowed your stock: 
take heart! Zeus bows not yet beneath the yoke. 
Fear not the throng of men, tum not to flight 
but straight toward the front line bear your 
shields, 
despising life and welcoming the dark 
contingencies of death like shafts of sun. 
You know what wre~k the woeful War-god makes, 
and are well to the grim fight's temper tuned. 
You have been with pursuers and pursued, 
you young men, and had bellyful of both. 
You know that those who bravely hold the line 
and press toward engagement at the front 
die in less numbers, with the ranks behind 
protected; those who run, lose all esteem. ,,69 
68 Callinus, Frg. 1 West (M. L. West's translation). 
69 Tyrtaeus, Frg. 11 West (M. L. West's translation). 
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Another virtue which some lyric poets insist we should cultivate as 
central is wisdom, as an act of learning or searching for what human life is. 
F or our purposes these lyric considerations are central because they show us 
the process that lyric poets suggest for acquiring this wisdom. This process 
is described as the result of an internal reflection. The purpose is to show us 
through this reflective process that any human being can know and improve 
himself. Lyric poets show us the way to get practical wisdom that comes 
from experience. This practical wisdom is central because it is the best 
source for providing us with knowledge of human nature and the ability to 
discern how to live a better life. On this point, Solon is a very illustrative 
case. F or him the way of wisdom has its grounds in experience. Real 
wisdom consists in the act of acknowledgment that wisdom is a process of 
permanent search and renewal, not a fixed condition. In Solon, it is clear 
that all his poetical reflections are a call to be heard by his community. We 
will see a clear example of this in the following verses: 
"But wisdom's hidden fonnula, which holds the key 
to all things, is the hardest to discem.,,7o 
and 
"As I grow old I'm always learning more.,,7! 
It is also interesting to remark that in Solon's political poems there is 
a connection between the benefits that poetical wisdom can provide 
individually as an act of self-reflection, and politics as a communal activity 
which requires practical wisdom in the person who wants to practise it -i.e., 
70 Solon, Frg.16 West (M. L. West's translation). 
71 Solon Frag. 18 West (M. L. West's translation): YTJpacncco S' aiEl 1toUa StSacrK6~EVo<;. 
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politics- reasonably. What Solon asks from the Muses, more than anything 
else, is the advice that will enable him to govern successfully with Justice as 
his guideline. Justice implies for Solon temperance, honesty, equanimity 
and consistency in his actions. 72 
Still on this topic of wisdom, Xenophanes in his lyric fragments 
insists on the human necessity of finding what is good as an act of freely 
searching for the best. At the same time he contrasts the gods' perfection 
and human insufficiency with the aim of emphasising human limitations 
and human possibilities. This is a way that lyric poetry provides more light 
in relation to human condition and human self-consciousness: 
"The gods have not of course, revealed all things to mortals 
from the beginning; 
but rather, seeking in the course of time, they discover 
what is better." 73 
V irtue is in Theognis mainly an upshot of learning from the good 
example that "good" human beings can bring to their community. The poet 
advises us to be close to and in company with the better sort of man because 
they are the source of practical wisdom.74 Following the Hesiodic tradition, 
Theognis opposes sense or judgement (yvIDJlll) -the greatest value- to lack 
of moderation: 
"The gods give nothing better to a man 
Than sense, Kumos; with sense, a man controls 
The outcome of all action. He who has 
Sense in his thoughts is lucky, for it is 
72 See Solon, Frags. 1-4, 13. 
73 Xenophanes, 18 D-K (A. M. Miller's translation). 
74 See Theognis, Elegies, 27-38. 
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Stronger than evil pride and wretched greed. 
There's no worse thing for mortal men than greed; 
Greed, Kurnos, is the source of every wrong. ,,75 
For Archilochus the mettle of any man is tested when he knows and 
appreciates that all human beings are subject to the ups and downs of 
fortune. That conception will be central for tackling the meaning of tragic 
consciousness. The lesson that he thinks that everybody has to learn is to 
distinguish the "reason" that motivates the behaviour of any individual and 
to try to keep this reason within human limits and possibilities. That is, one 
should not become euphoric or over-optimistic with happy events or too 
overcome by sorrows because both will be always present in human life. 76 
The key for Archilochus is to be found in the understanding of the 
changeability of human life and not surpassing human boundaries. 
Because, Archilochus advises us: 
"Tis fortune and fate, Pericles, that give a man all things.,,77 
As for Simonides, he will try to give us a more systematic view about 
what human virtue is by linking it to what he considers true, worthy, 
excellent and good for one's city. Simonides insists on indicating that the 
truth always imposes itself. He tells us that just to a few people gods 
concede perseverance in the practice that virtue involves. Human destiny is 
imperfection, but when human beings recognise their limited condition they 
75 Ibid., 1171-1176. 
76 See Archilochus,frg. 67a (Diehl). 
77 Archilochus, frg. 8 (Diehl) (J. M. Edmonds' translation). It is important to stress that for Archilochus 
the heroic virtue of dying for your city is the highest. In that sense communitarian ideals remain 
fundamental. As Homer and Hesiod show us in their poetry, the act of sharing and communicating values 
is central because it is a way that through dialogue we can understand and overcome our tragic human 
condition as insufficient and mortal beings. 
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can become virtuous through their own efforts. It is worth noticing that 
Simonides -like the majority of lyric poets- addresses his poetry to the 
community, insisting on the key meaning of virtue. To become virtuous 
always has communitarian connotations: it is a call for courage, it is call to 
achieve the highest honour, that is, to die for your city.78 The following 
passage illustrates how difficult is for human beings to get excellence: 
"There is saying 
that Excellence dwells on cliff ledges difficult to climb 
and there tends, close to the gods, a hallowed spot. 
Not to all mortals' eyes 
is she visible, but only to one upon whom heart-rending 
sweat 
comes from within, 
and who in that way reaches the height of manliness. ,,79 
In the case of Pindar we can find important elements for our 
purposes. He insists on the cultivation of three fundamental values: 1. 
wisdom to govern a community with 2. justice and 3. always to utter the 
truth. 80 His personal lyric evocation of human virtues is always in a 
communitarian context. The act of sharing these important values and of 
expressing poetically their intrinsic sense to an audience brings out why 
willingness in dialogue, communication and sharing of common things are 
central to consolidating a community, to getting an understanding and 
overcoming our limited condition. Pindar is a poet who celebrates in his 
poems public events that show us somebody's abilities or merits. In that 
sense, Pindar's poems have a very didactic aim: they strengthen 
78 See Simonides,frgs. 531, 542. 
79 Simonides,frg. 579 (A. M. Miller's translation). 
80 See Pin dar , Pythian I, 81-87. 
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communitarian links by extolling individual glories. These individuals 
become social models worthy of being imitated. Furthermore Pindar clearly 
expresses a poetic consciousness of the human tragic condition. Human 
beings are contingent, ephemeral, submitted to a random destiny and to the 
gods' will. All these elements are combined with one which is fundamental: 
in spite of mortals' being subject to changeability they can still forge their 
humanity, as long as they allow themselves to be illuminated by the gods. 
The reason is that human possibilities and what is good come from 
divinities: 
"He who has newly won some noble object 
and feels himself buoyed up in luxury 
soars in his kindled hopes 
on winged deeds of manhood, his ambitions 
outstrippping mere concern for wealth. With suddenness, 
for mortals, 
pleasure springs up and grows, but so it also falls to earth, 
shaken by purposes of adverse power. 
Being defined by each new day! What is a man? 
What is he not? 
A shadow's dream 
is humankind. But when the gleam that Zeus dispenses 
comes, 
the brilliant light rests over men, and life is kindly ... ,,81 
Sometimes there is, in some lyric poets, a hint of bitterness in relation 
to human destiny and a sort of complaint addressed to gods. Others 
maintain a more positive view. That is relevant for our purposes because 
81 Pindar, Pythian VIII, 88-97 (A. M. Miller's translation). See also Pythian L 41-46 and Nemean VI, Str. 
1, 1-7. 
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the way that lyric poets portray and question this pessimistic or unbalanced 
view of life is a clear prelude to the tragic consciousness that will be 
presented in drama in a dialogic form. For example, Callinus considers that 
human destiny is inevitable. We will die and life does not offer positive 
chances.82 Solon's view is that it is fate which gives good and bad things to 
human beings. Gods give their gifts indiscriminately. Any human action 
involves risk: when you undertake any project you do not know the outcome 
of the adventure. The man who tries to act correctly cannot predict that a 
resounding failure is coming. Another person who acted evilly, receives all 
sorts of successes and good luck from the gods. All of this can cover his 
negligence. In short: the divine moves in mysterious ways according to the 
perspective of human beings: 
"Fate brings to mortal men both good and ill: the 
gifts 
the immortals give are inescapable. 
There's risk in every undertaking. No one knows, 
when something starts, how it will finish up. 
One man makes noble efforts, but despite them 
all 
falls into unforeseen calamity; 
another handles ill, yet God gives him complete 
success, from his folly's consequence ... ,,83 
Hence the bitter complaint of Theognis to Zeus. The poet admits that 
Zeus governs with glory and great personal power, but he concedes the 
same fate to a just man and to the evil one. Theognis launches these 
questions: why does an hon~st man have infInite misfortune? Why does 
82 See Callinus, 1 (Diehl). 
83 Solon, 13 (M. L. West's translation). 
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the man with lack of moderation have unlimited fortune? Why does the just 
man achieve unhappiness, misery and powerlessness?84 For Theognis 
human life is essentially ill-fated, and it is much better never to be born or to 
die as soon as possible. The tension between human fate and human 
possibilities to become better is totally unbalanced: fate, normally, wins. 
There are no real possibilities for self-improvement because for Theognis 
nobody has the formula to teach people how to become virtuous or 
intelligent or how to transform themselves. 85 
Simonides openly exhorts us to be aware of our human contingency: 
we are susceptible to a different sort of uncertainties, our power is 
minuscule and, without the help of the gods, virtue is inaccessible. Human 
life is work and risk: 
"As you are mortal, don't ever affinrt what 
tomorrow will bring, 
or how long the man that you see in good fortune 
will keep it: 
not even the wing-spreading house-fly 
changes perch so fast. ,,86 
To summarise: lyric poetry continues to have a similar importance to 
that of epic poetry for our purposes. It portrays in a kind "metaphorical 
dialogue,,87 the tragic human condition and possible ways of overcoming it 
or in some cases -as we just have showed- to succumb to pessimism. 
Despite the fact that lyric poetry portrays the individual views of each poet, 
these approaches relate to communitarian contexts and ideals. That brings 
84 See Theognis, Elegies 373-392. 
85 Ibid ,425-439. 
86 Simonides, Frg. 521. 
87 See supra, footnote 66. 
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us back again to the idea that communication and dialogue between the poet 
and his audience remains central to representing and understanding 
ourselves as human beings. Lyric poetry is a communitarian call to self-
awareness and self-improvement. Sometimes it is an expression of the way 
that we have to bear our grief with dignity; sometimes it is an open 
complaint about our limited human condition. In these two latter senses 
lyric poetry is the threshold to tragedy. 
c) Tragedy 
Our next and unavoidable step is to clarify the relationship between 
dialogue and tragedy, that is, the key presence of OtaAEYEa8at in the 
structure of tragedy. It is true that in Homer we can appreciate the presence 
of well developed characters. In Hesiod we can see a similar pattern with 
his reflective characters. The point is that Homer's and Hesiod's works are 
still narrative poems and the narrator has to introduce any character or event 
of the story to the readers. In lyric we can appreciate metaphorical 
conversations, but not direct dialogues between independent characters. 
What is defmitive is that dialogue or the dialogic form or structure is, on the 
other hand, essential to tragedy. This open dialogue and confrontation 
between independent characters might permit us to talk about a dialectic of 
tragedy. It is in tragedy that we fmd for the frrst time an extended 
representation of dialogic human activity. That is, we can see different 
kinds of human discourse -including soliloquy and monologues- among 
different characters. In other words: OtaAEYEa8at as human conversation is 
obvious in tragedy. 88 In that sense tragedy is a direct literary antecedent of 
the Platonic formal dialogic style of writing. 
88 A good example of the intense and intrinsic dialogic form of tragedy might be found in Aeschylus' 
Seven Against Thebes, particularly in 375-652. 
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In this last section on the literary antecedents of dialectic there will be 
three main parts: 
L Whatever we have said about dialogue as a literary antecedent of 
dialectic in epic and lyric is even clearer in tragedy. We will propose that 
the dialogic content of the three tragedians includes a poetic reflection on 
the human tragic condition. Because of our human insufficiency we need 
communication and completion. Drama pictures a way of completion in its 
heroic characters. The dramatist portrays them in such a way that we can 
appreciate the process in which they acquire this tragic self-consciousness 
through well defined conversations. The moral message of this tragic 
conversation is central insofar as it contains two main points: 1. a proposal 
of a model of man and 2. a communitarian model of humanity. 
II. We will set examples of that in the three tragic poets, stressing the 
slight differences in the way that they illustrate my points. 
ill. We will show that in the particular case of Euripides the dialogic 
form is central because he illustrates with his tragedies a specific mode of 
verbal intercourse that has many formal similarities to the Socratic-Platonic 
idea of dialectic as a philosophical method of conversation through 
questions and answers. 
1. The dialogic content of tragedy: 
Tragedy is even more central for our purposes. In tragedy, poetic 
consciousness acquires a defmitive form through dialogue. What tragedy 
adds in relation to epic and lyric is that characters are talking directly to 
each other. Furthermore, characters are openly talking about the human 
condition and they are aware that this human condition moves between 
necessity -what is determined- and liberty -what it is possible to change. In 
tragedy it is noticeable that characters are talking about values -and the 
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personal challenge that that implies for their achievement - as a pre-eminent 
way of completing human nature. 
Tragedy is fundamental in the process of the emergence of human 
self-consciousness. Socially speaking, tragedy was an activity that was 
present in the community through the institution of tragic competitions. 
Aesthetically speaking, tragedy is a new creation as a literary genre. 
Psychologically speaking, tragedy implies a deep human change insofar as 
tragic man and tragic consciousness take defInite shape through the formal 
representation of actual dialogues. 89 
The invention of tragedy involves something new in human 
experience: the idea that human beings are questioning, responsive and 
responsible. Let me explain. The tragic sense of responsibility involves the 
portrayal of independent characters who are talking openly and directly 
about themselves and their activity. In tragedy human beings are a question 
for themselves. Human action becomes problematic and an object of 
"poetic reflection". To understand the message of the tragic poets implies 
understanding what tragic consciousness involves, that is that everything 
that is related to human beings is an open question. 90 The tragic 
performance becomes central because it portrays the wide range of human 
experiences as an object of dialogic understanding. The tragic experience 
involves a deep human meaning, produces a reflection in the audience and 
through dialogue shows us many different possible human ways of acting 
The three tragic poets present different features in their 
characterisation of tragic human consciousness through conversations. 
89 See, J. P. Vemant et P. Vidal-Naquet, My the et tragMie ell Grece ancienne, Volume I, Maspero, Paris, 
p.27. 
90 See ibid, Preface, p. 9. 
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Aeschylus 
Aeschylus' tragic consciousness gives the greatest weight to fate. The hero 
debates in a dilemma of consciousness which oscillates from the 
inevitability of things, due to the power of misfortune that comes from the 
gods' impositions, to the small chance of acting in a different way. This 
possibility of acting in a different way is presented generally as a process of 
reflection and deliberation by the protagonist who is in dialogue with other 
characters and as a process of persuasion from the gods who talk to the 
character to urge him to act against any sort of excess: violence, revenge, 
arrogance, etc. 
The human condition involves a paradox for Aeschylus: we become 
aware of our incomplete condition through different sorts of experiences, 
and preeminently through suffering. But it is in the act of sharing, 
interchanging and communicating these experiences with others that we get 
completion. All human experiences take us back always to communitarian 
or dialogic contexts. Even the most personal experience is susceptible to 
communication, and in that way the individual who has it gets clarity and 
understanding about it, when he talks directly and explains it to others. That 
is the reason that Aeschylus' well defmed characters become concrete 
models of humanity and that tragedy and its representation are central for 
the community. 
The subject who lives this transformational process experiences a 
change that makes him more human because he becomes aware of what he 
is and what he can become. Hence, suffering is the threshold of awareness 
of human dignity. 
Aeschylus tries to emphasise the element of fmitude as central for the 
clear understanding of the tragic human condition. From this we may infer 
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that for Aeschylus the human condition is sad because of its ephemeral 
nature: prosperous and ill-fated events will vanish anyway. 
Aeschylus' aim is to redeem his heroes in an environment of freedom 
in spite of the huge limitations that permeate human life. A typical feature 
of his tragedies is to portray great contrasts, mainly through verbal 
interchanges between human beings and the gods and among different 
characters. Human beings participate in a permanent self-cognitive and 
deliberated determination before the divine powers. This participation is an 
evolving process that shows us the different elements involved in the 
development of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a matter of 
responsibility before one's destiny. Even when the fate is unhappy the 
effects on the subject who experiences them are beneficial, because to suffer 
involves knowledge. 
Tragic characters in Aeschylus are human beings in action, nearly 
always at a crossroads and with the necessity ( destiny) of deciding 
(freedom) something in which they are totally involved. They are searching 
for the best path, in a reflexive deliberation. In that sense Aeschylus follows 
the line of tradition that comes from epic and lyric in which characters -or 
poetic subjects- are portrayed reflecting. The tragic Aeschylean characters 
are in a direct and open deliberative internal dialogue and in conversation 
with other characters before they make their fmal decision. 91 
Thus, the tragic view of man in Aeschylus has a double motivation: 
the necessary-decision. Because we are incomplete we need completion, 
and in the search for completion we have to decide, to act. Then to what 
extent are human beings their own source of action? Let us see: the hero of 
the drama is confronted by a superior necessity that is imposed on him and 
that addresses him, at least initially (destiny), but the internal movement of 
91 The ethical orientation of Greek tragedies is shown in the feature that dramatic characters act with will 
and responsibility. The tragic character is based in a permanent and problematic tension: he has to debate 
between decision and destiny. 
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his character assumes this necessity and confronts it (freedom). It is in this 
space that human beings fmd a degree or margin of free decision; without it, 
it would be impossible to talk about responsibilities and acts attributable to a 
subject. In that sense the Aeschylean hero is a conscious individual and 
therefore, executor and guarantor of his acts. 
Tragic consciousness is for Aeschylus an upshot of human dialogic 
experience. That implies an understanding, through suffering, of our own 
limitations and possibilities. We cannot avoid the weight of necessity, but 
we can confront necessity with the measure fixed by the gods: good 
decisions centred in moderate actions. 
Sophocles 
Turning now to Sophocles, we will see that he has many similarities to 
Aeschylus. The pathos of Sophoclean tragedy is presented by the poet -as 
in Aeschylus- through a permanent game of contrast. Self-consciousness is 
achieved insofar as human beings become aware of their essential 
insufficiency and the possibility of becoming better. F or Sophocles any 
possibility of completion implies a good self-knowledge, that is, knowing 
yourself in all your different aspects. In Sophocles and Aeschylus the 
respect that human beings have to keep for gods' laws continues to be a key 
for a virtuous life. 
In Sophocles -as in Aeschylus- you cannot, of course, avoid your fate 
because it is a matter of necessity, but at the same time he introduces some 
different elements in seeking to show what the tragic consciousness is. 
Sophocles' characters are presented as stronger and with more margin for 
action than in Aeschylus when they have to confront fate and take a 
personal and risky decision. 
84 
Sophocles develops the idea that experience gives moderation. The 
latter is understood as prudence and temperance. A moderate life is the key 
to getting fortitude, courage and self-control. The ideal of moderation is for 
Sophocles an upshot of a permanent human tension between the experience 
of living extremes, basically, suffering and happiness. That is the reason 
that Sophocles portrays human nature through the experience of the heroic 
condition. To become a hero is a process of humanisation, that is, of self-
conSClOusness. In fact, the most tragic feature of the Sophoclean tragedy 
resides in the recognition of the impossibility of avoiding suffering. 
Sophocles is not talking about a suffering masochistically self-inflicted or 
looked for, but a suffering which is inevitable and recognised as such in 
light of our human limited condition. For Sophocles suffering with wisdom 
dignifies the sufferer and improves him as a human being: to become aware 
of ourselves requires wisdom that comes from experience, particularly, 
painful experiences. Tragic consciousness is mainly in Sophocles an upshot 
of intensive dialogues among his characters: 
Another fundamental source of experience comes from human verbal 
interchanges. A sound dialogue requires a person capable of giving good 
advice and a patient interlocutor who listens to this and acquires a good 
disposition to direct or correct his life in a reasonable way. 
Euripides 
Euripides' characters are shown many times in internal debates and legal 
debates. That will be central for the origins of rhetoric and dialectic.92 
The Euripidean pathos puts in tension two human forces: the rational 
and the irrational- the last one is sometimes adjacenct to horror. 
92 We will develop this idea in part ill below. 
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Euripides' tragedies put into question many values that were thought 
immutable: what prevail are deceitful decisions among men, faith in gods 
begins to teeter, women's condition will be transformed since they will get 
good fame and prestige. 93 
Euripides is an inquisitive explorer of the human soul in its most 
contradictory feelings and passions. He combines these preoccupations 
with the influences that he receives from philosophy as a rational knowledge 
of reality and the study of the human being as a subject-matter. 
Euripides likes to put in contrast and to emphasise -like the majority 
of the epic, lyric and tragic poets- human happiness and misfortunes. He 
has the peculiarity of portraying characters skilful in criticism, who manifest 
the intrinsically and problematic nature of human beings and the 
questioning of everything that was conventionally accepted. 
The understanding of tragic cot;lsciousness in Aeschylus, Sophocles 
and Euripides will reveal us a simple truth: we are limited beings. We get 
self-knowledge through experience and preeminently through living dialogic 
relationships. Tragic heroism and self-awareness are united as a permanent 
human adventure of rediscovering what a human being is and what human 
possibilities are. 
II. Examples of dialogic activity in the three tragedians: 
Aeschylus 
Aeschylus presents in the Oresteia his conception of the meaning of human 
suffering. The way of prudence is given to men through a "beneficial 
violence" from the gods. Hence: 
93 See Medea, 410-420. 
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"Zeus has led us on to know, 
the Helmsman lays it down as law 
That we must suffer, suffer into truth. 
We cannot sleep, and drop by drop at the heart 
the pain of pain remembered comes again, 
and we resist, but ripeness comes as well. 
From the gods enthroned on the awesome rowing-bench 
there comes a violent love. ,,94 
The key to interpretation is in verse 178: 'tii> 1t(len Jl<leo~. The pathos as a 
deeply passive-active experience -that is, of testing, suffering- is the source 
of knowledge, education and learning. This understanding implies prudence 
and good sense. The result of that "beneficial violence" of the gods causes 
human beings to learn to examine themselves -as a result of unhappy 
experiences- and learn how to act with prudence and wisdom as a result of a 
better self-knowledge. Suffering illuminates reflection; thinking illuminates 
active experience. Aeschylus shows in an incipient mode a clear process 
towards self-knowledge. Let me make myself clear. Human tragic 
consciousness is recognised and internalised as such through the act of 
conversation among his characters. The way that one becomes aware about 
one's human condition is because of and through the act of talking with 
other human beings. Human consciousness is pre-eminently expressive. 
Human experience and learning are linked in Aeschylus with the 
virtue of justice. The virtue of justice gives understanding to those who 
have suffered and at the same time a kind of state of self-alert about 
yourself and the state of things. 95 The man who acts according to justice 
achieves honest aims. 96 
94 Aeschylus, The Oresteia. Agamemnon, 177-184 (translated byR. Fagles, Penguin, reprint, 1979). 
95 See ibid, 248-257. 
96 See ibid, 761-766. 
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In the Choephoroi Aeschylus will be explicit in relation to the 
contrast between prudence and lack of moderation. It is worth noticing that 
he defmes prudence in oral terms. He states that the "prudent tongue" is the 
one who knows when he must keep quiet and says the right word at the 
right r,noment. 97 The role of language shows us how human verbal 
interchanges can enrich us as human beings when we pronounce or we 
listen to the appropriate word. The acquisition of tragic consciousness is a 
dialogic matter which implies learning how to speak and how to listen to 
our interlocutors. Lack of moderation is defmed as a transgression of 
justice and disdain of divine will.98 That is, excess is understood as a lack 
of knowledge of our limited condition. Dialogue is again central because 
verbal interchanges become a fundamental source of self-knowlege and in 
general of knowledge of the human condition. Aeschylus glimpses that a 
sound conversation with a suitable interlocutor might be the way par 
excellence to transform a human being. That will be central for the 
Socratic-Platonic idea of dialectic as the best mode of communication and 
teaching. 
The Eumenides is a play dedicated to justice. The latter is personified 
m Athena's character. The goddess scolds the Furies because they 
pretended to be just without being just. 99 Aeschylus shows us too that terror 
is dreadful, but healthy, because it helps us to be cautious in our intentions 
and it is like a warning against evil. One must never vilify justice: 
FURIES: 
"There is a time when terror helps, 
the watchman must stand guard upon the heart. 
97 See Choephoroi, 568-571. 
98 See ibid., 579-588; 614-633. 
99 See Eumenides, 419-445. 
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It helps, at times, to suffer into truth. 
Is there a man who knows no fear 
in the brightness of his heart, 
or a man's city, both are one, 
that still reveres the rightS?IOO 
The tragedy concludes with an important moral lesson: 10 l one must 
not praise any extreme. The gods have fixed a norm for any right action 
which is the just mean (~£O"ov). Every excess ('o~Pt<;) is a result of arrogant 
impiety. The man who follows fmn reason achieves happiness which is the 
deepest human yearning. In accordance with the main tenor of his dramas 
Aeschylus insists that the recognition of our tragic condition involves the 
acceptance of our limited nature, constrained to change and to the gods. 
The key to good or positive free decisions is in the permanent awareness of 
the need to keep a reasonable measure in everything. The Eumenides 
stresses particularly how men may come to understand their human 
condition through their relationship with the gods. Even if divinities send 
suffering to human beings, this is beneficial insofar as it is an excellent way 
to self-knowledge and therefore of completion. It is in the confrontation of 
individual and collective suffering and in the act of sharing feelings of 
compassion with others and understanding the reasons for the suffering of 
human beings that drama portrays vividly what we are and what we can be. 
Sophocles 
We tum now to Sophocles' tragedies. The Ajax suggests repeatedly that 
human beings are ghosts or mere shadows. When the gods warn us, we 
100 Ibid, 529-535 (translated by R. Fagles, Penguin, reprint, 1979). 
101 See ibid, 536-545. 
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must contemplate our own condition and how to live a moderate life. A 
moderate life is for Sophocles a clear expression of prudence. Furthermore, 
the gods love men who are not arrogant. 102 
Ajax is recognised as a hero or as a man of excellence -even by his 
enemies- because of his greatness that permits him to stand out among other 
people. Greatness implies that the hero is not captivated by futile hopes; he 
lives and dies with honour. Nevertheless, U~Pt~ has been developing in 
Ajax after his success as a warrior. He thinks that he does not need the 
gods' help any more. 103 Ajax lost this "healthy" fear of gods; he forgot that 
human beings succeed when they think carefully, with intelligence and in 
dialogue with the gods. In short: Sophocles shows us through the figure of 
Aj ax that any form of excess goes against justice. Dubious victories just 
give ephemeral happiness. But again, as in Aeschylus, it is only through 
experience that mortals know how everyday events will be, not before 
that. 104 In Ajax human self-consciousness is, first and foremost, a 
recognition of our dependence on the gods and therefore of our contingent 
nature and the requirement of completion. 
In the Women of Trachis tragic consciousness is acquired through the 
experience of the man who knows how to take a risk -even if he has to 
suffer- with the aim of achieving his purposes. This daring has its grounds 
in human self-consciousness: our mortal destiny keeps changing -sometimes 
we get bad fortune, but sometimes we get good fortune. That is the reason 
that human beings can see an optimistic side to life. The Chorus addresses 
Deianeira: 
102 See Ajax, 121-133. 
103 See ibid., 748-783. 
104 See ibid., 1418-1420. 
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"When you complain of this fortune, I feel with you, but I shall oppose you; for I 
say that you should not wear away all hopefulness. Not even the son of Kronos, who 
ordains all things, has given mortals a fate free from pain; but as it were the revolving 
paths of the Bear bring to all suffering and joy in turn. ,,105 
Equally the Chorus points out to Deianeira that to achieve knowledge, 
experience is necessary. From this experience we learn that we are fallible 
beings. From here Sophocles drawns a moral lesson: there is a fundamental 
difference between the error voluntarily made and the one made 
involuntarily. The latter does not have to cause us any sort of worry or 
uneasiness; the former is impossible to redeem, that is, there is no hope that 
can give us strength to carry on. Sophocles is demanding in relation to the 
moral importance of each of his characters: each personal condition and 
nature require the fulfIlment of certain requirements of the dignity that they 
involve. We are responsible beings. Because of that we have to struggle 
and to try to search for the best way towards personal completion despite the 
fact that we will make mistakes. 
Antigone and Oedipus are, in my judgement, the tragic heroes par 
excellence in Sophocles' dramas, 
Antigone displays in her character a series of attributes that make her 
deeply human, but at the same time heroic. She confronts her destiny with 
responsibility. Let me make myself clear. 
First of all, Sophocles introduces the tragedy by showing us that the 
inherited fate of the Oedipal lineage holds in those on whom falls great 
suffering. 106 Secondly, Antigone does not let herself be influenced by 
human customs or human laws because they are changeable. Honourably 
105 The Women of Trachis (translated by H. Lloyd-Jones, Harvard University Press, Reprint, Cambridge 
Mass.lLondon, 1998). 
106 See Antigone, 1-10. 
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and piously, she decides to follow the divine law, despite the fact that that 
will be seen as a crime by everybody and, because it breaks the relevant 
human law, she will be condemned to death. 107 It is worth noticing that for 
Sophocles the weight of fate is less strong than in Aeschylus. 
Sophocles presents -through the Chorus- his conception of human 
beings that summarises what the tragic consciousness is for him: man is the 
most formidable thing on earth, but at the same time he is terrible. 
Sometimes he addressess his intelligence and his skill to the good, 
sometimes to bad things. There are two things that human beings cannot 
avoid taking into consideration: death is impassible and divine justice 
inviolable. lo8 
Sophocles carries out a game of contrasts personified on the one side 
by Antigone and Haemon and on the other by Creon and Ismene. In the 
well-defmed character of Antigone, Sophocles shows us -through intense 
dialogues- the tension that any serious human decision implies. Antigone 
clarifies her decisions through the different dialogues that she has with 
herself and with others. Sophocles presents dialogues in action as central 
for achieving a clear understanding of your personal human condition. It is 
through different interchanges with other characters in the drama that 
Antigone is envisaged as being able to achieve an appropriate view of her 
complex personal situation. Sophocles represents in Antigone the human 
condition: we are complex beings, with plenty of determining and 
conditioning factors, but we are at the same time capable of seeing our way 
through to free decisions. Let us see. Antigone rebukes Creon because he 
does and says with impunity whatever he pleases; and despite the fact that 
he has called her a crazy woman, she knows that she governs herself in 
107 See ibid, 69-77. 
108 See ibid., 332-375. 
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accordance with a superior law: her own conscience that follows the gods, 
and supervenes human laws and customs. 109 Antigone personifies human 
authenticity in the sense that she is consistent: she acts according to her 
thoughts. That is worth noticing because Sophocles portrays -as do the epic 
and lyric poets- reflective and independent characters who are aware of and 
responsible for their actions. 
The young Haemon tries to make his old and experienced father see 
that reason is the greatest good that the gods have given to men. Haemon 
insists to him that his obstinacy has blinded him into keeping his own point 
of view as the only sensible one on the basis that he is an old man with 
experience. Because: 
Haemon.- " ... It is not shameful for a man, even if he is wise, often to learn 
things and not to resist too much. ,,110 
Haemon's conclusion is that whoever speaks with moderation is somebody 
worth listening to. Whoever thinks rightly, it is because he is "full of 
knowledge"; but it is good too to learn from those who can give you a good 
counsel. F or Sophocles what keeps human acts in a reasonable measure is 
consistency between thoughts and actions. This consistency is achieved 
through the light that conversations provide. That is, for Sophocles a well 
balanced moral life comes from the capacity to listen to sound interlocutors, 
to think and to assimilate the content of what you have listened to and to act 
in accordance with that. 
The tragedy closes with Antigone's [mal dilemma of consciousness: 
she admits -in dialogue with the Chorus- that she goes to Hades, freely and 
\09 See ibid, 450-473; 506-507. 
JIG Ibid, 710-711 (H. Lloyd-Jones' translation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.lLondon, 
1998). 
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by her own will, but she questions the gods: why does this process involve 
so much suffering, and why with her pious attitude does she pass as 
godless? Were her actions are correct or not? Finally, and after 
conversations with other characters and internal dialogues with herself she 
concludes that despite everything, she is acting correctly, that is, devoutly. III 
Tiresias provides the fmal balance to Creon, because he makes Creon 
see -in a key conversation of the tragedy- that making mistakes is common 
to human beings~ that obstinacy is even worse, because it always implies 
senselessness. Tiresias adds that the misfortunes that the gods send to 
mortals affect the foolish very easily. In spite of everything, Creon has to 
give up, since he realises that it is vain to fight against fate. Sophocles' 
lesson is that human fortune fluctuates, but the truth always prevails 
because it is the right thing and we should listen to it. 112 
Thus good sense is the first step towards achieving a happy life. The 
secret resides in not challenging the gods, because any excess exacts its cost. 
Boasters only learn and could acquire wisdom after they suffer themselves 
the negative consequences of their arrogance. 113 
Oedipus is the archetype of human suffering and experience. This 
negative experience is for Sophocles -as for Aeschylus- the master par 
excellence. Furthermore: the possibility of understanding misfortunes is 
only opened when one has suffered reversals of fortune and one has 
experienced the mysterious and secret determinations of divinities. 114 
Sophocles presents a clear contrast between fate and freedom m 
Oedipus' character. On the one side he is not responsible for his 
III See ibid, 891-928. 
112 See ibid, 1155-1171; 1192-1195. 
113 See ibid, 1348 ff 
114 See Oedipus Tyrannus, 35-46. 
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misfortunes, but the victim who suffers the consequences of what is 
imposed on him. Nevertheless, he takes the initiative and responsibility of 
knowing this destiny. 
The tragic situation of the Oedipal crossroads allows Sophocles to 
present, through a very strong opposition, the irregularity and contingency 
of the human condition. Oedipus changed his conditon from being the most 
distinguished king, excellent man and favoured by the gods, to an individual 
with the most onerous load of misfortunes. He becomes torture for himself 
II-
and for those around himself. .) 
The pathos with which the tragedy concludes is deeply tender and 
instructive: Oedipus acknowledges the enonnous extent of human 
limitations and he tells his daughters that they have to implore the gods for a 
moderate way of living in the sake of avoiding the same unhappy destiny 
that he had. Sophocles' conclusion is the variability and inevitability human 
destiny. 
Oedipus' character is central for defining Sophocles' idea of the 
tragic consciousness. On the one hand tragic consciousness is a process of 
recognition of our deep human limitations, that is, that there are many 
determinations that we cannot change. But on the other hand tragic 
consciousness is a learning process, one of discovering our possibilities. 
That is, as long as we recognise our contingency, there are still many 
constructive paths to be built. In fact, real and positive human life is a 
pennanent challenge to decide and to build for ourselves. We are 
responsible beings. 
In Electra, Sophocles has the purpose of showing us a woman with 
character~ Electra is totally decided to act with full knowledge of the fmal 
consequences. Her dilemma of consciousness resides in how to achieve an 
action in accordance with wisdom. Sophocles contrasts Electra's character 
115 See ibid, 1188-1285; 1347-1355. 
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with Chrysothemis'. The latter is indecisive about revenging her father. 
Electra represents the authentic person who proceeds in accordance with 
justice and without giving in before temptations to transgress it, despite the 
fact that it might be more convenient. Furthennore, Sophocles shows in his 
characters that insofar as one tackles something that is just one has to will 
the means for its execution. Electra herself declares that 
" ... There is no success without hard work." 116 
With this declaration Electra shows her single-mindedness, but at the same 
time it is a sample of the human condition: because of our inherent 
limitation we have to win completion, and in the search for achieving that 
completion we must make a constant effort. 
In the plot of the tragedy Electra insists to Chrysothemis that she 
should follow her good advice, since she will gain the reputation of a pious 
and free woman. Furthennore, acting virtuously will give one the reputation 
of being a wise person. 117 
Despite the fact of the tragic destiny that constrains Electra, she 
knows how to face up to it in such a way that she will achieve the best 
prizes in the eyes of gods: she abides by divine rules which are the highest -
i.e., more important than human rules. 
Like Antigone, Electra is presented by Sophocles as a strong 
character who understands her tragic human condition and tries to confront 
it by taking wise decisions. The tragedy of Electra gathers together a moral 
message of wisdom that is achieved through dialogues and sometimes 
116 Electra, 945 (H. Lloyd-Jones' translation). 
117 It is worth noticing that the heroic epic idea that good reputation is a matter of public recognition 
continues to have its echo in tragedy. The difference is that Sophocles' characters are independent and 
defined through conversations and individual free actions. 
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confrontations: as human beings we must struggle to get sound decisions 
that involve foresight and wise thinking. 
In Phi/oetetes Sophocles again portrays his main thesis in relation to 
tragic human consciousness: the life of mortals is a matter of constant rise 
and fall, a permanent tension of opposite situations. The good man has a 
deep moral sense, since he searches for good things and rejects the bad. 
There are two contrasts in the play. The fIrst contrast is between two 
characters: Neoptolemus and Odysseus. Neoptolemus prefers to fail as a 
consequence of his right action than to achieve a boastful triumph 
accompanied by falsity and as a result of trickery. Sophocles points out, 
indirectly, that fair actions are preferable to merely crafty ones. Moreover: 
Neopto)emus.- "Everything is distasteful, when a man has abandoned his own 
nature (av'tou cp{)cnv) and is doing what is unlike him (Il" 1tPOOEtKo'ta).,,118 
Sophocles presents in this way a hint about what an appropriate human 
nature must be. From this moral position he will derive a notion of what a 
good and a bad man must be. That is, any human act that involves a clear 
transgression or surpasses the human condition will be considered bad. 
Odysseus is portrayed as particularly crafty, tricky in a negative 
sense, because he makes use of these resorts to be openly cruel. 
The second contrast is presented between the pair Chorus-
Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. The Chorus makes Philoctetes see that it is 
up to him to avoid his tragic destiny. The Chorus insist to him that the sort 
of pain to which he has been born goes beyond human limits. 
Achilles' son repeats to Philoctetes that the person who bears 
misfortunes that are voluntarily self-inflicted -as Philoctetes does- does not 
deserve any compassion. Neoptolemus also reproaches him for his inability 
lIE Phi/oetetes, 902-3 (H. Lloyd-Jones' translation). 
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to listen to good advice and sound wammg. The only way that 
Neoptolemus can persuade Philoctetes to change his decision is by swearing 
by Zeus that if he goes with them he will be judged as the best of the Greeks 
and furthermore he will recover his health and he will achieve the highest 
glory.1l9 Sophocles, like Homer, portrays the idea of honour and heroism in 
a cornmunitarian context. 
Phi/oetetes is particularly important for our purposes because this 
drama portrays the central role that dialogue and persuasion have in 
changing or supporting personal and difficult decisions. If Philoctetes 
changes his mind, it is [mally after the process of persuasion that the Chorus 
and Neoptolemus exert over him. 
The pathos of the tragic heroism in Oedipus at C%nus shows us an 
old and great man who knows how to suffer patiently all adversities that 
have come from an ill-fated destiny. 
Sophocles contrasts Oedipus' character with the figure of Creon. 
Creon is also an old man, but lacking in authenticity; excellent in his words, 
terrible in his acts. Oedipus makes Creon, the tyrant, see that he is skilful 
with his tongue, but that it is not enough to talk about justice to be just. 
Furthermore, Oedipus tells Creon that he cannot reproach him fairly for his 
sad destiny and actual condition. What Oedipus did, was involuntary 
damage, because he was in ignorance of many facts and circumstances. 
Sophocles praises, in Oedipus' words, the figure of Theseus, a young, 
honest and moderate man: 
Oedipus.- " ... And may the gods grant you what I desire, for yourself and for 
this country, since I have found in you alone among mankind piety and fairness and the 
absence of lying speech." 120 
Jl9 See ibid, 1314-1347. 
120 Oedipus at C%nus, 1124-1127 (II. Lloyd-Jones' translation). 
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Oedipus is convinced totally that the worthiest things are only to be 
entrusted to the best people. That is the reason why Oedipus talks to 
Theseus. His last advice addressed to the young leader is that he must not 
be led into the temptation to look down on divine laws because that attitude 
is the origin of all sort of madness. 121 
Oedipus at C%nus is a tragedy that summarises some central ideas 
in Sophocles. Because of our limited condition we have to learn through the 
passing of time to possess the humility to listen to sound advice about how 
to confront wisely the different sorts of adversities that life involves. To 
keep the right or reasonable measure in our thoughts, words and actions is 
equivalent always to respecting the divine law. 
Euripides 
Finally we turn to Euripides' dramas. We start with Medea. The character 
of Medea is portrayed as that of a woman who holds a series of misfortunes. 
Her character combines also an arrogant and impulsive nature. Euripides 
contrasts Medea's character to that of the Nursemaid. The latter tries to 
advise Medea of the great importance of the difference between moderation 
and excess: 
Nurse.- " ... For moderate fortune has a name that is fairest on the tongue, and in 
practice it is by far the most beneficial thing for mortals. But excessive riches mean no 
advantage for mortals, and when god is angry at a house they make the ruin greater.,,122 
121 See ibid, 1533-1539. 
122 Medea, 125-130 (D. Kovacs' translation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.lLondon, 1994). 
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Medea launches a capital moral question: why did not Zeus give to 
mortals the clear means to distinguish -as by a sort of fmgerprint- the good 
man from the bad one? Both the Nurse and Medea stress the point that the 
key to a good and moderate life resides in the consistency between your 
thoughts, your words and your acts. The weight of each word is central and 
that is the reason why Euripides makes us notice that a moderate tongue 
reveals one's internal personal condition as a harmonious one. 123 
In the last soliloquy124 Medea is aware that her misforturle comes 
from her pride; she knows the sort of crimes that she will commit, but her 
wrath is more powerful and seductive because it surpasses her calculations. 
Euripides shows us, in accordance with the tradition, that any sort of 
blinding passion is the main cause of bad things for mortals. Again the 
fmal motive of her crime is a matter of public honour: she cannot accept 
being mocked by her enemies. 
After Medea executes her crimes she concludes with a fmal sentence 
in relation to the human tragic condition: our mortal nature and our life is 
sometimes fortunate, but never happy. Thus, for Medea the gods always 
lead human beings on inexplicable paths. 
Hecuba contains the dilemma of a woman who sees her status lost, 
her past and happy times and her painful present. Her moral dilemma is put 
in terms of status: how can she continue to keep her honour despite the fact 
that she is involved in misforturle? In different speeches the character of 
Hecuba in intensive conversations with other characters portrays the 
instability of human fortune, the tragic human condition and the different 
ways that human beings are dependable on many things that are beyond 
their own control and limits: 
123 See ibid, 465-519. 
124 See ibid, 1019-1080. 
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Hecuba.- 0 grief! It seems there is a great struggle at hand, one full of groans 
and with no lack of tears! I did not die, it now appears, when I ought to have died, and 
Zeus did not kill me but keeps me alive, poor wretch, only to see new misfortunes still 
greater than the old! 125 
In this tragedy human nature is opposed to education. One was born 
good or evil, and it is impossible to change this fact. Nevertheless, to 
become well and correctly educated involves a learning of what is good. 
That lesson allows us to distinguish what is dishonourable from what is 
not. 126 
There is nothing safe for mortals. The gods send us fluctuations, 
instability and change with the aim that, aware of our ignorance, we respect 
them. 
Euripides stresses m Hecuba that the cautious man must search 
always harmony between his words and his acts. The [mal message of 
Euripides' Hecuba is related to the prudent man. He is the one who does 
not mix the just with the injust and who is taught by time that reflection is 
superior than haste. Thus, the wise and the courageous man is the cautious 
one who keeps calm at the right moment: 
Hecuba.- Agamemnon, men's tongues ought never to have more force than their 
doings: if a man has done good deeds, his speech ought to be good, if bad, then his 
words should ring false, and he should never be able to give injustice a fair name. 
Clever are the men who have mastered this art, yet their cleverness cannot endure to the 
end. They die a wretched death: not one has yet escaped.,,127 
m Hecuba, 229-233 (Kovacs' translation). See also 282-285; 583-584; 721-722; 956-960. 
126 See Hecuba, 592-600. 
127 Ibid, 1187-1194 (Kovacs' translantion). 
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Tragic consciousness is in Hecuba a matter of personal equilibrium in 
our relationships. Despite the fact that human life is subject to many 
external factors that constrain it, it is possible for human beings to keep 
harmony in our way of acting. The key is found in deliberation and 
reflection before talking and acting. 
Despite the fact that Euripides introduces many new elements in his 
tragedies he keeps the view of epic and lyric tradition in relation to human 
beings: we are contingent and dependable beings; the best way to maintain a 
worthy life resides in the recognition of our limitations and in the free 
decision to make an effort to mantain a moderate behavior. 
Hecuba is a tragedy that shows that, because it gathers together this 
idea that is common in epic and lyriG: Euripides shows us through his 
reflective characters in dialogues that despite the fact that we are 
constrained in many ways we are able to keep a virtuous life that is focused 
on moderation. Moderation and harmony are a result of deep thinking and 
talking. 
In the Suppliant Women Theseus puts forward to Adrastus that the 
argument that human life has more bad things than good ones is false. 
Theseus thinks that if that were true, human life on earth would be 
impossible. He thanks Prometheus for providing us with understanding and 
with the means to live. He thinks that human problems start because men 
themselves break the equilibrium with an arrogant attitude: we dare 
immortals because we think that we are wiser than them. Also Theseus 
strongly criticises senselessness, because he considers that if human beings 
know their miseries, at the same time we should know that our life is 
struggle. The gods play in a fickle way with mortals: sometimes they give 
us success; sometimes, misfortune. Nevertheless, the lucky man gives 
honours to immortals with the aim of keeping fortune; the unlucky with the 
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aim of getting it. Insofar as we become aware of these fluctuations we can 
address our lifes in a temperate way. 128 
Regarding the point of the central role of words III human life, 
Adrastus tells us: 
Adrastus.- "0 Zeus, why do men say that hapless mortals have any wisdom? 
We are dependent upon you and do whatever is your will. [ ... ] 0 foolish mortals, who 
shoot beyond the mark and justly suffer much calamity, you do not learn from your 
friends but only from events! Cities, you could bring your misfortunes to an end by 
speech, but you carry out your affairs by bloodletting, not words! 129 
We can appreciate that Euripides gives an important weight to the role of 
words and human language to solve human problems. Euripides reveals 
human nature as conflictive and violent, but at the same time as capable of 
recovering peace and equilibrium. If human conversations are [mally 
important it is because they provide us with something positive: self-
improvement and individual and communal completion. Dialogue is a way 
of self-understanding and of reciprocal understanding. 
In the Trojan Women Euripides presents a great variety of dialogues 
(llld debates that show us the different features of human nature. That is 
central because it is a way that Euripides grasps what tragic consciousness 
is: a pennanent dialogic process of self-knowledge and discovery of our 
limitations and possibilities of becoming better or worse. He insists 
repeatedly, that nobody can oppose fate. 130 
In a long debate -between Hecabe and Helen and before Menelaus 
when Helen is arguing for her life- Hecuba tries to show Helen that not 
128 See Suppliant Women, 195-249; 419-510. 
129 Ibid, 734-736, 745-749 (D. Kovacs' translation). 
130 See Trojan Women, 636-683. 
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everything in life is an upshot of chance. Hecuba states that it is not the 
same to follow the steps of fortune, just as they are, as to follow the steps of 
a reflexive and decisive virtue before changeable fortune. 13l In spite of the 
reversals of fortune, we should keep intelligence and measure as the most 
honest masters. In that way we act in accordance with Zeus, because he 
leads human matters fairly. 
The conclusion of this tragedy -a conclusion similar to Aeschylus' 
and Sophocles' general views- is that the honest man is the one who 
assumes his tragic condition, that is, his mortal and contingent nature with 
the possibilities and limitations that it involves. The honest man loves 
moderation that implies discretion, modesty and justice~ likewise, he 
recognises the power of the gods and the necessity of human submission to 
the full rigour of destiny. 
III. The dialogic form in Euripides: 
Drama pictures in an artistic way the real human dilemmas derived 
from the tragedy of human insufficiency and the permanent search for 
completion. Drama portrays -among other sorts of conversations- agonistic 
interchanges, picturing different sorts of dialogues. Sometimes 
conversations are between opposite characters in conflict -as when 
Euripides mimics legal arguments in his tragedies. That is, the main aim of 
any debate is to win. The interlocutor that shows more skilfulness and 
persuasiveness to convince his audience about any particular case wins 
regardless of its truth or falsehood. 
To debate has polemical means and arms; sometimes justified, 
sometimes not. To debate may involve personal or mere SUbjective 
motivations or interests that will be defended at any price. 
131 See ibid, 860-1059. 
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Tragedy is gomg to play a key role in the explanation of the 
antecedents of philosophy and rhetoric and also their birth. Tragedy tries to 
picture the different sorts of conversations that human beings have from the 
mere fact of being human and yearning for self-completion. Different sorts 
of conversations develop in the context of different human activities. 
Ordinary conversations can be about trivial things and just about them and 
have no wider repercusions. But there is a sort of common philosophical 
awareness that all human beings have, in the sense that ordinary men ask 
fundamental questions about themselves and the world. The point is that 
philosophy takes these fundamental questions and tries to give them 
methodical and rational answers. Philosophy starts as a self-conscious 
activity. It receives and undertakes, rationally, the ordinary, the poetic 
(epic, lyric and tragic), religious and political legacy of human 
consciousness forged over a long time and gives it a systematic direction 
that crystallises fIrst, in philosophy itself, and later in an ethics particularly 
constituted as a moral consciousness in the fIgure of Socrates. 132 The aim 
of philosophy -and of any philosophical search- is to have a more careful 
look at ordinary things and try to give a rational explanation of them. 
Tragedy pictures another sort of conversations. Ordinary people tend 
to debate as well. In these conversations the interlocutors are likely to be 
convinced that their motives are right. The aim of these debates is simply to 
win them. Sophocles and Euripides picture quasi-legal debates. Again, the 
aim of this sort of debate is agonistic: the interlocutor that shows more 
persuasiveness, craftiness and skilfulness to convince his audience will win 
\32 Religion gives another perspective on human consciousness. It provides us a clear distinction and 
contrast between an independent and differentiated human subject who establishes a link: and a relationship 
with a deity. The contrast between divine majesty and human smallness is another source of human 
consciousness. This religious awareness is again a recognition of insufficiency. Politics contributes also in 
this process of constitution of rational consciousness. Human beings start living as individuals in a 
community organised with laws and in consequence with personal and social responsibilities and aims. 
This individual-social contrast and interaction is another source of man's understanding of himself as a 
relative entity, that is, as an individual in and with relationships and responsibilities. 
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the debate or the case in dispute. 133 This is the ongm of rhetoric. 
Sophocles' introduction of debates is natural and in accordance with the 
normal development of the tragedy. But it is important to notice that 
Euripides' tragedies contain, in this picture of legal debates, a formal 
dialogic structure: his characters try to explain through a process of question 
and answer the motives of their actions, the consideration of the pros and 
cons. Euripides' characters tend to expose their cases through a process of 
rationalisation and deliberate consideration of their actions. All this process 
of giving an explanation involves a parallel between Euripides' characters 
and Socratic-Platonic dialectic. It is not a matter of coincidence that 
Euripides' characters frequently use expressions which seem much more to 
portray a rational argument than a mere drama.134 In fact, Euripides has 
been highly criticised for this practice because his critics think that he 
breaks the natural development of tragedy and just wants to make use of 
these digressions as a sort of rhetorical display to the detriment of the 
essence or real charm of the drama. 135 The very characteristic feature of 
Euripides' formal debates is that they are emotional in their motives, 
combative in their premises and one of the characters sometimes proposes 
an open challenge to argument. 136 Despite this agonistic aim, the majority of 
Euripides' tragedies end in agreement, but there is always a winner of the 
debate. That is crucial, because Euripides' aim is that his audience should 
become sympathetic with the winner because normally the victory involves 
a matter either of political or moral honour or reputation. 
133 In relation to this topic it is worth consulting C. Collard, "Formal debates in Euripides' drama", in I. 
McAuslan and P. Walcot (edd.), Greek Tragedy, Oxford, 1993, pp. 153-166. 
134 A good example of this is shown in Trojan Women (900 ff.) in the conversation between Hecuba, 
Menelaus and Helen and the exposition of Helen's case. 
135 In relation to this criticism addressed to Euripides see 1. P. Vemant et P. Vidal-Naquet, My the et 
tragedie en Gn}ce ancienne, Volume I, Maspero, 1981, Chapter III, p. 74. 
136 See C. Collard, art. cit., p. 155. 
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In addition: legal debates 137 in Euripides represent the key for 
connecting tragedy as a formal antecedent of dialectic in the sense of a 
dialogic method which implies the argumentation of a point -i.e., a case-
through questions and answers between at least two mterlocutors. As 
Collard states: 
" ... In trial-debates the speeches are shot through, exactly as they were in the law-courts 
of contemporary Athens, with all manner of emotional colour and narrative, or special 
pleading; and they are carefully organized with calculated switches from attack to 
defence, pre-emptions of the opponent's argument, appeals to probability, sententious 
or self-righteous recourse to moral truths. The imagination of transfer from 
OlKCXatt,ptov to aKllvt, is completed by the accompanying dialogue, carefully phased, 
where it precedes the long speeches, in its range from methodical question and answer 
to sudden accelerations in pace as a crack in the defence is widened, Of, after the main 
speeches, impassioned charge and rebuttal, recrimination, hostility and defiance, which 
are the regular stuff to end formal debates, gain theatricality from the forensic 
ambience." 138 
Tragedy and Philosophy 
Let me clarify some points. The direct roots and beginning of philosophy as 
dialectic in a Platonic sense are: 1. in the birth of philosophy itself with 
Thales who was the fIrst philosopher insofar as he asked questions and 
answered some of them rigorously and methodically, that is independently 
of pragmatic motivations and 2. in Socrates' conversations, particularly, 
which show us the way that philosophical conversations have to be 
developed. 
137 Some examples of legal-debates in Euripides' tragedies can be found in Hippolytus, 902-1089; 
Herac/es, 111-287; Phoenician, 435-637; Andromache, 547-765. 
138 C. Collard, art. cit., pp. 157-158. 
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The direct literary antecedents of philosophy as dialectic are in Greek 
poetry, that is, in epic, lyric and tragic poetry -and particularly in the form of 
actual legal debates and the representation of them. Philosophy starts as 
self-conscious activity; it assumes and develops rationally the "poetic 
awareness" of its literary antecedents. Philosophical conversations are 
methodical and with the aim of searching for the truth. 
Rhetorical debates are an answer to pragmatic human necessities: to 
Will an ordinary conversation, a formal discussion, or a case. Socratic 
conversations and the permanent inquiry that they involve have no 
constraints at all. It is a free and dialogic search for the truth. 
In other words, Euripides' tragedies dramatise debates with literary 
resources, motivations and purposes. 139 Plato writes philosophical dialogues 
139 There are different opinions in relation to the real origins and literary purposes of Euripides' formal 
debates. Collard shares Duchemin's view: "Jacqueline Duchemin has claimed that tragedy's agonistic 
character and particularly its formal debates -are in part its natural inheritance from a long popular or 
pastoral tradition of dramatic poetry- a primitive mimetic poetry, she means, of alternating or amoibaic 
form, which represents two contrasted characters or interests. She notes that debates as an established 
dramatic form, the agon of tragedy, appear first in Sophocles and Euripides (that is, in the surviving plays, 
the earliest of which, the Ajax, is generally put at c.450B.C.); but they are absent from Aeschylus. Earlier, 
she had drawn attention to two other literary forms strongly reliant on the formal opposition of characters 
or forces. One of these, comedy, developed its idiosyncratic agon well before the formal debate became 
established in tragedy; Duchemin's other analogy, the historians' use of contrast as mode in dramatic 
narrative or reported argument, is less cogent from the point of synchronism but indicative in a general 
way of her truth. The spoken word, and especially the reported argument, is as natural to Greek 
historiography as it is to Greek poetry, let alone poetic drama, when we consider the chief place of oral 
epic in time and influence in the Greek literary tradition. Duchemin therefore sees Aeschylus' use of 
alternating and pointed dialogue, especially stichomythia, as the linear ancestor of the more stylized 
exchanges in Sophocles and Euripides; she suggests that, while the sudden appearance of formal debates in 
Sophocles an Euripides around 450 is chiefly through the influence of contemporary developments in 
sophistic argument and rhetorical technique, it is certainly not due entirely to the sophists or rhetors. 
Rather, tragedy owes much to the sophists, but may itself have influenced them, from the time of its own 
sudden growth in Aeschylus' lifetime; it may actually have provided some kind of model for their agonistic 
discourses or eXvttA0'YtUt" (pp. 153-154). 
Desmond Conacher in his Euripides and the Sophists (Duckworth, London, 1998), states: " ... 
The influence of Sophistic rhetoric on Euripides is almost a cliche of literary studies of his plays. This 
influence is clearly discernible in the structure and the rhetorical devices of the speeches (rheseis), but it is 
particularly true of the markedly 'agonistic' ones, i.e., those in which leading characters indulge in the set 
speeches of formal debate, involving, for example, political ideologies (as at Supplices 409-62), dynastic 
rivalry (as at Heraclidae 134 if) or personal animosity (as at Medea 446 ff.) . 
... we need to remember that the influence of Sophistic ideas on Euripides' dramaturgy was part 
of a larger whole, involving style, language and rhetorical technique. Moreover, since rhetoric formed so 
large part of the Sophist's training for 'the good life' (itself associated with political succes), it would be 
surprising if there were not some overlap between their views on rhetoric and their views on 'values' 
(political and ethical)" (p. 50). We agree with C. Collard because we find his explanation more plausible 
and because we think that if it is undeniable that there is a Sophistic influence on Euripides, it is less strong 
than it is normally thought. In my judgement Euripides' motives are still and mainly literary, that is, he is a 
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with literary mastery, but his motivations and aims are strictly philosophical. 
That is, the form and content of his writing are an inseparable dialectical 
whole. That does not mean that the form in which Euripides pictures his 
dramas -and particularly his law-debates- do not present clear similarities 
and might represent a formal model and literary antecedent of Plato's style 
of writing. 
Many things have been said about the question why Plato wrote in a 
dialogic form. To clarify this question, which leads to the original one in 
my whole argument, -that is, the question about the origins of dialectic- it is 
necessary to put another question which complements and clarifies it: why 
did Socrates not write anything? The first answer might be, because 
Socrates embodies the ideal philosopher and the ideal way of doing 
philosophy, that is, the live, methodical conversation which puts everything 
to the test. Socrates' life and work are an indistinguishable whole. What 
characterised Socrates' attitude was his direct dialogue and doubting and 
rational approach to things. 
Socrates' personality and lifestyle must have been extremely 
attractive to many of his contemporaries -as it is for many scholars 
nowadays. The proof of that is that he had many followers, imitators and 
parodists throughout history.14o Many ancient authors have portrayed 
Socratic conversations in writing. It is clear that Plato was not the first 
person who wrote and imitated Socratic conversations. But as Diogenes 
Laertius states: 
"They say that Zeno of Elea was first to write dialogues. But, according to 
Favorinus in his Memorabilia, Aristotle in the first book of his dialogue On Poets 
dramatist who has the aim of creating and developing a tragedy with all the artistic resources and 
influences that he might consider appropriate to introduce for achieving his literary purposes. 
140 In relation to the topic of the figure of Socrates see D. Clay, "The origins of the Socratic dialogue", in 
P. A. Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement, Cornell, 1994, pp. 23-47. 
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asserts that it was Alexamenus of Styra or Teos. In my opinion Plato, who brought this 
form of writing to perfection, ought to be adjudged the prize for its invention as well as 
for its embellishment. ,,141 
It is clear too that Plato was not the creator of philosophy,142 but the 
foundation of what philosophy must be crystallises and consolidates in his 
project of philosophy as dialectic. In this Platonic idea of philosophy as 
dialectic the figure of Socrates is central. To put it better: the Platonic 
project of philosophy is incomprehensible without the presence of Socrates. 
Socrates was aware of the Presocratic philosophy and the appearance of this 
new and differentiated activity that was focused on a rational, unselfish 
approach to things. He develops and crystallises this new activity as a 
methodical way of life. Plato, for his part, had witnessed the origins and 
developm~t of philosophy and the Socratic philosophical project. Plato's 
philosophical greatness consists in pouring out in form and content the 
essence of the philosophical act. That is the reason that Plato defmes his 
philosophical project as dialectic (Philosophical dialogue): because he 
grasps the essence of philosophy as an unavoidably dialectical act, one of 
living by thinking by ourselves or preferably, in dialogue with others, past 
and present, and examining everything. 
It is not surprising that Socrates' questions and life style were so 
annoying. Philosophy started as a preeminent activity of inquiry that will 
call everything into question. Socrates was so annoying with his 
interrogation because despite the fact that everybody asks these fundamental 
questions just in virtue of their humanity, the majority of ordinary people 
tend to avoid them because there are many urgent, pragmatic problems and 
141 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, ill, 48 (R. D. Hicks' translation, Vol. I, Heinemann 
and Harvard University Press, London/Cambridge, Mass, reprint, 1995). 
142 Cj A. Wilson Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue. Plato and the constmct of philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, pp. 1-12. 
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priorities to solve fIrst. These people delay such philosophical questions and 
Socrates' insistence disturbs their daily life. Another group of people think 
that they really know the answers to these fundamental questions, but when 
they are tested by Socrates they realise that they do not possess the 
knowledge of the things that they pretend to know. Other people give 
"interested" answers to these basic questions according to their particular 
motivations regardless the truth. People resist, but Socrates persists. 
Socrates and Plato consolidate philosophy as a methodical inquiry, as an 
activity that put into question everything that was taken for granted or was 
considered certain. Philosophy starts as a disturbing activity. 
How does Plato characterise dialectic and the dialectician? Does the 
Platonic idea of dialectic remain in form and content throughout the history 
of philosophy? It is to these questions that we will dedicate the following 
part. 
III 
PART II. PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS OF DIALECTIC: GENESIS 
AND EVOLUTION 
This second part aims to gIve an account of the philosophical genesis, 
evolution and crisis of dialectic through its philosophical roots and history. 
The main thesis of the chapter is as follows: philosophy as an 
essentially dialectical activity has its literary antecedents in Greek epic, 
lyric and tragic poetry, but when it appears as itself it is born as a 
different, new and independent activity. 
The second thesis of the chapter: Plato's idea of dialectic as a 
philosophical conversation permeates all possible forms of philosophy but 
it is important to trace the variations of the idea throughout the history of 
philosophy to appreciate the different concepts of it. 
These changes can range from simple historical variations of the idea 
of what dialectic is to fundamentally and different conceptual philosophical 
approaches and developments. Philosophy, as a dialectical task, was 
explicitly and beautifully grasped by Plato. Philosophy has its internal 
crises. Plato was trying to advise us about them: without the aim of an 
unselfish or loving search for the truth philosophy is transmuted into mere 
antilogic, Sophistry or eristic. Without an ethical principle philosophy is no 
longer philosophy. 
We think that throughout the history of philosophy there have been 
three main conceptual approaches to dialectic: 1) the Socratic-Platonic, I that 
is, dialectic as equivalent to philosophy -i.e., philosophical conversations 
involving exchange and challenge in a methodical approach to things. 
Dialectic is a method, a rational disposition of subjects in relation to things 
1 There are some Stoic approaches to the idea of dialectic that are close to the Socratic-Platonic approach, 
but for none of the Stoics will dialectic be the philosophical method par excellence for searching for the 
truth. Dialectic is not going to provide the final criterion oftmth. 
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and with the aim of searching for the truth. The Socratic-Platonic idea of 
dialectic is going to playa pivotal role and provide a point of reference for 
previous notions of similar activities and any possible sort of future 
dialectic. 2) The Aristotelian, some Stoic approaches and Medieval: 
dialectic as a logical tool or an instrument for fmding erroneous arguments. 
With Aristotle dialectic becomes an instrumental device for education. 
With the Stoics dialectic acquires a complex logical and ethical meaning 
that is organic to their whole system. In this section there will be many 
central figures: Zeno and the Sophists, Aristotle and the Stoics. Zeno and 
the Sophists are rather important because they represent the bone of 
contention between the Platonic idea of dialectic and the Aristotelian one. 
For Plato they were only impostors and not authentic philosophers because 
they started the fITst distortion of what philosophy has to be. For Aristotle, 
Zeno is the inventor of dialectic, i.e., according to Aristotle's understanding 
of the concept. If Zeno and the Sophists were not dialecticians, what were 
they? If Zeno was a dialectician, why was he? Aristotle is central because 
he makes a break with the Platonic idea of dialectic and he will exert a 
predominant influence on some of the Stoics and on the majority of the 
Medieval philosophers. Aristotle concedes that Socrates made some 
contributions to philosophy, but he abandons the idea of dialectic as central 
and as a synonym for the whole philosophical process of searching for the 
truth through methodical conversation. Dialectic as a live dialogue is not 
essential any more, because it only deals with probable reasonings 
regardless of the truth. The Stoic idea of dialectic is complex and it needs to 
be understood as part of the Stoic system, as we will see. 3) The Hegelian 
and Marxist: the idea of dialectic changes in form and in content. Dialectic 
inheres in reality: reality is dynamic, through a perpetual movement of 
synthesis of opposites. We will show the particular differences between 
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Hegel and Marx and the transitional role that Kant plays in the history of 
dialectic. 2 
Let's take these three ideas of dialectic one by one. 
§4. THE ANCIENT IDEA OF DIALECTIC AND OTHER 
RELATED ACTIVITIES 
a) Plato 
Dialectic does not have a linear history. Philosophically speaking, Plato was 
the fIrst to develop a concept of dialectic. 
Dialectic is for Plato fIrst and foremost the highest science.3 
Dialectic in Platonic terms has three main aspects: 1. it is equivalent to 
philosophy itself insofar as philosophy is identical to/co-extensive with "the 
art of dialectic" (it 'tEXVl1 Ot<xAEK'ttKll). 2. it is a particular way of pursuing 
inquiry (whatever is currently regarded as the most fruitful procedure for 
doing it), and therefore a particular method of philosophy. 3. Dialectic for 
Plato means philosophical dialogue. The person who is able to carry out 
this philosophical dialogue is the dialectician. How does Plato characterise 
dialectic and the dialectician? 
We will support a unitarian approach to Platonic dialectic. It is 
nowadays an unusual approach, because the most common one is the 
developmentalist. 
First of all, Plato characterises the dialectician as the man who knows 
how to ask and answer questions. 4 This defInition is central for grasping 
2 The Kantian idea of dialectic represents a transition between the Ancient and Medieval models of 
dialectic and the Hegelian one. 
3 See e.g. Philebus, 57 e7. 
4 See e.g. Cratylus, 390c. 
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what philosophy must be for Plato. One clear point is that the Socratic-
Platonic method is an inquisitive procedure. To ask philosophical questions 
implies an act of recovering innocence in our relationship with things. 
Philosophical inquiry involves an ability to become surprised about ordinary 
things and to ask about them as they are themselves. Socrates' call is 
mainly addressed to the point of recovering a state of alert in relation to 
things and of contemplating them as they really are. Socrates and Plato 
reinforce the Presocratic philosophical approach to things, which involved 
objectivity and the purpose of aiming at truth. In that sense philosophy is a 
methodical, conscious way of asking questions about what things are in 
themselves. 5 
That is the reason that Plato identifies the man who has the mastery 
of dialectic with the lover of wisdom: 
Socrates.- "And the only person, I imagine, to whom you would allow this 
mastery of Dialectic is the pure and rightful lover of wisdom. 
Theaetetus.- To whom else could it be allowed?,,6 
Plato stresses the dialectician's attitude as that of "the pure and rightful 
lover of wisdom" ('t4> Ka8apm<; 'tE Kat OtKatm<; <PtAocro<pouvn). In this 
statement Plato defmes the ethical essence of philosophy: an unselfish 
search for the truth. Real love is always disinterested. A lover of wisdom 
needs a catharsis from any extra motive, apart from the truth. A lover of 
wisdom needs an initial humility to accept that he is just an aspirant or 
searcher for the truth, not a possessor or a manipulator of it. 
5 Plato portrays Socrates as a man who causes perplexity in his interlocutors by the sort of questions that 
he asks of them and because he sows a seed of philosophical doubt in ordinary and sometimes cultivated 
people's certainties; see Meno, 80 a-d and 84 b-c. 
6 Sophist, 254 e4-5 (F. M Cornford's translation). 
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The dialectician is also the man who knows how to answer questions 
scientifically. 7 What is it, according to Plato, that characterises a 
philosophical answer to a question? To give a philosophical answer implies, 
first and foremost, to give a reasoned account (Otoova.t 'Aoyov) of the object 
or item in question. Moreover, Plato writes: 
Socrates.- " ... And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is 
able to exact and account of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the 
one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to 
himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence about the matter?"s 
In this passage Plato expresses the nature and aim of his method: because 
philosophical questions are about what things are, philosophical answers 
imply that a philosopher is able to provide a precise explanation or rational 
account of the matter in question:9 an explanation which will satisfy not just 
himself but also others. The role of the interlocutor (even if the 
conversation is fictional, and consists in a silent philosophical dialogue with 
ourselves) is central for Plato. lO The person or persons who participate in 
the conversation represent the challenge and exchange necessary to test our 
thoughts. Ontologically and epistemologically speaking, the philosophical 
act is not completed until we utter verbally and coherently to others our 
thoughts, exposing them to testing. Or, indeed, until we have had the other 
person's response. In that sense, for Plato the search for the truth is not an 
act that is just within the competence of one subject in front of an object, 
7 See Republic VII, 534 d-535a. 
8 Republic VII, 534 bl-7 (p. Shorey'S translation). 
9 See Statesman. 286 a4-5. 
10 See supra, Introduction, note 27. 
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but a communicative act: it is an act of giving and receiving a reasoned 
account of each thing. i I 
When Plato states that dialecticians are men who know how to ask 
and answer questions he is giving us the key to the dynamics of his method: 
dialectic is fundamentally a matter of philosophical conversations 
(OtaAEYEa9at).12 Socrates always insists that the act of conversing 
philosophically implies -at least initially- a pleasure because it is an 
opportunity to talk, to keep company, and to examine your interlocutors in 
talking about thingS. 13 Plato many times in his dialogues portrays either 
Socrates or his interlocutors goading sombody else into conversation. 14 
Socrates is typically described by his friends as the man who will not let you 
go until he has tested you and your way of living in detail. 15 
Plato also emphasises that his philosophical method is fundamentally 
a direct conversation because dialectic is a preferably a matter of a joint, 
live investigation with the aim of testing truth and our own ideas. 16 
Plato thinks that the talk that the soul has with itself in the act of 
thinking is also a dialectical act. This internal conversation implies a kind 
of talking about one's theses in which one develops a fictional conversation 
and asks and answers questions oneself, affmns and denies, and challenges 
oneself with possible difficulties. 17 The culmination of this silent dialogue 
11 See ibid, 287 a2-4. 
12 It is not surprising that the word ouxA£'YEa8ut and its cognates recur throughout Plato's dialogues 
because it describes the essence of dialectic as philosophical conversation. 
\3 See Ap%gy, 41 c3 ff., Charmides, 154 e7. 
14 An example of interlocutors goading Socrates into conversation is in Lesser Hippias 373 a7. 
15 An example of Socrates goading others into conversation is in Laches, 187 e-18~d. 
16 See Protagoras, 347 c-348a. 
17 Supra, Introduction, note 27. 
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is a judgement (o6~a), that is, when you can arrive at something definite 
and apparently self-consistent. 18 
The role of the interlocutor in Plato's dialectic is central. Throughout 
his dialogues Plato portrays different sorts of interlocutors. Some are more 
passive than others, some are more challenging, some are even combative. 
The latter can destroy or twist the aim of real philosophical conversation, 
that is, dialectic as a cooperative and rational search for the truth. The mere 
presence of an interlocutor is, at least, an initial challenge for the person 
who is testing a thesis to express himself and communicate his thoughts 
clearly and consistently to his audience. 
Plato also claims that philosophical conversations are a matter of 
talking not a matter of arguing. This is important, because a clear 
difference between philosophy and eristics is that the former does not have 
polemical aims and does not use polemical means while the latter does. 19 
Socrates insists that the main difference between the philosopher and the 
orator is that the latter does not know how to answer a specific question and 
to address a point by means of serious conversation and the former does. 20 
Furthermore: Socrates defines real philosophical conversation as that in 
which the participants -however difficult it may be- propose to defme or 
criticise jointly any subject of conversation in an atmosphere of willingness 
to have a sound interchange, that is, to teach and to learn from each other 
with the aim of examining and clarifying the subject. When by contrast the 
aim is merely to dispute, the result is that interlocutors get irritated with 
each other, and become involved in mutual recriminations: one just stresses 
to the other that he is not right and he is not clear at all; and the other one 
thinks that he is just speaking out of spite. As we can appreciate there is 
18 See Theaetetus, 189 e-190a. 
19 See Euthydemus, 304 a-b, 305 a-b. 
20 See Gorgias, 448c-d; Lysis, 211 c. 
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just an anxiety and desire to wm instead of researching the topic m 
conversation. Eristics are also characterised for their lack of consistency 
throughout a discussion. The upshot is that even spectators of the 
conversation become upset with eristics because it is not worth listening to 
them. 21 The condition for any philosophical conversation is a complete 
willingness to be tested and to examine other's people ideas. 
Another important condition for the development of a sound and 
serious philosophical conversation is the capacity to know how to listen to 
your interlocutor. A dialogue is a matter of talking, but it is also a matter of 
patient listening, understanding and desiring to learn from your 
interlocutor. 22 
Plato's Socrates insists that open-minded interlocutors have a sort of 
natural inclination to companionship in the search for the truth: there is a 
good disposition towards talk with each other and towards developing a 
dialogue in which the answerer tries to provide true answers, clearly 
formulated in terms that are understandable to the questioner. Eristics are 
just lovers of disputations, debates, and mere contradictions, and they are 
not open to a sound conversation; they just require answers with the aim of 
refuting them, no matter what. 23 Dialectic is a question of friendly 
conversation that has its roots in the love of fmding things out. 24 
Socrates advises us of the danger of falling into disputation against 
our will. There is great power involved in the ability to dispute, but 
disputers tend to think, wrongly, that they are having a proper philosophical 
conversation and not just a mere quarrel. Eristics show their inability to 
keep up a philosophical conversation because they are unable to conduct an 
21 See ibid, 457 c-458b. 
22 See Alcibiades I, 105 c8-106d9; 129 b7-13. 
23 See Meno, 75 c-d; Republic VII, 539 b-d, pseudo-Platonic Sisyphus, 388 d. 
24 See Theaetetus, 146 a. 
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examination of the subject. Their real aims are reduced to catching verbal 
contradictions in what h,as been said and nothing else. 25 
In short: if Plato stresses a clear boundary between quarrels and 
philosophical conversations it is because the latter require good faith or 
willingness from the interlocutors to carry out a constructive process of 
searching and not of mere refutation. The fmal concern of dialectic is not a 
subjective or individual one, but finding an impersonal, objective truth 
through a process of questioning and challenge. 
Indeed, Plato's dialectic involves always an elenctic process because 
the essence of his method resides in the act of co-examination, summoning 
one to test and justifying rationally one's thoughts through an interchange of 
questioning and answering. If sometimes the process involves refutation, it 
has to be emphasised that that is not the kernel of the matter. Socrates 
always says that he is not concerned with mere refutation, but with fmding 
the truth. 26 The motivating and [mal aim is to put things to the test with the 
purpose of fmding its truth or falsity. Plato's dialectic as a scientific 
process involves too the setting out and developing of a thesis. That is 
central because the process shows us that sometimes the search for the truth 
cannot culminate in the fmal formulation of a defmition or clear description 
of the subject-matter in dialogue. But it shows also that the real dynamism 
of Plato's philosophy hinges on the idea that any problem or hypothesis can 
be taken up again and submitted to the test either to continue to explore the 
same topic or to fmd new possible routes or problems related to it. That 
confirms also the essence of Plato's philosophy as a perpetual search for the 
truth that is never completely satisfied. 27 
25 See Republic V, 454 a. 
26 See Philebus, 58 c-d. 
27 See Lysis, 222-223, Gorgias, 84 ff, Sophist, 250 c-251a. 
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Dialectic, and therefore the dialectician's task -in our judgement- has 
a second ethical aspect in Plato inseparable from the previous one that we 
indicated, i.e., the dialectician as the person who knows how to lead a 
philosophical conversation insofar as he knows how to ask and answer 
questions. Ethically speaking dialectic is also an educative process of 
acqumng self-knowledge through dialogue and therefore, of self-
improvement: 
" ... In education, [ ... ] what we have to do is to change a worse state into a better state; 
only whereas the doctor brings about the change by the use of drugs, the professional 
teacher ( aO<pta'tit~) does it by the use of words. ,,28 
Plato is convinced that the power of words is extremely great. That is the 
reason that he thinks that the best method for doing philosophy and teaching 
is by questions and answers. This method requires fairness from the person 
who asks the questions. That is central because Plato emphasises that it is 
the greatest inconsistency for a real educator who cares for virtue to be 
unfair in a conversation. The unfairness consists in the behaviour of a man 
who does not distinguish between mere controversy and a real discussion. 
Eristics just try to play and trip up his opponent as much as possible. In a 
real conversation the person who asks the questions must be serious and 
helpful with the interlocutor, pointing out to him just those mistakes and 
slips which come from himself or from pre-existing social prejudices. In 
that way one can realise that one's mistakes, confusions and difficulties 
come from oneself and not from the person who is asking questions. It is 
through this conversation that the interlocutor will recognise the benefit of 
the method, the change that he experiences in himself, the great quality of 
the interlocutor that he had and he will be back to take refuge and liberation 
28 Theaetetus, 167 a4-6 (M. J. Levett's translation, revised by M. F. Bumyeat). 
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in this philosophical process and in the person who carnes it out. But 
whoever follows the common and opposite practice, as most teachers do, 
will get the opposite result. Instead of like-minded philosophers you will 
produce people who hate philosophy because of the hostile and combative 
attitude of the teacher. 29 
If Plato insists on this positive mode of leading the conversation it is 
because learning and knowing are preeminently dialogic acts, and eventually 
because his main concern resides in the point that this cooperative work of a 
teacher and a pupil who are testing a given thesis should culminate in a 
rational clarification of the object in question: 
" ... In short, neither quicknesss of learning nor a good memory can make a man see 
when his nature is not akin to the object, for this knowledge never takes root in an alien 
nature; so that no man who is not naturally inclined and akin to justice and all other 
forms of excellence, even though he may be quick at learning and remembering this and 
that and other things, nor any man who, though akin to justice, is slow at learning and 
forgetful, will ever attain the truth that is attainable about virtue. Nor about vice, either, 
for these must be learned together, just as the truth and error about any part of being 
must be learned together, through long and earnest labor, [ ... ] Only when all of these 
things -names, definitions, and visual and other perceptions- have been rubbed against 
one another and tested, pupil and teacher asking and answering questions in good will 
and without envy- only then, when reason and knowledge are at the very extremity of 
human effort, can they illuminate the nature of any object. ,,30 
Live dialogue is the best way of communication and teaching because 
dialectic -in Platonic terms- is a "I'uxa),O)),ta. Making use of the science of 
dialectic is to cultivate the seed of knowledge by means of words in your 
29 See ibid, 167 d6-168b4. 
30 Letter vn, 344a-b (G. R. Morrow's translation). Despite the fact that it is unlikely that Letter VII 
comes from Plato's own hand, it probable contains important information about Plato's final ideas on 
philosophy and other topics. 
122 
pupils and cause through them an internal transformation of their souls. 
This change is presented as self-consciousness and consciousness of the 
world. Philosophy as a dialogic search of the truth causes an "internal 
purification" and a rational understanding of the world. 31 
Dialectic in this pedagogic and ethical sense is also a propaideutic 
that prepares pupils to develop a critical attitude in relation to ways of 
thinking and living and to address their thoughts systematically to what 
things really are. The search for the truth through dialogue requires 
education that implies: a) a disposition to learn32 how to mantain a serious 
conversation; b) courage to be tested and to test other people's beliefs and 
thoughts and to accept the need for getting rid of personal or social 
assumptions and prejudices. It is worth pointing out that to identify 
dialectic with teaching in Plato involves different possibilities. We can 
appreciate in the early dialogues that in the elenctic process it is Socrates or 
the dialectician who is asking questions and challenging somebody else. In 
the Phaedrus and in the Seventh Letter the younger interlocutor is 
challenging the older person. In the late dialogues and also in the Phaedo 
we see other people challenging Socrates, or even the development of 
mutual challenges among the interlocutors. All these different possibilities 
show that what is essential to dialectic is an open willingness in the 
interlocutors to develop an active conversation which results in a mutual 
education. What dialectic provides is a new methodical, rational and 
systematic approach to inquiry, via conversation, into the essence of things. 
It is also -according to Plato- dialectic that is the only science that can 
provide a confirmation and a complete explanation of any hypothesis 
31 See Phaednls, 248 d3 if, 276 e5-277a5. 
32 Plato also stresses that there are some characteristics that are distinguishable in the philosophical nature, 
mainly, quickness to learn and the capacity to retain and to see relationships in what is learned, love and 
disposition for virtue; see Charmides 159 e; Meno; 88 b; Republic VI, 486 c-487a and 494 a-b; Laws IV, 
709 e-71Oa; for a parallel view cj Xenophon, Memorabilia IV, 1,2-3. 
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because, at least in principle, it ascends to the fIrst principles of things. 33 
This last point connects us and passes on to a third aspect of Socratic-
Platonic dialectic, as a particular method. 
Socrates calls experts in dialectic: those who have the natural capacity 
to look at the one and the many.34 This dialectical process of looking at and 
relating the one and the many was developed in different ways. 1. The 
search for a defmition. 2. The setting out of an hypothesis. 3. The process 
of collections and divisions. Let's take this step by step. 
Plato's ontological starting point is that in reality we can distinguish 
unity and multiplicity. The difference between the eristic and the 
dialectician resides in the fact that the latter searches for and knows how to 
articulate this unitary and multiple structure that is inherent in things. The 
eristic just proceeds haphazardly, straight to the one, omitting the 
intermediate steps that are essential in the process.35 
1. Mainly in the early dialogues,36 it seems that the dialectical process 
takes place in a search for a defmition that can provide a unitary, systematic 
account of the different elements that are related among each other but that 
are spread in a multiplicity of entities. The task of the dialectician is to fmd 
the common denominator of these different elements that despite their 
individual differences share a common factor. 
2. In some early and middle dialogues the dialectical process implies 
the setting out of an hypothesis. This process shows something that is 
inherent to the researching process: when we are searching for the truth, it is 
33 See Republic VI, 511b -c3; VII, 514 a-517c, 518 b-519b, 531 c-535a, 537 b-539d. 
34 See Phaedrus, 266 b3-cl. 
35 SeePhilebus, 14 b-17a. 
36 For the sake of convinience we will treat these dialogues as early: Apology, Crito, Laches, Charmides, 
Hippias Major, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Gorgias and Ion; these as middle: Meno, Phaedo, Republic, 
Symposium, Phaedrus, Euthydemus, Menexenus, and Cratylus; these as late: Parmenides, Theaetetlls, 
Sophist, POlitiCIlS, Timaells, Critias, Phileblls, and Laws. 
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rather frequent that the original hypothesis will not lead to a fmal and clear 
defmtion or formula. It can lead either to a mere problematic solution that 
can be taken up again for a further analysis or to an hypothesis that is just 
probable but not completely and satisfactorily tested in this ftrst attempt. It 
is also true that sometimes the expounding of an hypothesis can lead to 
problematic or aporetic results that could be the beginning of a new 
treatment or approach to the same subject-matter. Furthermore: sometimes 
the setting out of an hypothesis can lead us to error. But insofar as we 
detect it, that can be a new beginning for positive conclusions. That is the 
reason that Plato insists on the idea that philosophical conversations can be 
taken up again many times: philosophy is a perpetual search. Dialectic is 
necessary for philosophising because we need to talk since it is the only 
means that we have to gain access to things. In other words philosophy is a 
dialectical search because we are humans and we need completion of our 
limited human nature, and because language gives us a rational access to 
things, Despite the fact that language is not reducible to things it provides 
us with elements for representing things objectively.37 
3. In the late dialogues Plato inisists on his constant and fundamental 
idea that the dialectician is the man who grasps reality in a scientiftc way. 
Reality has structures and the expert in Ot<lAElC'ttlCTt 'tEXVl1 tries to fmd 
where the articulations of kinds are through division (genera and species) 
and the search for similarities and distinctions between things. 
Dialectic here has to be seen as a process and as a crowning of a 
process. Dialectic aims at a complete understanding of the being and 
essence of things themselves through rational discourse. 38 Dialectic is a 
rational exercise that has the aim of achieving such an accolIDt. 
37 Regarding this topic is worth consulting E. Nicol, Metafisica de fa expresion, ed cit., pp. 59-60. 
38 See Republic VII, 532 a-b5. 
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The dialectician is the man who knows how to distinguish the 
constitutive and characteristic form of each thing and how to address his 
thoughts to them. 39 A particular way of fmding similarities and 
dissimilarities in Plato is through a process of grouping into kinds which 
involves too a process of collection and division. This process of grouping 
into kinds permit us to see to what extent a group of things exhibit and share 
certain characteristics. Kinds exhibit a network of relationships. Kinds are 
a unity and a multiplicity at the same time. They are a unity because they 
bring together in a whole different things that otherwise are spread and 
isolated in a disconnected multiplicity. They are a multiplicity because 
kinds can be interconnected among each other. Dialectic implies a 
discriminatory process. The dialectician has to discover which of them are 
combinable among each other, and which are not. In this sense kinds that 
combine among each other are interconnected wholes that group multiple 
parts.40 
When the dialectician can establish which combinations among kinds 
are possible and which are not possible he also establishes relationships of 
truth among things. The dialectician is capable of grasping a clear map of 
reality insofar as he can discern similarities and differences among things. 
As we have said, Plato makes Socrates say that dialecticians are 
lovers of collections and divisions. If the fmal aim of dialectic is to know 
what things are and state it in a clear formula, the dialectical process starts 
with the attempt to grasp from reality an initial kind that could describe or 
throw some light on things or a group of things. Any attempt to define 
something implies m<;tking explicit different notions of one particular object 
or group of objects, starting from the general and moving to the particular. 
39 See Parmenides, 13 5 b5-c3. 
40 In the earlier dialogues, kinds that do not combine among each other are differentiated wholes, that is, a 
plurality of unities. 
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Socrates.- " ... there is perceiving together and bringing into one form items that 
are scattered in many places, in order that one can define each thing and make clear 
whatever it is that one wishes to instruct one's audience about on any occasion.,,41 
This is the process of collection. One cannot start a process of division if 
one does not collect fIrst. Once the dialectician collects and groups 
according to kinds he can start a process of division into genera and 
subgenera until he achieves and expresses verbally a clear definition which 
shows his process of thinking and clarifIes in a whole system what sort of 
connections and inerconnections there are among things and what a specifIc 
object is. In this process of division the dialectician has to follow a 
principle that implies the ability to cut up -as much as is necessary- kind by 
kind, in accordance with its natural joints. 42 
In this unitarian approach to what dialectic is in the Platonic 
dialogues, we should emphasise that the three different meanings -or 
perhaps "modes": defming, hypothesising, articulating- of dialectic that we 
have been describing are compatible with each other. 
b) Aristotle 
As the good student he is, Aristotle rejects Plato's idea of dialectic, as we 
will see. 
It IS a fact that Aristotle presents different approaches to what 
dialectic is. 43 He says different things about dialectic and the dialectician 
throughout his work. For Aristotle dialectic is: a) an art of questioning: 
41 Phaedrus, 265 d3-5 (C. 1. Rowe's translation). 
42 See ibid, 265 e-266b2. See also Republic VII, 537 c5-8. 
43 See supra, Introduction, §l, b) Aristotle's objection. 
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" ... Dialectic, however, does proceed by interrogation, whereas, if it aimed at showing 
something, it would refrain from questions, if not about everything, at any rate about 
primary things and particular principles ... ,,44 
b) The man: 
" ... who can make propositions and objections is the skilled dialectician.'045 
c) Dialectic is the power of concluding contrary things, because -like 
rhetoric- it is the art of upholding the pros and cons of one given thesis: 
" ... Rhetoric and Dialectic alone of all the arts prove opposites; for both are equally 
concerned with them.,,46 
These three general features of dialectic are connected with two 
further general features, that is, that d) dialectic has a universal character in 
its fields and aims and e) that dialectic begins from generally accepted 
opmlOn: 
"The purpose of the present treatise is to discover a method by which we shall 
be able to reason from generally accepted opinion about any problem set before us and 
shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument, avoid saying anything self-
d · 47 contra lCtOry. 
44 On Sophistical Refutations XI, 172 a18-20 (translated by E. S. Forster and D. 1. Furley). 
45 Topica, VITI, 14, 164 b3-5. 
46 Rhetoric, I, 1, 1355 a12 (translated by 1. H. Freese). 
47 Topica, I, i, 100 a 18-2I(E. S. Forster's translation). 
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Aristotle says that the name of this kind of argument is "dialectical 
reasoning" (6 Ot(lAEK1:t1(()<; O"UAAO'YtO"JlO<;) and researching on it will be the 
central aim of his Topics. 48 
It is in these two latter points, that is, the universality of dialectic and 
the nature of its starting points (endoxa), that dialectic is opposed to special 
sciences. F or Aristotle any branch of science refers to a specific kind of 
objects and only one; dialectic does not refer to specific things in this way, 
that is, to a specific kind. Nevertheless dialectic gives access to the 
common principles49 of all sciences, but does not have any demonstrative 
power because it proceeds by interrogation. While every science is based on 
its own axioms, dialectic tries to fmd and to explain the universal common 
principles of all SCIences. That is the reason why, for Aristotle, the 
dialectician can move independently of any particular scientific 
consideration. For Aristotle also, the dialectician works in the field of 
probabilities and verisimilitudes, not in the field of truths. But dialectic is 
important in Aristotle's work because it is the means by which we acquire 
the principles of science. Dialectic must be distinguished from the sciences 
because it does not involve any particular approach to reality.5o 
What are the similarities and differences between Plato's and 
Aristotle's ideas of dialectic? 
The fITst point that is clear and obvious is that Plato's and Aristotle's 
ideas of dialectic are radically different. The main reason is that Aristotle is 
not interested in the idea of dialectic as a scientific activity. 
Nevertheless, we can fmd a common feature in Socratic-Platonic 
dialectic and in Aristotelian dialectic as an activity that the word itself 
48 See ibid., I, 1, 100 a22-24. 
49 Aristotle makes clear that he will understand by common principles of sciences " ... what they use for the 
purpose of demonstration, not the subjects about which they conduct their proof, nor the connections 
which they prove" (Posterior Analytics, I, 11, 77 a 26-28 translated by H. Tredennick). 
50 See ibid., I, 11, 77 a26-35 and On Sophistical Refutations, I, 165 bl-12. 
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designates: the method of question and answer. 51 For Plato the central 
value of dialectic resides in the verbal interchange between interlocutors that 
gives us the means to provide and to receive a reason for each thing and to 
show in words what things are. That is the reason that dialectic is the ideal 
form of communication and teaching. The dialectician is the philosopher 
who tries to grasp reality in a scientific way. For Aristotle the principal 
worth of dialectic resides -as Evans calls it- in its ''prescientijic,,52 nature, in 
its ability to discuss any thesis without the pressure or imposition of any 
specific approach or interpretation about objects. 
For Plato the dialectician and the philosopher are the same, whereas 
Aristotle rejects this identification. 53 
For Plato dialectic is a synonym of philosophy and it can provide us 
with the highest and most complete rational account of things. For Aristotle 
dialectic and philosophy are different. They are different in their outcomes. 
For Aristotle dialectic is merely tentative where philosophy is scientific: in a 
negative sense dialectic can destroy claims of knowledge, but positively it is 
incapable itself of producing knowledge. According to Aristotle's idea 
about what philosophy must be, it has to study the essence and attributes of 
things and the nature of substance that is prior to these attributes. Dialectic, 
basing its enquiry merely upon popular opinions, tries to fmd general 
common principles of science, but it cannot scientifically study causes, 
concepts and attributes related to these principles.54 
F or Plato dialectic is the highest way of knowledge, the science of 
reality which studies reality as it really is. For Aristotle, dialectic is only a 
particular form of intellectual activity, but lacking in scientific status. 
51 See Pl<l;to, Statesman, 287 a2-4; Aristotle, Topica, VITI, 1, 155 bl-16. 
52 See 1. D. G. Evans, Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic, Cambridge University Press, 1977, p. 29. 
53 See Plato, Sophist. 253c-e; Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 2, 10004 b16 if; Topica. I, 1, 101 a30b4. 
54 See Aristotle, Metaphysics, III, 1,995 b20 if, IV, 2,1003 bl-19, 1004 a 31-b25. 
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For Plato and Aristotle the objects of dialectic are the same, but 
dialectic does not tackle these objects in the same way. Let me explain. For 
Plato dialectic is the highest form of scientific and intellectual activity and 
universal in its application in the sense that he suggests that dialectic could, 
in principle, tackle any complex item and ultimately "the fmest and 
greatest". 55 For Aristotle, despite the fact that dialectic is universal in its 
application, the way that it tackles its objects is not scientific. 
For both dialectic implies an art of examination through questions 
and answers. In that sense Plato and Aristotle recognise a pedagogic worth 
and progress in the question and answer process. 56 Equally both are aware 
that without method in the way of conducting the dialogue, dialectic can 
degrade into eristic. While for Plato it is evident that scientific progress 
could be got by dialogue if it is conducted according to dialectical rules (and 
according to reality), for Aristotle the fact of the educational worth of 
dialogue and these preventive rules are not themselves sufficient guarantee 
of intellectual advance beyond an improving capacity of arguing. 
Moreover: Aristotle considers that with dialogue we are more susceptible to 
making mistakes than when we just deal directly, face to face, with things 
on our own. That is the reason too that for Aristotle the defmitive criterion 
of truth has its grounds in the examination of particular objects. 57 As Evans 
remarks: 
" ... Aristotle distinguished things which are more intelligible absolutely from things 
which are more intelligible to us, and this distinction represents a recognition of two 
senses in which something can be said to increase our understanding. The explanation 
may include elements which are absolutely more intelligible than that which is to be 
explained, or elements which are only intelligible to some person pr group of people. 
55 See Statesman, 285c-286b. 
56 See Plato, Meno. 80-86; Aristotle, Topica. I, 2, 101 a. 
57 See supra, Introduction, § 1, b) Aristotle's objection, pp. 11, 13-14, and 16. 
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Consequently Aristotle has the means of contrasting genuinely and absolutely 
explanatory with what people may find explanatory; and the complexity of the situation 
can be seen from the fact that, according to the Aristotelian distinction between the two 
forms of intelligibility, one could speak of someone's, indeed of most's people's, 
understanding being advanced by explanations which nevertheless are not genuinely 
explanatory. ,,58 
In short: Aristotle does not see in dialectic an objective and secure method 
for searching for the truth. 
F or Plato and Aristotle dialectic is a method. F or Plato it is the 
scientific method par excellence which provides us with the ideal rational 
means for arriving at the truth and the fmal foundation of it, via dialogue. 
For Aristotle -despite the fact that it can sound contradictory- dialectic is a 
non-scientific method or a neutral capacity of reasoning that just provides us 
with a possible access to the discovery of general scientific common 
principles. Dialectic is still important for Aristotle, but not essential, 
because it refers to the ultimate, general foundation of science and opens a 
firm beginning to particular sciences since the latter are incapable of 
providing these final foundations. 
F or Plato dialectic involves essentially a search for defmitions or at 
least for explanations, in a scientific way. For Plato the work of dialectic 
implies a double way that leads up from assumptions to a beginning or 
principle that permits us to go beyond these assumptions and to work with 
forms and to interconnect them and another one that leads down from a 
principle to a conclusion. 59 Because Aristotle ,demotes the range of dialectic 
it acquires an instrumental role as a discriminatory process. But Aristotle is 
still interested -as is Plato- in the scientific search for the truth. He will 
transfer the role that Plato assigns to dialectic -mutatis mutandis- to what he 
58 1. D. G. Evans, op. cit., Chapter II, p. 8. 
59 See Republic VI, 510 b and 522 b. 
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calls fIrst philosophy. First philosophy will study everything (everything, 
that is, in a way) in a scientifIc way. 
Both try to fmd a unifying and supreme scientifIc knowledge in their 
philosophical systems: Plato with his idea of dialectic; Aristotle with his 
fIrst philosophy. 60 
Aristotle makes it the aim of dialectic to test the correctness of 
op1lllons. For Plato dialectic is the highest science which we have to 
liberate us from the realm of opinion. Aristotle says that dialectic belongs to 
the realm of "general culture" (1tatoEta) which is empty because of its 
generality. The scientifIc person is the person who knows because he 
possesses knowledge (E1tt(j'tllJlll).61 For Plato dialectic is a leading of the 
soul (",UxaY(OY1a),62 and is education (1tatoEta) par excellence. The 
original ethical purpose of using dialectic is to fmd the objective truth 
because one pursues knowledge of reality, self-knowledge and in that way 
the improvement of one's life. This is also the core of Socratic-Platonic 
humanism as an active reflection on what a human being must be and the 
project of improving and transforming oneself through perpetual self-
examination and general examination of any object given. 
Plato makes a clear distinction between rhetoric and dialectic and he 
opposes each to the other. Rhetoric has -in general- a negative role that puts 
in serious jeopardy the dialectician's task. Rhetoric is for Plato a skill of 
talking with persuasive arguments, but one that does not care for the 
objective truth. Aristotle relates dialectic and rhetoric as arts that can prove 
opposites. 63 He considers Zeno as the founder of dialectic. With this 
statement he introduces a defInitive break with the Platonic idea of dialectic 
60 See Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 1 and 2. 
61 See Aristotle, Politics III, 11, 1282 a6, Eudemian Ethics, I, 8, 1217 b21. 
62 See Phaedrus, 271 clO. 
63 See footnote 46. 
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and a new beginning that could provide a historical background to his own 
idea of dialectic. That is why it is not surprising that Aristotle assigns to the 
dialectician the ability to make propositions and objections. 64 
Our next step is to clarifY the role of Zeno in the history of dialectic 
in order to tackle Plato's rejection of certain practices as part of dialectic 
and Aristotle's assertion that he was the founder of dialecti~. 
c) Zeno and Co. 
Plato's objection against any sort of anti-dialectic -i.e., eristic, Sophistry or 
antilogic- is very strong. The reasons that he gives are clear: they put in 
serious danger the idea of the essence of philosophy as a scientific and 
noble activity. The fruits of these anti-dialectical practices are such 
approaches as relativism, subjectivism and scepticism. As examples of 
such antidialectical practices, we propose to examine Zeno, Protagoras and 
Gorgias in turn. 
We will start with Zeno. If we consider the philosophical verdicts of 
Plato and Aristotle on Zeno's method, we can see that they are contrary. 
Plato writes in the Phaedrus 
Socrates.- "So do we not recognIse that the Eleatic Palamedes speaks 
scientifically, so as to make the same things appear to his hearers to be like and unlike, 
one and many, at rest and in motion? 
Phaedrus.- Yes indeed. 
Socrates.- Then the science of antilogic is not only concerned with law-courts 
and public addresses, but, so it seems, there will be this one science -if indeed it is one-
in relation to everything that is said, by which a man will be able to make everything 
which is capable of being made to resemble something else resemble everything which 
64 See footnote 45. 
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it is capable of being made to resemble, and to bring it to light when someone else 
makes one thing resemble another and disguises it." 65 
And concludes: 
Socrates.- "In that case, my friend, anyone who does not know the truth, but has 
made it his business to hunt down appearances, will give us a science of speech which 
is, so it seems, ridiculously unscientific. ,,66 
Aristotle said in his Sophist: 
" ... that Empedocles was the first to discover rhetoric and Zeno dialectic.,,67 
Plato does not think: that Zeno is a serious philosopher. Why does 
Plato suppose that Zeno is not serious? Why does he imply that the things 
that Zeno is doing are what an eristic does -where eristics as the name of the 
"expertise" in question is a kind of Sophistry? Why does Aristotle say that 
Zeno is the founder of dialectic? Why is Zeno not a Sophist for Aristotle? 
What is a Sophist? Why did Aristotle abandon the word "dialectic" for "the 
science of the most important things"? 
If we follow the method that Zeno uses, to judge from his fragments, 
we can conclude that: 1. He tries to demonstrate logically certain 
propositions based on a thesis; 2. sometimes he reaches contradictory 
conclusions;68 3. sometimes we have to accept certain assumptions or make 
concessions in relation to his inferences and conclusions;69 4. sometimes he 
65 Phaedrus, 261 d = DK 29A13 (C. 1. Rowe's translation). 
66 Ibid, 262 c (C. Rowe's translation). 
67 Diogenes Laertius, VIII, 57 = DK29AlO. 
68 See Frg. 3 and 29A13 (DK). 
69 See 29A25, Frg. 4 (DK) and Aristotle, Physics, Z9, 239b1I. 
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likes to start from hypotheses that are probable and to develop the reasoning 
to its last consequences. 70 
What are the criteria rn Plato for identifying a philosophical 
discourse? The criteria are that the discourse has to be dialectical, that is, the 
philosopher has to show his capacity to defend it; his intention has to be 
teaching rather than merely persuading; 71 and his aim to pursue the truth. 
For Plato dialectic is the method par excellence; dialectic is dialogue; 
dialectic is the synoptic science of reality which studies it as it really is, 
through questions and answers. 
Why does Plato reject Zeno's procedure? Probably because Zeno 
carries out his reasonings without any serious dialogue and human 
interchange, and above all, because at the end of his logical exercises, he 
does not compare his results with primary evidences. One can also "play" 
with arguments that are formally correct, but not really (truly) correct 
because they do not represent anything real. For Plato this is metaphysically 
and ethically a serious mistake. 
Antilogic can be useful as long as you are permanently confronted 
with reality; otherwise it can be the fIrst step to eristic and Sophistical 
procedures and conclusions. It is no accident that Protagoras and Gorgias 
took their source of inspiration from Zeno. Plato calls Sophists people like 
Protagoras or Hippias. The key to derrning a Sophist, in the pejorative 
sense, is, according to Plato, to analyse the different forms in which he 
appears and acts 72. A "Sophist" was originally an expert. Zeno is not 
normally treated as a Sophist, but sometimes he does things like a Sophist 
70 SeeFrg. 3 and AristotlePhysics8S, 263 alS-1S, b3-9. 
71 See A. Wilson Nightingale, Genres in Dialogue. Plato and the constmct of philosophy, Cambridge 
University Press, Chapter 4, V, p. 165. See also C. Rowe, "The Unity of the Phaedrus: a reply to Heath", 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Vol. 7 (1989), pp. 180-183. 
72 In fact that is the startIng point of the Sophist, that is, the six preliminary definitions of the Sophist as he 
appears provide us with the initial and fundamental light to enable us to hunt him down in a clear formula. 
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(e.g. reaching contradictory conclusions, treating hypotheses as fIrm starting 
points). Plato claims that Sophists were not philosophers because they did 
not pursue the truth. In this sense Zeno is an eristic for Plato because he 
does not care about truth and he only operates on a conceptual level. 
Plato's rejection of Zeno in the Parmenide/3 is because he really 
thinks that Zeno is an eristic. Zeno claims, in accordance with Parmenides' 
thesis, that there is only one thing in the universe. Plato considers that 
Parmenides is serious because he addresses real problems such as being and 
not-being. The really interesting questions are for Socrates those that Zeno 
ignores. Zeno is not interested in questions like how something could be 
like and unlike. Equally, Plato's Socrates thinks that the problem is not 
with particular forms, as Zeno thinks,74 but with forms and their 
relationships of similarities and dissimilarities. 
Plato has an extraordinary ability to construct arguments. In that 
sense he is very pragmatic: he uses arguments at the moment that he needs 
them, but always with dialectical means and aims. We cannot deny that 
Plato introduces Zeno in the Parmenides in order to put his own 
philosophical problems, that is, to show us what elenchos is and what the 
development of an hypothesis can be when the aim of the conversation is 
philosophical, that is, to help in the search for the truth, and to put this into 
contrast with Zeno' s way of proceeding. 75 That is, Plato wants to contrast 
dialectic and eristic by resorting to Zeno' s case. According to Plato, Zeno 
only uses his antinomies for establishing paradoxes, just like a mere fIrst 
attempt -one that never reaches anything clear and concrete-, but he does not 
go further. In that sense Plato treats Zeno as a contradiction-monger. 
73 See Parmenides, 127 d-130c. 
74 Parmenides is interested in questions like this, at any rate, but at least his approach is open to discussion 
and he is not taking anything for granted as Zeno does. 
75 SeeParmenides, 136-137. 
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Parmenides' and Zeno' s starting points come from the perceptions of 
other people or the majority of people. Both are trying to convince us that 
our perceptions are wrong and deceptive. Plato accepts primary evidences 
as a starting point and he does not demote or deny their ontological status, 
but he does not think that the fmal criterion of truth will be provided by 
mere perceptions. 
Plato rejects Zeno radically from the beginning, and fmally he 
commits parricide against Parmenides,76 because at the end both are 
denying primary evidences and facts -the existence of unity and multiplicity, 
change and difference in real things and in their relationships- that are the 
starting point and the conditio sine qua non of Plato's dialectical method. 
If fmally Plato rejects both it is because he seeks to demonstrate and 
to test his own theses and ideas, giving them a stronger historical and 
theoretical foundation through a dialogue with eminent figures like 
Parmenides and Zeno. 
Methodologically speaking, Plato rejects Zeno's contentious 
procedure for achieving puzzling aims. His arguments hinge on logical 
assumptions that make them, sometimes, look logically possible, but 
physically impossible. That is, they can be premises that look possible, but 
are really puzzling. But Plato accepts Parmenides' method as a 
philosophical one -insofar as Parmenides is really concerned with the truth-
despite the fact that finally Plato will reject his conclusions. 
Zeno, according to Plato, has merely partial aims: he wants to show 
us that he is personally right regardless of the objective truth. Parmenides' 
search is for Plato too a real one: his aim is to prevent human confusion and 
error. He really thinks that human ways of perceiving are unreliable. The 
truth, according to him, requires a different path and that is what he is trying 
to show us in his poem. 
76 See Sophist, 241 d5-7. 
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As we have said, the concept of dialectic in Aristotle involves three 
main ideas: 77 1. it is an art of questioning; 2. it is the power of reaching 
contradictory conclusions, insofar as the dialectician is the man who has the 
ability to make propositions and objections. 3. it is the method of reasoning 
from generally accepted opinion. 
We can grasp the similarities between Zeno and Aristotle in relation 
to dialectic: 1. The ability to reach contradictory conclusions; 2. the use of 
endoxa: for Aristotle the dialectician works in the field of probabilities and 
verisimilitudes, not in the field of truths;78 3. for both it involves an art of 
questioning 
Aristotle accepts the value of the Socratic elenchos, but rejects the 
idea of dialectic as a science -in the Platonic sense. When Aristotle says 
that Zeno was the founder of dialectic, it is obvious that he is referring to 
dialectic in the Aristotelian sense. F or Aristotle antilogic can be a step to 
dialectic (and in this sense he supports Zeno's method), but dialectic is only 
a first attempt or preliminary and neutral capacity of reasoning that requires 
discipline so as not to degenerate into eristic -and he does agree with Plato 
in relation to the risk that antilogic implies. 
If Aristotle does not accept any historical affiliation with Platonic 
dialectic, he has to change the meaning and scope of his idea of dialectic in 
accordance with its Zenonian origins. Dialectic will not be any longer a 
form of episteme, and Aristotle has to create a new path to study "the most 
important things": first philosophy. 
Conclusion: Zeno was an ambiguous figure. We only have fragments 
of his work, and that is a kind of hermeneutical restriction when we try to 
give an accurate account of his thought. Zeno will continue to produce 
many controversial reactions among scholars. Probably, most of the time he 
77 Supra. pp. 127-129. 
78 See J. D G. Evans, op. cit., Chapter II, pp. 26-27. 
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could not offer us conclusive reasomngs, but he gIves us with his 
antinomies enough elements to make us hesitate about what other 
philosophers take for granted. 79 Also, his "logical plays" have given enough 
work for lovers of formal logic and mathematics. 
Gorgias and Protagoras are very controversial figures too. Nowadays 
some contemporary interpreters and champions of the Sophists' activities 
and practices have expressed their rejection of Plato's portrayal of them in 
his dialogues. 80 The reasons that they exhibit for that rejection are as 
follows: 1. Plato's idea of philosophy is so narrow and inflexible that it does 
not allow him to include in it anything that involves ways of thinking that 
do not show clear boundaries between true and false reasonings; 2. Plato 
suggests that he portrays the Sophists fairly; nevertheless their defenders say 
that this is not necessarily true because what the Sophists support does not 
always represent their own doctrine. 
These champions of the Sophists also argue that Plato just ridicules 
the Sophists' activity, but that he really did not know what their purposes 
were. 
What should we respond to this? 
Plato's idea of philosophy is an organic dialectical project with a 
complete and linking set of means and aims, form and content. 81 If he 
insists throughout his works on this idea of philosophy as methodical 
conversation with the aim of discovering the truth in reality it is because he 
saw clearly the serious risks involved in including as philosophy personal 
opinions or personal points of view. Even if it is true that, for example, 
79 See D. 1. Furley, "Zeno and indivisible magnitudes" in A. P. D. Mourelatos (ed.), The Presocratics, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, pp. 365-366. 
80 See G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, Cambridge University Press, reprint, 1993, Chapter 6, pp. 
59-67; A. Nehamas, "Eristic, antilogic, sophistic, dialectic: Plato's demarcation of philosophy from 
sophistry", History of Philosophy Quarterly 7 (1990), 3-16; and G. Striker, "Methods of sophistry" in 
Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and EthiCS, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 3-21. 
81 Cj A. Nehamas, art. cit., pp. 8-9. 
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Protagoras in his Truth was just trying to defend the validity of personal 
opinion and beliefs, that does not mean that we can go a step further and 
assert that philosophy can be reduced to a collection of them. 82 It is one 
thing to say that everybody should be allowed to support or to express his 
(her) personal opinion, view or belief about anything and it is another 
completely different thing to hold that these opinions, views and beliefs 
should be granted philosophical status for themselves. That is the reason 
that Plato insisted that dialectic involves an elenctic process, that is, that 
everything has to be put to the test and its truth or falsity demonstrated. 
In other words, if it was Protagoras or somebody else who was trying 
to vindicate individual perception, it does not follow that it can be 
automatically set up as an epistemological and universal criterion of truth; 
and if it represents his position, Plato was trying to show us the serious 
consequences that follow from it: subjectivism and relativism. 83 
Moreover: let us suppose that whatever Protagoras in his Truth and 
Gorgias in his What is not were saying were not their own theses. That is, 
let us suppose that they were just trying to address themselves against 
Parmenides' theses, or theses like Parmenides', with the aim of showing us 
four main points: 1. that his reasonings do not lead to anything; 2. to 
demonstrate other possibilities of reasoning; 3. to vindicate the status and 
validity of opinion -Protagoras; and 4. that nothingness permeates 
everything and from there, that there follows the impossibility of the 
cognition and communication of anything -Gorgias. But what happens if -
as Plato did- we follow them out to their last philosophical consequences, 
independently of who supports them? Immediately we notice that they are 
deeply antidialectical -in the Platonic sense of the term. If we take personal 
perceptions as the measure of everything it will be impossible to get any sort 
82 Cj G. Striker, op. cit., p. 21. 
83 See Plato, Theaetetus, 154b-155d. 
141 
of agreement. Philosophically speaking, it implies the destruction of any 
ontological, epistemological or ethical criterion of truth. In that sense it 
would imply also the atomisation of philosophy, which would be just a 
collection of isolated opinions, views and beliefs about existent or non-
existent "things". 
If we take absolute nothingness as the comprehensive category that 
includes everything, obviously there is no step further to go. Even if we 
make a concession and we provide nothingness with concrete characteristics 
or attributes we are, fIrst of all, contradicting ourselves, and secondly we 
can just conclude that because of this dominance of nothingness, knowledge 
and communication are impossible. But facts contradict us; we 
communicate with each other despite the fact that there is always the 
possibility of having misunderstandings. 
To broaden the discussion: in relation to other Sophists, it is not valid 
either to say that Socrates and the Sophists have the same method, but 
different aims, because what Socrates was doing [mally was just "refuting" 
other people's beliefs and "winning discussions" according to what he and 
his interlocutors consider true. 84 
This is radically wrong. To reduce the elenctic process that Socratic-
Platonic dialectic includes to mere refutation is just to oversimplify and 
misunderstand its essence and aims. Dialectic -in the Platonic sense-
involves an elenchos which implies also a dialogic process of testing and 
examining ideas with the aim of searching for the truth. 85 Plato does not 
defme philosophy in polemical terms. Socrates does not want to seek or to 
get any victory through discussion, he wants -in accordance Plato's 
dialectical purposes- to search jointly -via conversation- and objectively for 
the truth that is present in a common reality that all of us share. 
84(f A. Nehamas, ibid, pp. 10-13. 
85 Cj G. Striker, ibid, p. 9. 
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We would insist that it is not valid to split the means and aims of 
Platonic dialectic because they constitute an inseparable whole. 
It is not true either to say that because of the limited scope of Plato's 
notion of what philosophy is, he could not understand the value of rhetoric 
and probable reasonings that the Sophists use to exhibit in their practices, 
while Aristotle does. 86 We proceed point by point. 
It is true that, in general terms, Plato uses the word rhetoric m a 
negative and therefore pejorative sense. It is not until Plato's maturity that 
he conceives the possibility of a positive practice of rhetoric. 87 Rhetoric in 
its negative sense is for Plato -broadly speaking- an art of speaking with 
merely persuasive88 or false reasonings making use of fallacious arguments 
that do not correspond to any reality. Plato's main concern continues to be 
the same: the objective truth. That is the reason that Plato rejects probable 
reasonings and conclusions: because while they can be useful in many other 
human activities and practices they do not show us directly what is true or 
false. 89 Furthermore: Plato has in mind the serious risks that rhetoric would 
involve when reason is used as an instrument of power. 
It is also true that Aristotle builds a very detailed idea of what the art 
of rhetoric must be and he posits it as a "counterpart of dialectic". He also 
considers that both can construct arguments that lead to opposite 
conclusions. 90 But Aristotle was concerned with truth, proof of which is 
that he considers -as Plato did- that philosophy and the particular sciences 
ultimately aim at the truth. The difference from Plato is that Aristotle does 
86 Cj A. Nehamas, ibid, p. 14 and G. Striker, ibid, p. 10. 
87 We are referring to the Phaedrus and the Statesman, especially. 
88 See Gorgias, 455 a if and Philebus, 58 a if 
89 There is no harm in remembering Benjamin Disraeli's famous phrase: "There are lies, damned lies and 
statistics. " 
90 We are borrowing this expression from 1. Brunschwig, "Aristotle's rhetoric as a 'counterpart' of 
dialectic", in A. Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric, University of California Press, 
1996, pp. 34-55. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 1355 a33-36. 
143 
not think that the way to search for the truth is through dialectical means -in 
the sense that Aristotle understands the term. Dialectic for Aristotle is not 
part of philosophy. It is true that Aristotle gives some value and recognition 
to the process that the Sophists use to achieve their probable reasoning. But 
it is false to say that because Aristotle has "no such pious reservations,,91 -as 
Plato has, according to these contemporary critics- or a more flexible idea 
about what philosophy is than Plato, that Aristotle considers that dialectic 
deals with similar objects and methods to philosophy. For Aristotle 
dialectic does not have any demonstrative power and it is neutral in relation 
to truth because it does not deal with any particular subject-matter as 
philosophy and the particular sciences do. 
If fmally Plato disqualifies the Sophists' way of proceeding it is 
be'cause this practice can lead to a mere love of contradictions and to our 
becoming misologues. 92 This state reveals a very anti-philosophical attitude 
in relation to objective truth 
Socrates.- "It would be pitiable, Phaedo, ( ... ) when there is a true and reliable 
argument and one that can be understood, if a man who has dealt with such arguments 
as appear at one time true, at another time untrue, should not blame himself or his own 
lack of skill but, because of his distress, in the end gladly shift blame away from 
himself to the arguments, and spend the rest of his life hating and reviling reasonable 
arguments and so deprived of truth and knowledge of reality. 93" 
We suspect that Plato would not have been concerned at all if his idea 
of philosophy as a dialectical project -with all the ontological, 
epistemological, methodological and ethical implic~tions that it necessarily 
91 See G, Striker, art. cit., p. 9. 
92 See Phaedo, 89 d. 
93 Phaedo, 90 c8-d7 (G. M. A. Grube's translation with modification). 
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involves- had a "limited appeal",94 because fmally, as he states, repeatedly, 
unanimity is not a criterion of truth and what the essence of the science of 
philosophy and the philosophers disposition must involve is 
" ... to love the truth and to do everything for its sake.,,95 
d) Stoics96 
For the Stoics dialectic is part of logic. By logic they will mean "the science 
of rational discourse".97 For the Stoics, as with Plato and in opposition to 
Aristotle, dialectic is a science and its subject-matter is things. With the 
Stoics the idea of dialectic makes reference to the science of correct 
discussions and implies a method of conducting arguments by questions and 
answers in different ways. 98 It can be used: 1. In a Platonic way, that is, 
testing hypotheses through a quest for true defmitions. 2. It can be used in 
the Aristotelian style as a method of probable reasoning and as a tool that 
can provide the general foundation of science.99. 
For the Stoics dialectic -as question and answer -is one possible 
method, but it is not the proper method for doing philosophy. According to 
94 Cj A. Nehamas, art. cit., p. 14. 
95 Philebus, 58 d5. 
96 Our account on the Stoics is heavily dependent on A. A. Long, "Dialectic and the Stoic Sage", in J. M. 
Rist, The Stoics (ed.), University of California Press, 1978, pp. 101-124 == A. A. Long, Stoic Studies, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 85-106. 
97 A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, Duckworth, 2nd. edition, London, 
1096, p. 122. 
98 See A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Volume I, Cambridge University Press, 
1997, pp. 183 ff 
99 For Diodorus Cronus the Megarian -and the teacher of Zeno the Stoic- dialectic is associated with the 
idea of eristic. For the Sceptical Academy dialectic is an instrument that provides us with knowledge to 
answer arguments equally strong on the opposite side. 
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Diogenes Laertius lOO dialectic in Stoicism is an expertise (E1tta'tTu.t1l) that 
has a discriminatory role because it permits one to distinguish what is true, 
false or neither true or false. Philosophers must possess this dialectic, 
understood as such a discriminatory faculty. Stoics think also that a wise 
man must be a dialectician because the content of dialectical studies IS 
words and things and the relationships between them. 
The idea of dialectic in the Stoics is difficult, because it is an organic part of 
the Stoic philosophical system as a whole and because its role varies 
throughout the history of Stoicism. 
1. The place of dialectic in Stoic philosophy, according to Diogenes 
Laertius,101 can be presented as follows: 
STOIC 
PHILOSOPH 
OglC 
(science of rational 
discourse) 
cience of rhetoric 
cience of dialectic 
epistemology 
grammar 
some 
treatments 
of literary 
style 102 
Diogenes says also that, for the Stoics, dialectic is the general science 
of rational discourse and language and rhetoric's task is the organization 
and construction of arguments for political, forensic, and panegyric 
speeches. 103 
100 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII, 42. 
101 See Diogenes Laertius, op. cit., VII, 41 and if 
102 I ' 1.)0 
. e., lI.t~et(;. 
103 See ibid, VII, 42. 
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II. Some ideas of dialectic among the Stoics: 
This is what of Alexander of Aphrodisias attributes to certain Stoics. 
The Stoics held that: 
a) Dialectic is the "science of speaking well". 
b) "Speaking well consists in saying things that are true and fitting". 
He says also that: 
c) "Dialectic is a peculiar property to the philosopher of the most 
perfect philosophy." 
d) Therefore, only the wise man is a dialectician. 104 
At the beginning of the Stoa around 300 B.C it was a time of great 
philosophical activity. A number of different schools were active: 
Academics, Peripatetics, Cynics, Megarians, and the new schools of Zeno 
and Epicurus. They differ in their conceptions of dialectic but the common 
denominator of all of them is that dialectic 
" ... undertook the posing and solving of logical paradoxes and also the provision of 
relatively formal techniques of argument between a questioner and respondent on a 
variety of subjects."lo5 
If we follow Diogenes Laertius' account of Stoic logic, we fmd him 
remarking that the difference between dialectic and rhetoric for the Stoics is 
that: 
Dialectic: is "the science of discoursing correctly on arguments in 
question and answer form, hence the Stoics also defme it ~ the science of 
things true and false and neither true nor false" and 
104 See Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta II, 124 = Alexander of Aphrodisias, p. 1, 8 Wallies. 
105 A. A. Long, "Dialectic and the Stoic Sage", p. 102. 
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Rhetoric: is "the science of speaking well on matters which are set 
forth by plain narrative.,,106 
According to Sextus Empiricus 107 the principal differences between 
dialectical and rhetorical arguments are in method and the style: dialectic 
operates by means of brief discourse and rhetoric operates through long 
discourse. Theoretically speaking both are sciences appropriate to the wise 
man. Both are part of Stoic logic, both are scientific activities and they 
belong to the Stoic sage insofar as they involve the ability to distinguish 
truth from falsehood. 108 
Further on Diogenes109 starts a very detailed description of Stoic 
dialectic and he includes in it the following topics: 
VOIce 
elements of speech 
types of style 
speCIes 
DIALECTIC division 
amphibology 
sign function of language 
language as meaningfultJekta (things are said or meant) 
("things signified") propositions and arguments 
logical paradoxes 
It is generally accepted that Chrysippus was the creator of Stoic logic 
-logic in the wider Stoic sense. 110 He was very well known for his highly 
106 Diognes Laertius, vn, 42 (translated by R. D. Hicks), Volume II, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
Mass.lLondon, Reprint, 1995. 
107 SeeAdv. Math II, 7 = Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta I, 75. 
108 Diogenes Laertius gives us an alternative definition of dialectic (VII, 62) as "the science of discoursing 
correctly on arguments in question and answer form." A. A. Long (art. cit., p. 104) considers that this 
definition is not distinctively Stoic because it just describes dialectic as a way that is consistent with the 
general conception of the term in the early Hellenistic period. We can notice also that the Socratic and 
Sophistic influences in this definition are clear. When Diogenes gives a detailed summary of Stoic logic he 
does not refer to this definition at all. He addressed the topic as the "science of things true" or what 
Chrysippus calls "signs and things signified" (VII, 63). 
109 vn, 55-83. 
110 See Diogenes Laertius, VII, 50-82. 
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elaborated logical theory, III but Long suggests -and it seems reasonable-
that Chrysippus has to be seen much more as: 
" ... the first Stoic to develop dialectic beyond argument by question and answer into a 
science that made epistemology, language and logic together an integral part of Stoic 
philosophy as a whole." 112 
But what about his predecessors? According to Plutarch, 113 Zeno the 
Stoic had a very restricted interest in dialectic as the necessary tool for any 
good philosopher to solve paradoxes. Diogenes says that Zeno defmes 
dialectic as the science 
" ... of correctly discussing subjects by question and answer ... ,,114 
Cleanthes is seen as the man who prepared the ground for 
Chrysippus' focus on dialectic because of his interests in subjects such as 
sophisms, forms of arguments and dialectic, and because Cleanthes gave a 
systematic form to Stoic logic. 115 
There is a clear Platonic influence in Chrysippus' idea of dialectic 
because the latter is closely related to the idea that the dialectician is the 
wise man who possesses the knowledge to research the essence and name of 
each thing. 1l6 The concrete association is with one passage of Plato's 
III See W. Kneale and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 113-
176. 
112 A. A. Long, art. cit., p. 105 and see also his Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, ed. 
cit., p. 121. 
113 See Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, I, 50 = De Stoicorum repugnantiis, 1034 if 
114 Diogenes Laertius, VII, 42 (R. D. Hicks' translation): "... Kai 't"v OtaA£K'ttK"V 'tOU operoe; 
OtaA£'YEcr9at 1tEpt 'trov EV EP0)'t110Et Kat Cx1tOKpiOEt AO'Y(i)V· ... ". 
115 See Sfoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, I, 489 and Diogenes Laertius, VII, 175. 
116 See A. A. Long, art. cit., pp. 106-107. 
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Cratylus ll7 and another one in the Republic. 118 In Cratylus Plato associates 
the job of the dialectician with the man who knows how to ask and answer 
questions and how to look to the natural name of each thing. Because of 
that the dialectician must be the ideal man to supervise "the giver of 
names". The passage in the Republic conveys the general tenor of Platonic 
dialectic, as the correct method of research as a systematic attempt to grasp 
the essence of each thing itself. 
That is crucial because from here we can state some similarities 
between Plato and Chrysippus and a distance from Aristotle. 119 Despite the 
fact that Chrysippus does not recognise the same importance that Plato gives 
to dialectic as a synonym of philosophy and as a philosophical conversation 
in the search of the truth via questions and answers, he admits that dialectic 
is still a kind of knowledge and a sort of wisdom necessary for any sort of 
philosophical research that involves the aim of "knowledge of demonstrative 
procedures".120 The Stoics do not follow Aristotle's idea of dialectic as a 
mere instrument and they refuse to use the term organon for describing the 
second order task oflogic and dialectic. 12l 
Diogenes Laertius 122 stresses the ethical value of dialectic insofar as 
dialectic is a virtue itself when it is associated to the Stoic sage. These 
virtues involve human excellence and are indispensable for a good life. 
The virtues that dialectic includes -and which are fairly attributed to 
Chrysippus- according to Diogenes are: 123 1. U1tp01t'tO)cria: that is, a sort of 
II7 See Cratylus, 390 c-391a. 
118 See Republic, 533 b. 
119 See A. A. Long, art. cit., p. 107. 
120 See Stoicontm Vetentm Fragmenta II, 49, 31. 
121 See ibid, II, 49, supra, pp. 132-134. 
122 See Diogenes Laertius, VII, 46-47. 
123 For the following descriptions we are using Hicks' translation, but with some modifications. 
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moral sense that provides us with a discriminatory and reflective knowledge 
that permits us to distinguish "when we should give assent and when not"; 
2. UVEtKUtO't11<;: that is, wariness that is understood as a determination that 
permits us to resist what at the fIrst instance seems probable and not to 
grasp at it; 3. UVf.AEy~ia: "irrefutability" which means "strength in 
argument", that is not being led to the opposite side and 4. uJla'tato'tl1<;: 
"seriousness", that is, a complete determination or a habit that opens up the 
possibility of referring presentations (cpav'tao"iat) to right account or reason 
(op9o<; AOyo<;). 
It is interesting to notice that for the Stoics without dialectic knowlege 
is impossible: 
" ... Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state 
which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study 
of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to 
fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate 
what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot 
methodically put questions and give answers."J24 
There are many similarities between Stoic dialectic and the elenctic process 
that Socratic-Platonic dialectic implies. For Plato you possess knowledge of 
any given object insofar as you can give a complete, rational account of it in 
a question and answer process. This epistemological process implies an act 
of being tested. The Stoics consider that dialectic is a necessary condition 
for progress because dialectic is a study that provides a discriminatory 
capacity to the sage that permits him to distiguish truth and falsehood; and 
arguments that are just plausible or that involve any ambiguity. For Plato, 
the dialectician is fmally concerned with the truth, and in that sense, 
124 Diogenes Laertius, vn, 47 (R. D. Hicks' translation, Lives oj Eminent Philosophers, 
London/Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, Volume II, 1995). 
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dialectic implies also a discriminatory and intellectual progress. At the 
same time the Stoic role of dialectic is associated with Aristotle insofar as 
the dialectician is the man that has the ability to deal with arguments for and 
against any given thesis and because the role of the dialectician is still 
associated with deb~tes as an expertise in discussion -but is not a science. l25 
In short: dialectic in the Stoics plays a very important pivotal role, one 
which allows the connection of ethics with logic in their whole system. To 
act wisely requires dialectical knowledge. That enables us to understand 
also the meaning of a "good life" for the Stoics. A good life implies living 
in accordance with nature or the universal logos that pervades everything; it 
requires a dialectical wisdom to grasp, to reflect, to make correct 
judgements related to facts and to moral actions. Dialectic is the necessary 
knowledge that permits us, as human beings, to develop our rational abilities 
and to realise our human nature. That is again related to the Socratic-
Platonic idea of dialectic as the method of achieving general knowledge and 
self-knowledge. 
It is very important to emphasise that for Chrysippus l26 the main aim 
of dialectic is constructive, that is, to produce knowledge and to search for 
the truth. The act of arguing the opposite sides of the question has to be 
handled very carefully and as a educational tool, but avoiding its misuse, 
that is, an abusive practice of mere refutation. l27 
To sum up: Chrysippus' idea of dialectic has some similarities with 
Plato's and some others with Aristotle's. Like Plato and Aristotle, he thinks 
that just by rational means and argumentation we will achieve philosophical 
125 Chrysippus probably shows a direct Aristotelian influence from the Topics insofar as in his logical 
works he dedicates long sections to techniques of argument and the treatment of sophisms. 
126 Nevertheless, Plutarch in his treatise On the Contradictions of the Stoics considers that Chrysippus' 
position shows inconsistency because when he was under the influence of Arcesilaus he used to practise 
the two sides of the question to the detriment of a sound use of reason. 
127 See A. A. Long, art. cit., pp. 110-111. 
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progress. Like Plato, for Chrysippus the dialectician is not merely a 
logician, but the man who has the task of achieving knowledge of reality. 
In ~at sense, Plato and Chrysippus differ from Aristotle, because dialectic 
for him does not provide us with any specific knowledge. However, Plato 
and Chrysippus differ with each other in relation to the epistemological 
means to carry out dialectic. For Plato philosophical dialogue through 
questions and answers is essential for establishing relationships between 
kinds i.e., connections among things in reality. Chrysippus is mainly 
interested in demonstrating the necessary conditions of the correct sense-
impressions and propositions that correspond to material objects. 128 
The reach of dialectic is for Aristotle too limited and for him it is 
impossible through dialectical procedures to search for the truth. Dialectic 
has a logical value as a necessary discriminatory tool that permits us to 
distinguish erroneous arguments and an ontological and epistemological 
importance insofar as it provides a means of access to the general, universal 
foundation of science. In that sense Chrysippus is closer to Aristotle's idea 
of dialectic as an educational means, but dialectic is not a method for 
discovering truths. We can say that for Chrysippus dialectic is very 
important logically speaking -logic as a science 9f rational discourse- but it 
has a very restricted epistemological scope. The dialectician is a wise man 
who has an excellent ability ih the business of question and answering in 
live formal "discussions", but these dialectical encounters do not provide 
anything of cognitive value and even less do they have a constructive role 
for the demonstration of truths. That is, dialectic is a knowledge that is 
particularly useful for the conduction of question and answer arguments, but 
it is not a science that searches for or discovers truths. 
But, is dialectic -according to the Stoics- completely hopeless for 
discovering the truth? Here the Stoics make a very subtle distinction. The 
128 See A. A. Long, art. cit., p. 112. 
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dialectician is a wise man, but not the only sort of wise man. All wise men 
are dialecticians, but not conversely. The wise man possesses real 
knowledge because he articulates it in a whole consistent system that 
enables him to discover the truth: 
" The fact that dialectician, in Stoic usage, falls into the category of predicates 
peculiar to the wise man tells us something about the Stoic view of dialectic. 
Moreover, as we have seen, Stoic statements about dialectic lay great emphasis upon 
the wise man's unique competence. 
He instantiates what dialectic is, the science of things true and false, and he is 
distinguished from other men, including would-be dialecticians, by his possession of 
truth (aletheia). According to strict Stoic usage, truth is knowledge, a disposition of the 
wise man's logos, and it differs from 'the true' in various ways. Above all, truth is 
something compound or complex whereas the true is uniform and simple. Dialectic, 
whether treating of assent to sense-impressions or to methods of inference, deals with 
the conditions that make particular propositions true or false. But a man can learn to 
formulate true propositions without grasping a complete structure of logical 
relationships, an ordered system of true propositions, which constitutes dialectic as such 
and therefore truth as a whole. The distinction between truth and the true helps to show 
the systematic character of the wise man's knowledge. He represents an ideal of 
language and rationality at one with reality, of truth discovered.,,129 
Diogenes Laertius points out that logic deals too with canons and 
criteria of truth, that is, with the formulation of rules that permit us to 
discriminate different <puv't(lcrlUt that we have with the aim of discovering 
the truth.130 According to him also there is no general agreement among the 
Stoics in relation to the criteria or standards of truth. 131 For Chrysippus, 
Antipater and Apollodorus the standard of truth is the apprehending 
129 A. A. Long, art. cit.. pp. 113-114. 
130 See Diogenes Laertius, VII, 42. 
131 See ibid, VII, 54. 
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presentation (KU'tUAll1t'ttK1l <pav'tuaia) that comes from a real object. 
Boethus considers that there is a plurality of criteria: intelligence, sense-
perception, desire and knowledge. Chrysippus contradicts himself in 
another of his books because he considers that sensation and preconception 
are the only criteria of truth. Other older Stoics and Posidonius make right 
reason the standard. 
Epictetus in several of his discourses132 attacks Epicureans and 
Academics for their sceptical attitude in relation to truth. He represents the 
general Stoic attitude as regards dialectic because he considers that as 
human beings we are naturally endowed to achieve the truth with our 
intellect and sensory faculties. The only explicit remark he makes about 
intellect and sensory faculties is that both require logical training through 
dialectical method. 
Epictetus is very representative of the general, orthodox Stoic idea of 
the discovery of the truth. This point connects us to Diogenes' testimony on 
the topic. The elements that he mentions constitute the key that permits us 
to reconstruct the Stoic epistemology which is part of the dialectical science: 
to assent correctly and to grasp the correct content of a sense impression or 
a sentence is a discriminatory process which implies the ability and the 
criterion to distinguish <pav'taaiat. The wise man who possesses the 
dialectical virtue has this ability. Going further: the act of assenting and 
grasping has its origins in the human rational governing principle (logos). 
This logos is defmed as "a collection of general concepts and 
preconceptions.,,133 Defmitions are essential because the way that we grasp 
things is through general concepts. For the Stoics to know what each thing 
is implies an inseparable link between Ka'taA ll1t'ttKTt <puv'taaia and logos 
that allows us to associate the particular object of perception or a 
132 See 1.7; 1.17; 2.12; 2.25. 
\33 See Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta II, 841. 
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proposition with a valid general concept that is based on sense experience 
and it is organised coherently by intellect. 
The wise man who possesses an op9o<; )...0"(0<; is capable of reasoning 
correctly and acting according to the right reason. The active principle of 
the universe is for the Stoics right reason and the same as god. Dialectic 
plays an interconnective role in the Stoic system insofar as it provides the 
theoretical means of tackling facts and reason correctly and the practical 
means that permits us to live in harmony with nature. In that sense, because 
dialectic deals with language, and is the property of the wise man, it inter-
relates the three main fields of Stoic philosophy, that is, logic, ethics and 
physics. 134 
With these considerations it is possible to infer that dialectic might be 
seen in the Stoic system -perhaps mainly in Chrysippus- as an ethical 
attempt at self-discovery.135 The correct application of the logos with the 
aim of discovering the truth is in accordance with human nature. This 
sound dialectical exercise of the logos provides us with a high logical 
technique of theoretical discernment and practical understanding of human 
nature and the rationality of the universe. Dialectic is a means to knowledge 
and truth. This ethical projection of Stoic dialectic has many similarities 
with the elenctic-dialectical Socratic-Platonic idea, because [mally what a 
philosopher pursues through the dialectical method is the knowledge of 
reality. Knowledge of reality is a permanent process of examination of any 
object given, of human nature and of self-examination. 136 
134 See A. A. Long, art. cit., p. 118. 
135 See A. A. Long, ibid, pp. 116-117; Diogenes Laertius, vn, 189-202. 
l36 A. A. Long (art. cit., pp. 119-121) remarks that the figure of Epictetus is important insofar as he 
represents a good equilibrium between two extreme Stoic positions in relation to logic -i.e., to consider 
logic in a dismissive way as mere pedantic exercise that does not help at all for the development of a good 
life (Seneca and Musonius Rufus) and the other extreme that considers that logical techniques themselves 
are enough for a good philosopher- and the understanding of philosophy as a whole practice that involves 
a refining of our reasoning powers and a correct channelling of them into our conduct. That is also the 
reason that for Epictetus the role of dialectic is identified with the knowledge proper of the wise man. 
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The Stoic, and Aristotelian, ideas of dialectic will exert a defmitive 
impact on the Medieval idea of dialectic. 
§5. THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF DIALECTIC137 
Dialectic is for the scholastics the instrument par excellence with which all 
philosophical argumentation works. The term dialectic in the Middle Ages 
refers to two main things: l. the legitimacy of the use of reason to 
investigate and clarify revealed truths, and 2. the display of a logical 
technique for disputing probable questions or persuasive arguments in the 
Universities and among philosophers. 
The Middle Ages are strongly influenced by the Aristotelian and 
Stoic ideas of dialectic. Dialectic has in the Middle Ages a very Aristotelian 
sense: a tentative and probable reasoning, and a very Stoic tincture: as 
formal logic. Dialectic in the Middle Ages acquires an instrumental role: as 
a logical tool. From the patristic period to the end of the 12th century 
dialectic was identified with logic and considered one of the liberal arts of 
the trivium with grammar and rhetoric. One of the main problems was the 
validity or invalidity of using rational dialectic in the theological field, that 
is, in a domain of divine revelation, a domain that, in th&t time, could be 
tackled by religious faith. 
Some ecclesiastical writers, such as Tatian and Tertullian, assumed 
an anti-dialectical position. They called dialectic "the father of heresy". 
Some others, including Saint Augustine, approved the use of dialectic in 
Christian doctrine as a means to getting a deeper appreciation of the 
Dialectic permits him to reason correctly by question and answer, to distinguish good logic from bad logic 
and to conduct his life along good paths. 
137 Our account of Medieval Dialectic is mainly based on Eleanor Stump -Dialectic and its Place in the 
Development oj Medieval Logie, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1989- which we find the 
clearest and most explanatory. 
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doctrine of divine revelation and as a means of detecting and refuting 
heresy.138 This controversy for and against the use of dialectic in religious 
contexts reached its climax in the 11th and the 12th century. The tension 
exploded between dialecticians and grammarians in the Eucharistic 
controversy, and in the 12th century, between dialecticians and the monks in 
the Trinitarian controversies. In the thirteenth century dialectic consolidates 
a positive place in theology. That explains the height of development of the 
scholastic method in quaestiones disputatae, quodlibetales, summae, and 
commentaries, in which new scholastic syntheses were made. But then the 
abuse of dialectic in theology and philosophy led to its decline in the late 
period of Medieval scholasticism. 
Dialectic in the Medieval period IS understood fundamentally as 
logic. The ways that the dialectical tradition changed throughout the 
Meddle Ages had clear repercussions in the different logical concerns of 
medieval philosophers. It is not surprising that because dialectic involves 
the idea of a logical tool, it played a central role in the late scholastic 
theories of consequences 139 and obligations. 14o In the first case dialectic is 
central for the rise of the theory of consequences and in the second case 
dialectic is a necessay resource in disputation. 141 
We start with Boethius. It is undeniable that the figure of Boethius 
and his attention to the subject of dialectic exerted a fundamental influence 
on the understanding of scholastic treatments of dialectic in Medieval 
138 See De D(Jctrina Christiana, 2.3; De Civitate Dei, 8.10. 
139 The word consequentia is mainly used in the Medieval period with the sense of "conditional 
proposition"; see W. Kneale and M. Kneale op. cit., pp. 274 and ff. 
140 W. Kneale and M. Kneale -op. cit., p. 234- define obligationes as follows: "Obligationes are 
obligations assumed by a party to a disputation, or conditions within which such a discussion must be 
conducted. The logicians of the period considered in detail what was involved in making this or that 
concession for the purposes of argument, e.g. that a certain proposition was doubtful, and insisted on 
maintaining consistency betweeen the principles assumed during any discussion. Little, if any, modern 
work has been devoted so far to the investigation of this part of medieval logic, but it may perhaps be 
compared with Aristotle's treatment of debate in his Topics and De Sophisticis Elenchis." 
141' . d· See E. Stump,op. Cit., Intro uctlOn, pp. 1-2. 
158 
philosophy. For Boethius dialectic is part of metaphysics and a necessary 
consequence of it. Because the nature of the world involves a series of 
regular connections among things, it is possible to know these 
interconnections and state certain true propositions and make true 
inferences. 
The case of Abelard is different because he established a partial 
division between certain parts of logic and metaphysics. The reason for his 
doing this is because he considers that certain inferences do not contain any 
dialectical relationship and that they are true exclusively because of their 
form. The terminists make the next step and fix a clear distancing between 
dialectic and metaphysics: they formalise logic. They consider that 
dialectical inferences are theoretically reducible to syllogisms and that their 
validity depends just on their form. 
Ockham attempted to broaden the field of dialectic agam to 
inferences logically possible and to include the discussion of obligationes in 
his treatments of inferences. For Ockham dialectic and demonstration are 
equivalent. 
As we have said, the main roots of the scholastic tradition on dialectic 
come from Aristotle, and particularly from his Topics. 142 Aristotle says at 
the beginning of his Topics that the main aim of his treatise is to fmd a 
method -he calls it dialectical reasoning- that allows us to reason from 
generally accepted opinions about any problem given and permits us to 
distinguish contradictions in our arguments. What is clear is that the 
Aristotelian idea of dialectic is characterised as a skillfulness in reasoning 
and not as an integral method for searching for the truth as in Plato. 143 That 
will be central in Boethius and in the rest of the Medieval philosophers' 
142 See ibid, Introduction, p. 3. 
143 See supra my treatment of Aristotle §4, c. 
159 
practice of dialectic: dialectic is a matter of logical relations. As Stump 
says: 
" ... an Aristotelian Topic is primarily a strategy of argumentation and secondarily a 
principle supporting the crucial inference in the argument generated by such a strategy. 
The method for using the Topics is tied to Aristotle's predicables (accidens, genus, 
property, and definition). In Aristotle's view, every dialectical argument consists in 
showing that a predicate is or is not predicated of the subject at issue, and every 
predicate is subsumed under one of the four predicables. Aristotle's Topics are grouped 
according to the four predicables; and within each group associated with a predicable, 
the Topics are ordered by the degree to which they have to do with the nature of the 
predicable for that group. Aristotle's Topics, then, is a system that teaches the essence 
and accidents of each of the predicable in order to make a person deft at finding 
arguments.,,144 
Despite the fact that Boethius is clearly influenced by Aristotle's idea 
of dialectic, his method presents particular obvious differences. For 
Boethius there are two different kinds of Topics: maximal propositions 
(principles) and differentiae. By differentiae he understands broad headings 
that cover maximal propositions. By maximal propositions Boethius 
understands self-evident truths that work as guarantors of validity in 
argumentation. They are general premisses that are fundamental to the 
validity of predicative arguments and a key in hypothetical arguments that 
permits us to make a valid transition from the antecedent to consequent in 
the conditional premiss of the argument. Differentiae constitute the main 
tool for giving an affIrmative sense to arguments. The process consists in 
proposing a kind of term that would be the ideal intermediate between the 
subject and the predicate in a dialectical question. 
144 Ibid., Introduction, p. 4. 
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As we have seen, dialectic implies a process of logical relationships 
and it is an essential tool, but not a philosophical aim in itself. Boethius' 
influence is clear in Garland the Computist who dedicates much of his 
attention to Boethius' dialectic. Garland is historically central for the study 
of the earliest medieval logic insofar as his text on logic remains intact and 
because he built a complete logical system. 
In the case of Abelard it is clear that he will focus his logical 
concerns on categorical syllogisms with the aim of separating them from the 
Topics and in that way cutting their links with Topical inferences. Abelard 
agrees with Garland that the Topics are still central for the study of 
hypothetical syllogisms because the adequacy of conditional propositions 
depends on them. Nevertheless, Abelard's logic is original and it represents 
a change in the scholastic approach. He considers that the validity of 
categorical syllogisms resides exclusively in their form. They are perfect 
inferences and therefore unlike Topic inferences which are imperfect just 
because dependent on Topics. These perfect inferences are perfect or sound 
because their soundness comes from what things are. Differentia 145 for 
Abelard is to be understood in terms of logical relations, that is, as the 
relational link that provides solidity to an inference. 
In the thirteenth Century there is a flowering of logic and the Topics 
(dialectical arguments). Peter of Spain is very representative of the 
terminists. He considers that Topical inferences are dialectical syllogisms. 
Like Aristotle he makes a clear distinction between dialectical and 
demonstrative syllogisms. Through the premisses of dialectical syllogisms 
that are merely probable we will just achieve opinion, not knowledge. The 
study of Topical or dialectical arguments is just an art not a science and they 
depend on demonstrative syllogisms. Peter of Spain's logical method has 
the aim of justifying dialectical arguments. Nonetheless his logical method 
145 "The main instrument for findng arguments is the Differentia"; ibid, Introduction, p. 4. 
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has its grounds in a whole metaphysical system and is not merely dependent 
on syllogistical movements. 
Despite the fact that the terminists have at the beginning of the 
movement a defmite Aristotelian influence their logic experiences some 
gradual changes in accordance to the tendency of the thirteenth-century: the 
Aristotelian influence on the treatment of dialectical arguments IS 
undermined and the new tenor consists in treating all syllogisms as 
dependent on Topics (probable syllogisms) and in giving a necessary logical 
status to both demonstrative and dialectical arguments. 146 
Another Medieval development that shows an undeniable Aristotelian 
influence in the treatment of dialectic is the theory and practice of 
obligationes: 
" ... Obligations in scholastic treatises from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries is a 
complicated set of rules for inferences set in a disputational context, where the 
disputational context makes a difference to the evaluation of the inferences. 
Frequently, complications for the evaluations of an obligations inference arise because 
there is a reference in the premisses themselves to the evaluator of those premisses or to 
an action by the evaluator within the disputation. ,,147 
Some of the most representative figures in the field of obligationes 
are William of Sherwood, Walter Burley, Richard Kilvington and Roger 
Swyneshed. The figure of Burley is interesting because in his treatise he 
shows us how certain paradoxical arguments can appear in the context of 
dialectical disputation despite the fact that the way of proceeding -
monitoring of formal logical rules- seems to be impeccable. The ludicrous 
results appear when the background of the discussion is not taken into 
account. In that way Burley shows that the basic rules of obligations have 
146 See ibid, Introduction, pp. 6-7. 
147 Ibid, Introduction, p. 7. 
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no consistency, if one inserts the real context and nature of things in the 
disputation. 148 
The figure of Ockham is attractive because he intertwines syllogisms, 
dialectical arguments, obligations and insolubles in a whole and more open 
system that provides an account of inferences that is more flexible that the 
terminists' approach. o ckham , s account accepts the possibility that there is 
a range of non-syllogistic inferences and he includes among them dialectical 
and obligational inferences. Syllogisms are just one species of 
consequences. 
Dialectic during the Middle Ages -and under the Aristotelian 
influence of the Topics and Sophistici Elenchi, Cicero and Boethius- is also 
understood as the scholastic method of teaching in the cathedral schools and 
in the recently founded Univer~ities. Dialectic in this sense is a discipline of 
reasoning that tries to fmd a conclusion on the face of two possible and 
contrary propositions. The disputatio as the art opponendi et respondendi 
was a compulsory subject in which the dialectical technique was the 
rigorous instrument for dealing with and for solving it. This disputatious 
dialectic took place between a student who presented objections and a 
bachelor who responded to them. The master was the person who presided 
over the disputation and who mediated and resolved it. 
Dialectic is in that sense an art of discussion that was mainly applied 
to teaching with the aim of providing a skill for the students in the art of 
controversy and with the aim of defending a religious faith. The dialectical 
technique was included in the the lectio of the "divine page". The idea of 
148 E. Stump (see op. cit., p. 8) indicates that Swyneshed, Kilvington and Heytesbury try to deal with the 
inconsistencies that Burley shows in the Theory of Obligations and try to solve them by resorting to what 
they call epistemic logic that implies the recognition of the content and context of discussions and the 
possibility that some fundamental logical laws are not applicable and do not fit with some rules for 
dialectical disputation. 
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this reading aloud was that the students should react to the text read and to 
promote in them capacities for thinking and discussing. 149 
Dialectic as an art of discussion was associated with the 
appropriateness of terms. That explains why dialectical "discussions" in the 
Middle Age were focused on the arguments for and against any thesis given 
and in the elimination of sophisms. That is the reason that for Abelard 
dialectic is mainly an instrument for discussing controversial theses. The 
process consists in putting arguments for and against the thesis given with 
the aim of getting a reasoned consensus. 150 
It is worth noticing that dialectic as a technique of discussion will 
deal with probable arguments accepted by the majority. In the case of John 
of Salisbury, for example, dialectic is an ability that does not consider that 
the truth is as important as the persuasive ability to convince the opponent. 
He also makes a clear distinction between the philosopher who resorts to 
demonstrations and has the truth as his aim and the dialectician who resorts 
to hypothetical premises and whose target is in the field of opinion. 
In the thirteenth century Lambert of Auxerre defmes dialectic ill 
terms of a reasoning or conversation between two people: one who is called 
the opponent and leads the conversation and another one that answers in the 
discussion. 
What is clear is that dialectic in the thirteenth century is understood in 
terms of a live discussion, as an art of disputation in which two people 
present opposite probable theses. The job of the dialectician is understood 
as the one that has to resolve the dispute. It is worth noticing that this idea 
149 The practice of this academic and religious debates can provide us with an explanation and gives the 
reason why written Scholastic Summae and Commentaries took the fonn of dialectical debate. 
150 In the same line as Abelard is the Catalan philosopher Ramon Llull who also states a systematic idea of 
dialectic. He considers that natural reason is the best art that human beings possess for resolving 
disputation and avoiding mistakes. His efforts were focused on the task of achieving an ars inveniendi that 
could provide a complete and systematic explanation of probable and valid arguments. He sees in dialectic 
this inventive art that could provide us with a whole system that would exclude any possible 
indetermination. 
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of dialectic involves some similarities in form to the Platonic idea as a live 
conversation, but at the same time the content, method of achieving and 
aims of Medieval dialectic are clearly Aristotelian. 
Through the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries an anti-dialectical 
polemic took place. On the one hand it is possible to distinguish a clear 
opposition to reducing grammar to logic. The reason for mantaining them 
as independent subjects resides in the fact that the defenders of grammar 
consider that it is important to keep the study of language in relation to its 
historical reality and evolution. On the other hand there is a tendency to 
separate dialectic from metaphysics and logic. In that way dialectic was 
understood again as a persuasive and probable reasoning that remains in the 
field of opinion. Therefore, dialectic will be closely associated to 
rhetoric. 151 
For example, Petrarch criticises the "dialectics". He considers that 
dialectic is a very useful tool, but that is just a mere technique of discussion 
and that dialectic does not exhaust alI philosophy. 
According to Garin 152 the humanists of the Renaissance reduce 
dialectic either to logic or to rhetoric. They were very keen on double 
reasonings that show both sides of a question. To start from noh-necessary 
premises and the defence of the thesis and to do exactly the same with the 
antithesis was a typical training in the Schools. This new understanding of 
dialectic was represented by figures such as ValIa, Agricola, Poliziano, 
Vives, Melanchthon and Ramus. The main tendency of the majority of the 
humanists in relation to dialectic is strongly Aristotelian insofar as they 
understand it in the same terms as did Aristotle, that is, as an instrument that 
resorts to probable and persuasive reasonings, but one that does not deal or 
151 See E. Garin, "La dialectica desde el siglo XII a principios de la Edad Modema", en N. Abbagnano et 
al., La evoluci6n de fa diafectica, p. 151. 
152 See ibid, pp. 158-163. 
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pursue the truth. Vives -like Aristotle- also considers that dialectic provides 
the general grounds for all sciences. Ramus was the exception because he 
considers that dialectic is the method par excellence, the theory and art of 
invention that is practised through the analysis of reasonings. As an art of 
invention dialectic must be displayed with the habit of observing carefully 
the form in which nature expresses itself as a concrete and creative process. 
Nizolio appeals to Cicero and reduces dialectic to rhetoric. 
All these historical movements during the Renaissance prepare the 
way for the modern idea of dialectic. 
§6. THE MODERN IDEA OF DIALECTIC 
a) Kant and German Idealism 
Dialectic in Kant falls within his philosophical system. It occupies the 
following place in his Critique of Pure Reason: 
Critique of Pure 
Reason 
Transcendental __ .... 
doctrine of Elements 
{
Analytic 
Logic 
. Dialectic 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant divides the material of the book 
into two sections: Analytic and Dialectic. The analytic represents negative 
criterion of truth. It divides the tasks of the understanding and reason into 
their primary components. Kant defmes his dialectic as follows: 
" ... So great is this temptation that this general logic, which is merely a canon for 
judging, has been used -like an organon, as it were- for the actual production of at least 
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deceptive objective assertions, and thus has in fact been misused. Now general logic, 
when used as supposed organon, is called dialectic. ,,153 
In short, for Kant dialectic has at the beginning a negative role. It is fIrst a 
logic of illusion which is part of critical philosophy and acquires its positive 
role by a "critique of dialectical illusion". 154 In Kant's works, dialectic as 
the critique of dialectical illusion is always present after the analytic in each 
of his three major Critiques. The figure of Kant is central because his idea 
of dialectic permits us to connect the ancient and modem understanding of 
it. Kant explains his uses of dialectic with a reference to the different senses 
that the term has among the ancient philosophers, that is, as a 't£XVl1.155 
Kant's definition of dialectic has both a pejorative sense which is identified 
with the Aristotelian sense and a positive or critical sense. Let me explain. 
For Aristotle dialectic is a probable reasoning that works with opinions that 
are generally accepted in contrast to the demonstrative or scientifIc 
reasoning that arises from primary and true premises. 156 Aristotle thought 
that there is in principle a similarity between rhetoric and dialectic because 
dialectic uses syllogistic and inductive premises admitted by a given 
audience with the aim of persuading and convincing. Kant calls this 
dialectic the "logic of illusion". But there is a positive sense of dialectic in 
Kant. Kant divides his logic into analytic (invention)157 and dialectic 
(judgement). Kant's dialectic teaches how to distinguish and disclose 
judgements which seem to have a similarity to truth, but are in fact false. In 
fact the criticism that Plato will make in the Sophist of the sophists as 
153 Critique of Pure Reason. A62!B85 (translated by W. Pluhar, Hackett, Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1996). 
154 See ibid, A61!B85. 
155 See ibid. A61!B86. 
156 See Topics, 100 a 28-30; see supra my treatment of Aristotle §4, c. 
157 Kant explains that the task of a critical analytics consists in discovering through a process of analysis all 
the different movements of reason that we make in the act of thinking. 
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''jugglers of words,,158 has some similarities -mutatis mutandis- to the 
criticism which Kant makes against the "metaphysical jugglers". 159 The job 
of the philosopher is to make a critique of dialectical illusion and not to 
generate an art of producing these sort of illusions dogmatically as 
"metaphysical jugglers" use to do. 
Kant's criticism is not only addressed to the sophism that just pursues 
a "blind desire", that is to persuade. At the same time he is criticising 
sophisms that are a result of the natural and unavoidable illusion 
(misdirection) of human reason. This transcendental illusion emerges from 
the basic rules and maxims that we consider valid as objective and rational 
principles. 160 The fundamental source of illusion comes from reason's 
search for unity and completeness with the appearance of progressing in the 
direction of completeness, going upwards, to wider conditions and 
" ... to bring into our cognition the highest unity of reason ... ,,161 
Reason searches for the ideal conditions -or absolute totality- for a given 
thing. But instead of considering this process of searching as a pursuit of a 
mere approximative and regulative principle, reason, by means of 
transcendent and dialectical inferences, gives a concrete existence to this 
provisional process and it creates an illusion of completeness through 
transcendent concepts of pure reason. 162 These will be the object of Kant's 
criticism in the two books dedicated to dialectic in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
158 See Sophist, 268d. 
159 See CPR, A3091B366. 
160 See ibid, 2971B353 
161 Ibid, A3091B365 (pluhar's translation). 
162 See ibid., A3091B366. 
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In the first book of the Dialectic Kant focuses his criticism on the 
transcendent concepts of God, the world and the subject (soul). The second 
book addresses its criticism to the inferences of the sciences. Theology, the 
science of God, employs and takes refuge in ideals in its reasoning; 
cosmology falls into insuperable antinomies; and psychology falls into 
paralogisms. In each case, the mistake consists in the deceptive attempt to 
generate unity and completeness in relation to God, the world and the soul 
which is revealed as "dialectical illusion" because it rests on erroneous 
premises and invalid inferences. 163 
The Socratic-Platonic idea of dialectic as a philosophical method of 
searching for the truth in conversation and of approaching things implies the 
following equivalence: to philosophise is to be a dialectician. After Plato, -
and before him with Zeno and the Sophists- the practice that Aristotle 
rebaptises as "dialectic" aquires an instrumental role: it is going to be an 
auxiliary that deals with reasonings and with logical arguments, but not with 
reality. Aristotle took out the ontological content (reality) and the 
epistemological matter (truths that correspond to something) and the ethical 
aim (unselfish and dialogic search for the truth) of Socratic-Platonic 
dialectic. The Aristotelian influence, with regarding to the idea of dialectic, 
was much more defmitive in the history of philosophy than the Socratic-
Platonic one. 
163 According to H. Caygill, (A Kant Dictionary, Blackwell, Cambridge Mass, 1995, pp. 77-78) the 
Critique of Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgement are also structured in tenns of analytic and 
dialectic. The dialectic of practical reason emerges from the endeavour to define the "highest good", 
which leads to the "antinomy of practical reason". The practical antinomy consists in the opposed 
assertions that " the desire for happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue" and "the maxim of virtue 
must be the efficient cause of happiness." Both positions are shown to be untenable. Kant proposes a 
"critical resolution" of this antinomy by resorting to the conclusions achieved in the analytic of pure 
practical reason. To solve this antinomy, Kant resorts to his previous theoretical antinomy of freedom and 
natural causation, and makes a distinction between freedom in the noumenal and natural causality in the 
sensible world. 
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The interesting thing to notice is that Kant thinks that Plato was 
wrong when he did not give any credit to Zeno' s way of proceeding and 
following Aristotle's line he qualifies him as a dialectician: 
"The Eleatic philosopher Zeno, a subtle dialectician, was severely rebuked as a 
mischievous sophist already by Plato because -to show his artistry- he sought to prove a 
proposition by plausible arguments and soon after to overturn the same proposition 
again by other arguments equally strong. Zeno asserted that God (tIps God presumably 
was for him nothing but the world), is neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor at 
rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing. I believe, however, that he cannot 
rightly be charged with this. [ ... ] If two judgments that are opposed to each other 
presuppose an inadmissible condition, then despite the conflict between them (which, 
however, is not a contradiction proper) both of them drop out, because the condition 
drops out under which alone each of these propositions was to hold.,,]64 
And some lines further on he concludes: 
" Permit me to call this sort of opposition dialectical but that of contradiction 
analytical opposition. Thus of two dialectically opposed judgments both can be false, 
because one judgment not merely contradicts the other but says something more than is 
. d c: d·· ,,165 reqUlre lor contra IctlOn. 
What is clear is that Kant makes use of his idea of dialectical opposition 
with the aim of providing logical foundations for his metaphysical thesis 
concerning the distinction between noumena (reality) and phenomena 
(appearance) and to remove in that way the antinomies of pure reason. He 
resorts to Zeno' s method and expresses his affiliation with him with the aim 
164 CPR, A5031B531 (Pluhar's translation). 
165 Ibid., A5041B532. 
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of having a historical support for his own ideas and for proving ill an 
indirect way the "transcendental ideality of appearances". 166 
The positive role of Kant's dialectic consists in developing a method 
that permits us to correct our judgements and to promote a permanent 
critical attitude that was, fmally, the similar aim -mutatis mutandis- of the 
Socratic-Platonic elenctic dialectic. Nevertheless, dialogue and human 
interchanges do not figure at all in Kant's agenda to achieve these purposes: 
" ... Hence the dialectic by no means promotes skepticism. But it does promote the 
skeptical method, which can display the dialectic as an example of the method's great 
benefit: viz., when we let the arguments of reason come forward against each other in 
their greatest freedom; for although these argument sultimately do not supply what we 
were searching for, yet they will always supply something beneficial and useful for 
. . d ,,167 
correctmg our JU gments. 
After Kant, Fichte and Schelling provide a kind of bridge to Hegel's 
dialectic. Fichte and Schelling contribute some elements to the modem idea 
of dialectic. Fichte, in his Doctrine of Science, defmes dialectic as a 
synthesis of opposites by means of their reciprocal determination. 168 Fichte 
is making reference to the opposition and mutual determination of the "I" 
and "Not-I" that le~ds to a representation in the "1". Fichte's idealism is 
called subjective. Schelling took Fichte's dialectical method and applied it 
to things, because he thought that nature itself has always an internal 
movement. These subjective and objective idealisms will exert a defmitive 
influence on Hegel's idea of dialectic. 169 
166 See ibid, A5071B535. 
167 Loc. cit. 
168 See Fichte, Doctrine of Science, §4 E. 
169 Despite the fact that Schleiennacher (1768-1834) was a contemporary of Hegel (1770-1831), his idea 
of dialectic did not have the same echo. Schleiennacher wrote a book called Dialectic or, The Art of 
Doing Philosophy in which he goes back to the Platonic idea of dialectic and tries to build again an 
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Hegel accepts in his Lectures on History of Philosophy his great debt 
to Ancient Philosophy. He called Heraclitus the fIrst dialectician -in the 
sense that Hegel will understand the term- because Hegel thinks that 
Heraclitus' philosophy involves the idea of internal dynamism and unity of 
opposites in reality. Hegel admits also that his logic as a whole was 
conceived taking into account all Heraclitus' fragments. Hegel indicates 
that the Socratic-Platonic dialectical procedure of testing everything and the 
philosophical necessity to demonstrate any assumption constitute one of the 
pillars of his philosophy. The limitation that he found in Ancient 
Philosophy in general terms was that it dealt with forms or abstractions; 
ancient philosophers had not discovered the transcendental philosophy. 
Hegel thought that modern philosophy could make the great synthesis. This 
synthesis -according to him- consists in a real philosophical approach that 
involves the actualisation of the universal. Hegel thought that with this 
approach he would surpass the ancient speculative formal-dialectic. 
Hegel mentions that Proclus discovered for him the triadic nature of 
the . dialectical procedure, considering this procedure as a derivation of 
emanation of things from the One and its return to the On~. Hegel thought 
that Proclus' merit resided in giving not only an abstract shape to the triad 
as a whole, but to each and every one of the three abstract determinations of 
the triad. In this way Proclus achieved a real triad. These are the remote 
influences on Hegel's idea of dialectic. 
As for the proximate influences, Hegel saw in Descartes' philosophy 
and particularly in his "methodical doubt" a healthy sceptical approach to 
reality. It is clear also that Hegel took Kant's transcendental dialectic and 
applied it without restrictions. Fichte's and Schelling's influences are clear 
omnicomprehensive dialectical project as philosophy itself His idea -rejecting Kant- is that if philosophy 
contains something real, transcendental and formal philosophy must be the same because the principles for 
doing philosophy and the highest and most general elements of knowing are the same. 
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because Hegel saw in his philosophy the real synthesis ofFichte's subjective 
idealism and of Schelling's objective idealism in an absolute idealism. 
Now, the question is: what did Hegel understood by dialectic? In his 
Enyyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences Hegel defmes his dialectic as a 
scientific application of the laws which inhere in the nature of thought: 170 
"The insight that the very nature of thinking is the dialectic, that, as 
understanding, it must fall into the negative of itself, into contradictions, is an aspect of 
capital importance in the Logic. When thinking despairs of being able to bring about, 
from its own resources, the resolution of the contradiction in which it has put itself, then 
it returns to the solutions and appeasements in which the spirit has participated in its 
other modes and forms. But it was not necessary to let this return degenerate into 
misology, an experience which Plato already confronted; thinking does not need to 
conduct itself polemically against itself; which is what happens when a so-called 
immediate knowing is asserted to be the exclusive form of the consciousness of 
truth." 171 
But this dynamism of the thought which follows its own laws is in 
conformity with the development of being itself. So the dialectical 
movement is generalised and it is the true nature and real property of the 
determinations of understanding and of things themselves, as it is spread in 
all fmite things. 172 That is the reason that Hegel calls dialectic the immanent 
transcending principle of coherence and necessity in which the 
determinations of understanding display themselves as what they are, that is, 
h . . 173 as t err negatIon. 
170 G. w. F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia, LOgiC. Part I of the Encyclopaiedia of Philosophical Sciences 
with the Zusdtze, Translated with Introduction and notes by T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris, 
Hackett, CambridgelIndianapolis, 1991, §48. 
171 Ibid, §11. 
172 See ibid, §81. 
173 See ibid 
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Hegel considers that it is crucial to have the correct approach and to 
recognise the importance of dialectical movement: it is the principle of all 
motion, all life, and all activation in the actual world, and the "soul" of all 
proper scientific cognition. Every fmite thing contains, in its own nature, its 
opposite. 
It is worth noticing that Hegel insists on the idea that dialectic should 
not be confused with mere sophistry. He says that the essence of sophistry 
resides in the fact that it just takes into account partial and abstract 
determinations which are valid in isolation and according to particular 
interests and circumstances: 
" The dialectic diverges essentially from that procedure, since it is concerned 
precisely with considering things [as they are] in and for themselves, so that the finitude 
of the one-sided determinations of the understanding becomes evident. ,,174 
In that sense Plato and Hegel are similar since both reject the practice of 
sophistry mainly because it implies a distancing from a direct and objective 
approach to things. 
Historically speaking Hegel considers that Plato, among the ancients, 
was the inventor of dialectic in an objective and scientific way. Hegel 
thinks also that with Socrates, dialectical thinking still remains subjective 
because the main feature which he attributes to Socratic philosophy is irony. 
F or him, Socrates addresses his dialectic to ordinary consciousness and 
particularly against the Sophists. According to Hegel, the Socratic method 
could be described as the one in which he pretends in his conversations to 
be longing for instruction about the subject-matter under discussion. In this 
process of conversation Socrates brings up all different sorts of questions in 
such a way that the interlocutors are led to hold up the opposite thesis that at 
174 Ibid. (Geraets', Suchting's, Harris' translation). 
174 
the beginning seemed to be the correct one. In the case of Plato, Hegel 
portrays his dialectic as follows: 
"And by means of a dialectical treatment, Plato shows in his strictly scientific 
dialogues the general finitude of all fixed determinations of the understanding. Thus, 
for example, in the Parmenides, he deduces the Many from the One, and, 
notwithstanding that, he shows that the nature of the Many is simply to determine itself 
as the One. This was the grand manner in which Plato handled the dialectic.,,175 
Hegel holds Plato's dialectic in high regard. He qualifies Plato's writings as 
"scientific" because of the dialectical method that they involve. Obviously 
Hegel infers from this that Plato represents a good starting point for his own 
understanding of dialectic as a omnicomprehensive category that pervades 
everything. 
Hegel considers that in modem times Kant was the philosopher that 
mainly put dialectic back in its position of primacy. According to Hegel, 
Kant performed this task with his exposition of the antinomies of reason 
which recognises that all determinations of understanding themselves 
involve and tum into their opposite. But Hegel thinks also that Kant just 
displays the negative part of the antinomies which has to be completed by a 
positive one that recognises that everything contains in itself opposed 
determinations within it. That is the reason that for Hegel the act of 
cognition implies a comprehension or an act of being aware of the presence 
of this concrete unity of opposed determinations. 176 
In short, dialectic affmns itself in all the particular fields and 
structures of the natural and spiritual world. 
175 Ibid. (Geraets', Suchting's, Harris' translation). 
176 See ibid., §§48 and 81. Hegel remarks -§80- that understanding must be considered as what is 
involved in the notion of the goodness of God. Related to this he added that the principle of dialectic in an 
objective sense is equivalent to the notion of God's might. 
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The application of Hegel's dialectic involves three steps: 1. The step 
of understanding: one or more concepts (categories) are taken as perfectly 
defmed and differentiated from each other. 2. The proper dialectical step or 
the stage of negative reason: when we start the process of reflection about 
these categories, many contradictions arise from them. 3. The stage of 
speculation or positive reason: the product of this dialectic is an 
independent, omnicomprehensive and higher category, which involves the 
previous categories and the contradiction implied in them. This new 
category is a descriptive "unity of opposites" that is more easily discernible 
in some cases easily than others. 177 In relation to opposites, Hegel thought 
that both in the case of thoughts and in things they are interchangeable when 
the opposition is stronger or reveals itself 
This last speculative movement of dialectic IS affirmative or 
positively rational. The reason is that it grasps the unity of the 
determinations in their contradiction and in a determinate content. The 
rational result is a concrete unity of distinct determinations. That is the 
reason that, for Hegel, philosophy deals with concrete thoughts. 178 
Hegel makes a distinction between nature and spirit. The dialectic of 
natural things and events evolves in a different way from the dialectic of our 
thoughts about them. On the one hand, the dialectic of our thoughts 
advances from lower to higher stages of nature. On the other hand, the 
decomposition of a natural entity ends in another entity of the same or 
similar type and not in a change of state to a higher degree of nature. Spirit 
has a progressive history; that is the reason that its evolution frequently, but 
not invariably, fits with the advance of our thought about it. 
In Hegel dialectic is a method, but he never understood the method as 
an instrument or way to grasp the objects of knowledge. For Hegel the 
177 See ibid, §§79-82. 
178 See ibid, §82. 
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method is the procedure of scientific explanation and it is understood as the 
path that the thing has to display itself. For Hegel the method is not a set 
pattern of interpretation which is applied from outside to things in order to 
analyse and understand them. Hegel thought that this idea of conceiving the 
method is subjective and merely accidental. In Hegel the method is the 
movement of the thing itself that is spread out in its particularities and 
returns to the starting point as a "concrete universal". If we really want to 
grasp this movement it is essential to submerge ourselves in the thing itself. 
Dialectic pervades all reality, and it implies a dynamical, historical, and 
perpetual synthesis of opposites. Hegelian dialectic is a view of reality as 
historical; it is an intrinsic movement of things and processes, and the 
philosopher only discovers them because he is immersed and is part of this 
omnicomprehensive movement. In other words: this spiritual movement is 
the absolute method of knowledege and, at the same time the immanent 
"soul" of the container itself. 
" ... For Hegel dialectic does not involve a dialogue either between two thinkers or 
between a thinker and his subject-matter. It is conceived as the autonomous self-
criticism and self-development of the subject-matter, of, e.g. a form of consciousnees or 
a concept." 179 
In Hegel's philosophy dialectic explains all sorts of movement and 
change, in the world and in our thought about it. That is, dialectic gives a 
reason for the systematic understanding between things and thoughts. 180 
179 M. Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Blackwell, 1997, p. 81. 
180 Hegel gives us some examples to illustrate the way that his dialectical method operates. In the 
Phenomenology of the Spirit, he says that this work represents an example of his method when it is applied 
to a more concrete object, i.e., consciousness. But maybe in his Philosophy of History he provides us with 
a more accessible example of how the omnicomprehensive dialectical method permeates the entire world 
history. In his Logic his method is applied in a more complicated way to the process and categories of 
human thinking. Related to this topic see P. Singer, Hegel, Oxford University Pres~, 1980, pp 75-83. 
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In short: Hegel represents the clearest proposition of a new idea of 
dialectic. Despite the fact that he recognises many merits in the ancient idea 
of dialectic, he considers that as merely formal. For him, dialectic does not 
involve a particular form of approach to things. Dialectic does not involve 
either any kind of dialogue, art of discussion or ability in the use of 
language. Dialectic is the natural property that characterises and explains 
everything as a dynamic synthesis of opposites. 
Hegel's idea of dialectic has been defmitively the most well known 
and spread among philosophers. Maybe his success was due to the fact that 
Marx took the Hegelian method of contrapositions and applied it to his 
particular developments about the topic. 
b) Marx and Engels 
The idea of dialectic in Marx contains two main aspects in its exposition: 1. 
a criticism addressed to Hegel, but at the same time the acknowledgment of 
his idea of dialectic as a synthesis of opposites, and 2. the conviction that 
philosophical thought has to be addressed to practical things in order to 
transform the world. 
Marx's dialectic recognises its Hegelian influence, but at the same 
time it is built on a very strong criticism against it. Marx's main criticism 
of Hegel's dialectic is that he develops a process simply on the level of ideas 
and that he does not touch reality at all. In that way Marx thinks that Hegel 
reduces everything to logic and to the development of ideas. Therefore 
Hegel does not provide us with a proper approach to reality, men and 
nature. For Marx, Hegel's dialectic is illusory and merely fictional because 
at the end he justs transfers the conservative religious, social and political 
views to an idealistic philosophical level. Instead of that, Marx proposes a 
radical change: dialectic implies the recognition of the fact that the real 
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principle of nature resides in the material conditions. The revolution must 
be radical: the starting point requires the annihilation of religion, private 
property and the State because they represent the alienation of man, his 
work and his social relationships respectively. 181 
Marx applies his conception of dialectic in his system in different 
ways, but dialectic always refers to the idea of movement. According to 
him the main task of dialectic is to provide us with an explanation and 
understanding of history because dialectic shows us the real historical 
rhythm and historical movement and because dialectic is at the same time 
the method for understanding and grasping history. The general historical 
dialectical movement involves and explains other dialectical processes. That 
is the reason that Marx talks about the dialectic of alienation, the dialectic of 
revolution and the dialectic of knowledge among others. 
Marx considers that the historical phenomenon of alienation is 
subject to a dialectical process, that is, to a movement of thesis, antithesis 
and "surpassing". In Marx the proletarians have to tolerate the main effects 
of this alienation. According to him the communitarian nature of men splits 
them in antagonistic parts. This splitting is the beginning that leads to the 
surpassing to a new society in which antagonisms among social classes 
disappear an any human alienation to external powers too. That is the point 
of arrival at communism. 
The dialectic of revolution implies the dialectical movement of 
history which is developed in the antithesis between the dynamic basis 
(development of workforces) and the static social and mental 
superstructures. This opposition between the dynamic nature of the basis 
and the mainly static superstructures produces a gulf which is expressed in a 
181 See K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Third Manuscript: Private Property and 
Labour. Political Economy as a Product of the Movement of Private Property; Private Property and 
Communism; Human Requirements and Division of Labour Under the Rule of Private Property; The 
Power of Money and Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole. 
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clear antagonism: a revolution. With the revolution the gap between forces 
is broken with a new way of production and the out dating of social and 
mental relationships. Marx proves his conclusions insofar as he shows how 
the new way of production derives from the invention of the machine and 
the industrial revolution collides with medieval superstructures. Equally 
Marx shows that within capitalism the development of modem productive 
forces have started a collision with the social and mental superstructures of 
the bourgeoisie. 
In relation to the dialectic of knowledge, Marx is again close to 
Hegel. Marx says that reality, as it is now, does not give us the truth in 
history. What history really is will appear in the future. That is the thesis 
that provides the dynamism of the revolutionary mind: the dialectical 
movement that projects to the future. Marx applies the same dialectical idea 
to knowledge. Truth is a matter of movement which involves a process of 
birth, disappearing, rebirth of different beings, forms and institutions in the 
world. That is the reason that natural and historical reality and the 
knowledge of them are dialectical. Truth is understood in Marx in the 
tendency and [mal result of the process: truth is in the dialectical mediation. 
Marx and his followers continue to use the Hegelian idea of dialectic, 
but with some modifications. Hegel's dialectic is an idealistic one; Marx's 
dialectic is a materialistic one. Marx considered that it was necessary to 
refine Hegel's dialectic which he saw as a mere idealistic concept. Marx 
thought that Hegelian dialectic is self-consciousness and remains at this 
level; it reaches the object, nature or reality, in thought, nature or reality, not 
as themselves. According to Marx, Hegel's philosophy remains at the level 
of abstraction and therefore, it just describes reality and history as an 
abstract image. This abstract image is put as a supreme truth in the 
Absolute Spirit. Marx claims the necessity of a dialectical transformation 
from abstraction to reality, that IS, from the closed world of self-
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consciousness to the open world of nature and history. 182 In short: Marx 
thought that Hegel's methodological discovery was a real discovery, but not 
his way of applying it. The point is that for Marx, Hegelian dialectic was 
merely speculative and he proposes to set up in opposition to it a scientific 
dialectic. 
Marx asserts in his Poverty of Philosophy -explaining the Hegelian 
dialectic- that the dialectical movement consists in the ~xistence of two 
contradictory sides, in their struggle and their fusion in a new category. 
"Just as from the dialectic movement of the simple categories is born the group, 
so from the dialectic movement of the groups is born the series, and from the dialectic 
movement of the series is born the entire system. 
Apply this method to the categories of political economy, and you have the logic 
and metaphysics of political economy, or, in other words, you have the economic 
categories that everybody knows, translated into a little-known lapguage which makes 
them look as if they had newly blossomed forth in an intellect of pure reason; so much 
do these categories seem to engender one another, to be linked up and interwined with 
one another by the very working of the dialectic movement.,,]83 
Furthermore: in this same book, when speaking of his criticism of 
Proudhon, Marx stresses that the essence of dialectic resides in the "force" 
of negativity. That is, for Marx, if we try to eliminate the negative side of 
history we simply annul all the elements that constitute the dialectical 
movement, and therefore we would eliminate history itself. 184 
Marx recognises that Hegel's greatest philosophical merit was his 
dialectical method, in the sense that its essence resides in the opposition of 
determinations as a starting point. But he thinks that in order to provide a 
182 See Marx, Capital, I, 1, Afterword to the Second Edition. 
183 See The Poverty of Philosophy. With an introduction by Frederick Engels, translation into English 
International Publishers, International Publishers Co. Inc., Fourth Printing, New York, 1971, p. 108. 
184 See ibid, p. III and Appendices, p. 179 fr. 
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concrete foundation to dialectic, it has to be understood in terms of social 
and economic relations: 
"The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with their 
material productivity, produce also principles, ideas and categories, in conformity with 
their social relation~."185 
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx 
dedicates some parts to the problem of Hegel's dialectic. 186 According to 
Marx, Feuerbach is the only one who has adopted a serious and critical 
attitude in relation to Hegel's dialectic and at the same time he has made 
real discoveries in this field. We can summarise these discoveries -
according to Marx- as follows: 1. Philosophy has been nothing else but 
religion insofar as it has been understood and expounded as mere thought. 
It has to be condemned as a form of alienation or estrangement of the 
essence of man. 2. The basic theoretical principle of the true materialism 
and of real science resides in the social relationship of man to man. 3. The 
denial of the absolute spirit, positively based on itself and self-supportive, is 
possible as a result of the negation of the negation. 
For F euerbach, Hegel's starting point was the true one, that is, the 
positive facts that we know from our senses. But Hegel's problem was the 
ascent to mere idealistic and theological abstractions that do not correspond 
to any real object. That is the reason too that Hegel-according to Marx- just 
provides the abstract, logical, speculative manifestation for the movement of 
history, i.e., not the real one. 
185 Ibid. p. 109. 
186 See K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Third Manuscript, Critique of the 
Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole. 
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For Marx the speculative Hegelian spirit displays itself in three 
superposed and interrelated planes that result in a dialectic of pure thought. 
The one-sidedness and limitations of Hegel's philosophy involve the 
following: 1. The Hegelian Phenomenology describes a historical 
"movement" which does not correspond to real human beings. In this way 
Hegel transfers the movement of real history to a level of self-
consciousness. 2. Marx thinks that this transference is a mistaken approach 
which has its origin in a false idea of human being as the self-
consciousness, and not as a sensible (perceptive) entity, as a spiritual being 
and not as natural, and as theoretical man and not practical. That is the 
reason that any possibility of achieving objectivity is totally removed 
because Hegel's philosophy is a philosophy of the subject and not of the 
object, that is, it is a form of idealism. 3. For Hegel, the highest way of self-
consciousness is knowlege. In Marx's opinion this is the origin of the most 
serious distortion, which consists in replacing real problems that require real 
solutions with theoretical problems which just offer solutions that are purely 
theoretical. 187 However, Marx considers that Hegel's Phenomenology 
contains the following merits: 
"The outstanding achievement of Hegel's Phiinomenologie and of its final 
outcome, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generating principle, is thus first 
that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as 
loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he thus 
grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man -true1 because real man-
the outcome of man's own labour. The real, active orientation of man to himself as a 
species-being, or his manifestation as a real species-being (i.e., as a human being), is 
only possible if he really brings out all his species-powers -something which in turn is 
only possible through the co-operative action of all of mankind, only as the result of 
187 See Norberto Bobbio, "La dialectica en Marx", en N. Abbagnano et al, op. cit., p. 265. 
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history- and treats these powers as objects: and this, to begin with, is again only possible 
in the form of estrangement." 188 
Marx thinks that the way of surpassing Hegel's mistakes is simply to 
show the material essence of men: because human beings are living, natural 
beings invested with objective inherent powers, by their essence they are 
capable of dealing and grasping real natural objects. The human awareness 
of the self-alienation of the external world should lead to the assumption of 
a real, and objective world that is independent from our human entity but 
that can be grasped in its real dimension: 189 
" ... We see also how only naturalism is capable of comprehending the action of world 
history. " 190 
Marx thinks that the positive aspects of the Hegelian dialectic are 
within the realm of estrangement and can be expressed as follows: 
1. The supersession (heben) as an objective movement of revoking 
the alienation into self: this process implies the real objectification of man 
through the recovering of his objective essence which involves the 
appropriation of the objective world. That is the reason that for Marx 
atheism, as the supersessIOn of God, -and as the advent of theoretical 
humanism- and commUnIsm are the two necessary conditions for the 
understanding and fulfiling of the real and actual essence of men. 191 
188 Ibid, K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, translated into English Progress 
Publishers, Progress Publishers and Lawrence and Wishart, Sixth Printing, MoscowlLondon, 1981, p. 132. 
189 See ibid, p. 135. 
190 Ibid., p. 136. 
191 See ibid, p. 142. 
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2. Hegel's entire logic is the demonstration that abstract thought -
defmite concepts- and the absolute idea as its culmination are nothing in 
themselves. Just nature -says Marx- is something. In 
It is true that Marx's idea of dialectic does not have a singular 
meaning. At least we can say that the common denominator of the word 
dialectic in its different meanings involves a situation· of opposition, of 
contradiction, of antinomy, of contrast that has to be solved. 
According to Norberto BobbioI93 it is possible to summarise Marx's 
idea of dialectic in two main descriptions: the fIrst is when the word 
dialectic is united to the nouns "reference", "relation", "fact"; and the 
second one is when dialectic is described as relating to "development", 
"movement", "process". 
Engels asserts in his Anti-During that the proof of dialectical 
materialism is nature because dialectical materialism is: 
" ... the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human 
society, and thought.,,194 
In his Dialectic of Nature, Engels presents three main laws of dialectic 
relating to historical development and human thought: a) the material 
mutation of quantity into quality: that implies that dialectical materialism 
accepts different sorts of qualities which are an upshot of the transmutation 
of quantity into a new qUality. Any sort of quality comes from matter itself; 
diversity of qualities is an effect of the transformation of quantity in 
192 See ibid, pp. 144-148. 
193 See N. Bobbio, art. cit., op. cit., p. 268. 
194 F. Engels, Anti-During, p. 194, apud R. Nonnan and S. Sayers, Hegel, Marx and Dialectic: a debate, 
The Harvester Press, SussexlNew Jersey, 1980, p. 22. 
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matter; 195 b) the unity of contraries: this law implies that every entity is 
identical to itself and different in relation to others. But it also implies that 
each entity contains contrary elements, while remaining as a unity. That 
explains -according to the Marxist theory- why inside any entity there are 
changes that give us a reason for its becomingness. The unity of opposites 
is the characteristic feature of the dialectical opposition that explains the 
process and the development of entities and systems. In that sense 
dialectical materialism has its foundation in the thesis that matter is self-
sufficient and that it contains in itself the principle that explains any natural 
or human process; c) the negation of the negation: in any dialectical 
movement the negation implies a double partition. On the one side the 
negation of the previous system and on the other side the positive partition 
that implies the construction of something new. 
Engels 196 was the theoretician of Marx's dialectic and he developed 
two main meanings for it: 
l. Dialectic as synthesis of opposites: Hegel's idea of dialectic of 
negativity had a central influence on Marx as a philosopher of history. For 
Marx -as he says in his Poverty of Philosophy_197 history is dialectical: this 
principle of the force of negativity is the core and necessary condition of 
historical development. There are two different formulas in relation to the 
necessity of opposites associated to the principle of the force of negativity: 
a) Every historical stage gives rise in itself to contradictions which are the 
core of the historical development. There is a point, nearly inevitable, in 
which a historical situation enters into contradiction with another historical 
195 Nevertheless, Engels himself could discern the difficulties that the generalisation of this principle 
involves and the multiplicity of qualitative changes which cannot be explained by a mere quantitative 
change. 
196 See F. Engels, Outlines oj a Critique oj Political Economy and Anti-Diihring; K. Marx, A Contribution 
to the Critique oj Political Economy. 
197 See K. Marx, The Poverty oj Philosophy. ed cit .. Chapter II The Metaphysics of Political Economy. 
§ 1 The Method, pp.103-126. 
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situation, and the result of the breaking of this contradiction is 
becomingness. b) Historical contradictions give rise to antagonisms, that is, 
to the struggle between the class representatives, and those who are victims 
of these contradictions, and at the same time the predestined to surpass 
them. The creation of the new society is a result of this struggle. 
For Marx, as Hegel said, dialectic -as a theory of history- IS 
understood as perpetual becoming developed in successive negations: if 
negation is the core progress, the negation of negation -in the sense of the 
resolution of the contradiction- constitutes progress itself. 
2. Dialectic as interpenetration of opposites: because dialectic 
constitutes the formal structure of reality, dialectic is also the method of 
scientific search that Marx discussed and applied to elaborate an economical 
theory and a science of man in society. Marx thought that dialectic was the 
instrument par excellence for a rounded (complete) understanding, because 
dialectic stresses oppositions and tries to fmd a solution. 
On these grounds dialectic is understood as a concrete unity in the 
study of the historical development: it is the result of the synthesis of 
opposites (negation of negation). Here the definitive category in the course 
of human history is becomingness. 
But dialectic also is the scientific study of reality that shows us -in 
Marx's judgement- the unity represented as a result of an interrelationship 
among entities -reciprocal action- which the abstract intellect wrongly 
isolate from each other. In this way we get the defmitive category of the 
organic totality. This organic totality is constituted of different entities in 
opposition. Here dialectic is a method of reciprocal action: the organic 
totality is the upshot of the reciprocal interrelation of entities. 
From this general exposition of Marx's idea of dialectic we can see 
that he dissents from the ancient and medieval ideas of dialectic in a number 
of crucial aspects. For him dialectic does not involve any sort of dialogue, 
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art of discussion or human interchange. Following only the modem canon 
of dialectic, for him dialectic has to do first and foremost with the formal 
structure of reality. Despite the fact that Marx thinks that dialectic is also a 
method of scientific search that has to be applied in order to create an 
economical theory and a science of man in society, dialectic is not -as in 
Plato- a matter of philosophical conversation which has the aim of searching 
for the truth. Marx introduces -because of his Hegelian influence- an 
important element in his idea of dialectic: because dialectic permeates 
everything, dialectic is the correct way to approach to history in order to 
understand it. 
Another point that is worth noticing -and one that is related to the 
previous one- is that for Marx philosophy has the task of transforming the 
world not of thinking about it. In that sense, Marx' philosophical project 
differs from Plato's. Marx will not consider that the act of thinking and 
examining everything with the aim of knowing is valuable in itself. 
What is clear is that the Hegelian and Marxist idea of dialectic has 
exerted a definitive influence on the philosophy of the Tweintieth century. 
Proof of that is the fact that the word dialectic is immediately associated -
and many times exclusively related- with the idea of the opposition of 
contraries and movement in reality. That explains why the majority of the 
philosophical developments of the topic of dialectic among contemporary 
philosophers always contain a Hegelian and Marxist basis. 
After this historical analysis of the idea of dialectic we will deal with 
the topic of the Socratic-Platonic dialectic and its concrete application in the 
Sophist. 
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PART III. SOCRATIC-PLATONIC DIALECTIC 
The third part of this thesis intends to give an account of the essence and 
development of the Socratic-Platonic method. As an illustrative case we 
will analyse how dialectic works in the Sophist. 
§7. THE NATURE OF THE SOCRATIC-PLATONIC METHOD 
The first thesis of this part is as follows: elenchos and dialectic are two 
inseparable activities. Any topic chosen for dialogue must be submitted to 
the dialectical process (philosophical conversation) and has to to be put to 
the test (elenchos). Socrates' figure is central and cohesive for 
understanding and keeping the essence and aims of the philosophical task as 
Plato conceived it: as a methodical (dialogic and rigorous) and unselfish 
search for the truth. That is the reason that we will concentrate our efforts 
on defming the nature of Socratic-Platonic activity (§7). 
One constant idea in Plato's thought was his understanding of what 
philosophy is. Because he identifies philosophy with dialectic or the act of 
philosophising with the dialectical 'tExvll it is central to trace the different 
written forms in which Plato presents his idea of dialectic (§8). 
The Socratic-platonic dialectic is a single entity that has different and 
interrelated aspects: elenchos, hypothesis and collection and division. We 
will centre our attention in the elenctic element. Elenchos is part of the 
Socratic method, but part of the Platonic method too. Elenchos is not the 
whole of the Socratic method, but it is essential to Platonic dialectic because 
testing is fundamental to Platonic dialectic. If elenchos is part of Platonic 
dialectic it is because it forms a fundamental part of the whole Platonic 
dialectic. 
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Our starting point will be that elenchos is necessary to the dialectical 
process. Dialectic involves coming up with ideas and the act of testing 
them. The Socratic testing is in principle always positive. In other words: 
part of the Socratic method is to reach positive conclusions through 
arguments. The Socratic method is one of is moving on from dialectical 
agreements. 
Too much emphasis has been put on defming the Socratic method in 
negative terms, that is, as a mere process of refutation that does not lead to 
positive conclusions. In this narrow sense the Socratic method is identified 
with the elenchos and the latter is understood as a mere cross-examination 
in which one of the interlocutors submits his opinion to another person and 
to a succession of questions. When the Socratic method is defmed in these 
terms it seems that it does not contain a positive epistemological value, 
insofar as it is not a method for discovering the truth. 
The main questions and objections that are usually put to Plato about 
the Socratic elenchos are the following: if elenchos normally leads to 
refutation and hopefully admission of ignorance, where do we go from 
here? Is elenchos only useful as a means or mere part of the hypothetical 
method? Does elenchos only test other people's opinions? Can the 
elenchos, in principle, reach positive conclusions? Was Socrates not a 
complete philosopher because he only refuted people and rarely set out 
positive theses? Why does Plato have confidence in someone who seems to 
be unsystematic, like Socrates? Again, it is not completely clear whether 
the Socratic method is per se a scientific method because, Socrates is so 
often arguing ad hominem. 
When the Socratic method is identified with the elenchos and the 
latter is characterised in terms of refutation, it is normally associated and 
identified with the similar practice of eristics and antilogicians. In the same 
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way this approach links, historically speaking, the Socratic elenchos with 
the Greek predilection for debate and discussion. 
"Plato's view that question-and-answer is essential to good method was due in 
general to the fondness of the ancient Athenians for discussion. They regarded thinking 
as a social affair, and interpreted thought in terms of speech. Although Plato 
recognized that a man may make discoveries in his study, he held that he does so by a 
process essentially the same as that of discussion. "I 
Hence anyone who describes elenchos as a refutative and polemical 
method will associate the Socratic-Platonic practice with Zeno and 
therefore, with the Aristotelian sense of dialectic. The common element -
according to this common interpretation of the elenchos- in Zeno's, 
Socrates', Plato's and Aristotle's method resides in the refutation of an 
opponent's thesis by deducing from it some unacceptable consequence. The 
result of the process will be an indirect argument or destructive hypothetical 
syllogisijl. 2 
In that sense elenchos will not differ essentially from eristic 
(antilogic), rhetoric and sophistry. But, as we have shown/ Plato dedicated 
many pages to setting out the boundaries between these different practices 
and his own method. Moreover: Plato's dialogues frequently call 
antilogicians contradiction-mongers. 4 The idea expressed in this sentence is 
that the use of the reduction to contradiction commonly leads to abuse. 
To defme the "Socratic method" (i. e., the elenchos) as no more than a 
refutative method implies reducing its scope, atomising the elements that it 
involves and misunderstanding its nature. This is the typical approach, and 
I R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, Oxford University Press, 2nd. edition, 1962, p. 83. 
2 See ibid., pp. 91-92. 
3 See supra, Part II, §4, a) and c). 
4 See Euthydemus, 275 d if, 277e if, 283 e if, 296 a if, Gorgias, 520, Sophist, 223 b, 223 c ff., 231 b ff. 
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constitutes a wrong starting point. 5 The Socratic-Platonic method as a 
whole implies an elenctic process. Elenchos has to be understood as a 
process which involves testing, examining, dialogue and challenge among 
the interlocutors, and one which seeks to change their actual condition to a 
better one, that is, to educate them or take them forward. 
Let us take, as a guiding example, the case of the Crito. We can 
appreciate that there are two people, Crito and Socrates who are challenging 
each other and suggesting different ways to develop the conversation and to 
tackle the topic. We see fIrst of all Crito -siding with the majority- and 
trying to persuade Socrates to escape from death and putting his arguments 
to support his position,6 and Socrates answering these and changing the 
course of the conversation: 
Socrates.- "... How should we examme (o"Ko1toi~£ea.) this matter most 
reasonably? Would it be by taking up first your argument about the opinions of men, 
whether it is sound in every case that one should pay attention to some opinions, but not 
to others? Or was that well-spoken before the necessity to die came upon me, but now 
it is clear that this was said in vain for the sake of argument, that it was in truth play and 
nonsense? I am eager to examine together with you, Crito, whether this argument will 
appear in any way different to me in my present circumstances, or whether it remains 
the same, whether we are to abandon it or believe it. It was said on every occasion by 
those who thought they were speaking sensibly, as I have just now been spellking, that 
one should greatly value some people's opinions, but not others. Does that seem to you 
a sound statement?" 7 
This passage is central because it allows Plato to show the essence of his 
method and to stress the element of dialogic and rational examination and 
5 See e.g. C. D. C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology, Indianapolis, 1989; M. W. Blundell, "Commentary on 
Reeve", in J J Cleary and W. Wians (edd.), Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient 
Philosophy, Volume VIII (1992), University Press of America, pp. 115-181. 
6 See Crito, 4Se-46a. 
7 Ibid, 46 c7-e3 (G. M. A. Grube's translation). 
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challenge as the core of philosophical conversations. Socrates insists to 
erito that we do not have to care about the maJority's opinion, but for the 
truth itself; and he proposes to examine whether this is correct (to examine 
the view). 8 
In the Crito 's model we can appreciate the real nature of the Socratic-
Platonic method and the elenchos:9 it implies a joint exercise of reasoning 
about things in a process of testing through questions and answers which 
has the ultimate aim of reaching conclusions. That is, what the interlocutors 
[mally aim is to ask questions about the nature of things and to try to fmd 
the most accurate answer about them according to the evidences that we can 
extract from reality. The ideal result is to get an understanding -normally 
provisional- of the thjng in question that is communicated in verbal and 
rational terms. The Socratic-Platonic method which involves elenchos is 
the way to reach conclusions and is not primarily refutation: 
Socrates.- "Let us examine the question together, my dear friend, and if you can 
make any objection while I am speaking, make it and I will listen to you, but if you 
have no objection to make, my dear Crito, then stop now from saying the same thing so 
often, that I must leave here against the will of the Athenians. I think it important to 
persuade you before I act, and not to act against your wishes. See whether the start of 
our inquiry is adequately stated, and try to answer what I ask you in the way you think 
best." 10 
According to the Socratic-Platonic procedure the philosophical search 
for the truth will be understood in terms of putting things to the test. 
8 See ibid, 48 a. 
9 A point which has not only epistemological implications, but also ontological implications. 
10 Crita, 48 d9-492 (Grube's translation). 
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Philosophy is a permanent process of examining things. 11 The positive 
result of the Socratic-Platonic method can be expressed as follows: that we 
agree about something in dialectical conversation because we discover 
something reliable insofar as it has been tested. 12 
The elenctic process often involves also the dialectical search for a 
deftnition. Socrates clearly expressed his aim to pursue the truth by asking 
for the essence of the things, i.e., the one and not the many. 13 The way to 
reach the truth is to give the logos of the object in question. 14 Plato thought 
Socrates' method to be justifted because, for him too, question and answer is 
the best way to do philosophy, to teach and to put things to the test. 
Elenchos is essential for the dialectical process. 
Socrates insists also that the main task for human beings consists in 
the examination of our lives. Socrates' form of procedure can be defmed in 
ethical terms as a method of life through self-knowledge with the aim of our 
becoming better people. The Socratic-Platonic method, through its elenctic 
phase (for sometimes -especially in the so-called "Socratic" dialogues- it 
appears just as a method of elenchos) gives us the opportunity to examine 
our lives. When Socrates is questioned in the Apology about the sort of 
wisdom that he possesses he answers that perhaps the wisdom that he has is 
a human wisdom (av9pm1ttvT) O"o<pia).15 This wisdom has as a starting 
point a clear awareness of one's ignorance and one's human limits. At the 
same time this brings us back to the point that the philosophical search for 
completion is, in Socratic .. Platonic terms, a joint search for self-
Jl Related to this topic see J. F. Balaude, "La philosophie comme mise a l'epreuve. Les mutations de 
l'elenchos de Socrate a Platon", in Platon et 16bject de la science, Textes reunis et presentes par Pierre-
Marie Morel, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 1996, pp. 17-38. 
12 See RepUblic, VII, 538 d-53ge. 
13 See Theaetetus, 146 and 147c; Meno, 72c, and 74d, Euthyphro, 6d. 
14 See Sophist, 23ge-240a, Republic, 534b. 
15 See Apology, 20 d. 
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examination, self-knowledge and self-improvement. In the Alcibiades 
Socrates makes reference again to the human need to look after ourselves 
through a 'tEXVTl that improves us. The main requirement for this 'tEXVTl is 
self-knowledge. 16 The process of self-knowledge requires an encounter 
between souls, that is, of one soul with another as a mirror of intelligence 
and rationality. Self-knowledge is the source of moral consciousness, that 
is, it allows us to know what is good inside us and in that way we can know 
what is better for us: 
Soctrates.- "Well then, could we ever know what skill makes us better if we 
didn't know what we were? 
Alcibiades.- We couldn't. 
Socrates.- Is it actually such an easy thing to know oneself? Was it some 
simpleton who inscribed those words on the temple wall at Delphi? Or is it difficult, 
and not for everybody? 
Alcibiades.- Sometimes I think, Socrates, that anyone can do it, but then 
sometimes I think it's extremely difficult. 
Socrates.- But, Alcibiades, whether it's easy or not, nevertheless this is the 
situation we're in: if we know ourselves, then we might be able to know how to 
cultivate ourselves, but if we don't know ourselves, we'll never know how. 
Alcibiades.- I agree.,,17 
What does the Socratic figure embody, methodologically speaking ? 
Ifwe consider Theaetetus 150a-e and 167c-e we can concl~de that: 
1. What Socrates practises is an art. "The Socratic art" IS -
metaphorically speaking- a process of midwifery that implies an 
examination of souls. The feature of Socrates' art is the ability to apply all 
16 See Alcibiades I, 128c ff (often regarded as spurious, but it contains what are generally acknowledged 
to be genuinely Platonic ideas). 
17 Ibid, 128 elO-129alO. 
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possible tests to young men with the aim of specifying if their mind is 
conceiving imaginative mistakes or fertile truths; 
2. His art is a compulsion from god that permits him to assist at the 
births of others' ideas (but, puzzlingly, forbids him to give birth). The 
elenchos is the necessary stage for distinguishing between ignorance and the 
presence of understanding. 
3. For Socrates, any intelligent person should prefer the method of 
question and answer to any other because it is the best way of testing any 
theory given insofar as it implies a mutual challenge. 
In short: there are ontological, epistemological and ethical benefits to 
the Socratic-Platonic method, and it may reach positive conclusions. The 
ethical aim of the Socratic-Platonic method is that we should become better 
people. It is necessary to know what virtue is if you are to be virtuous 
because virtue is knowledge for Socrates. Furthermore, there is his vital 
commitment to the ethical idea that knowledge of the good is the necessary 
condition of the rational and organic construction of a real human life. The 
self-consciousness of ignorance is the first condition of improving oneself 
(the elenchos as illustrated especially in the so-called "Socratic" dialogues). 
The key is not in a [mal answer about the nature of the truth, but in the 
correct preparation for asking the ideal question that is going to be our task 
in life: the permanent examination of everything and the examination of 
oneself (itself no less a matter of elenchos) in order to be able to live a 
worthy life. I8 This purpose is translated into the fundamental Socratic 
question: how should men behave? The knowledge of what we should do 
implies a kind of commitment in our acts. 
The positive results of the Socratic-Platonic method can be 
summarised in the following sentences: 
18 See Apology, 38 a. 
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1. The Socratic-Platonic method through the elenctic process is 
capable of changing ignorant men from the state of falsely supposing that 
they know to the state of recognising that they do not know. This 
recognition ignorance excites the desire to know. Philosophy begins in 
thauma (wondering and questioning). Elenchos supplies the thauma. 
Curiosity is basic to the acquisition of knowledge. 
2. But the Socratic-Platonic method is an active and positive process 
insofar as everything has to be put to the test through conversation that 
involves mutual challenge among the interlocutors. That is the reason that 
elenchos is for Plato the most sovereign of purifications, both of men and of 
their thoughts and ideas: 19 it is the medium for the examination men's lives. 
3. The Socratic-Platonic method has ethical consequences: virtue is 
knowledge for Socrates in the sense that we have to live thinking: to think is 
a way of life, because thinking is vital (thinking is living). The Socratic-
Platonic method synthesises theory and practice in the person of Socrates: 
Socrates' procedure is a method of living. 
4. The Socratic-Platonic method through the elenctic process includes 
the self-consciousness that we are aiming at this end by these means. That 
is, Socrates is a systematic and serious philosopher, with positive aims. 
5. The elenctic process that the Socratic-Platonic dialectic involves 
mantains the basic ontological and epistemological idea that knowledge is a 
dialogic and communicative act, one that implies the primary evidence 
which reality gives us of the same object of knowledge, shared by two or 
more subjects. A perspective on this fundamental idea has been lost after 
Plato and it is the origin of the ancient problem of philosophical solipsism, 
so frequently repeated in subsequent philosophy. 
19 Sophist, 229 e-230e. 
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§8. DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON PLATONIC DIALECTIC 
The most common approach to Platonic dialectic takes as a starting point 
the idea that there is an evolution to it. This evolution involves the thesis 
that in the earlier dialogues Plato portrays an elenctic dialectic that leads to 
refutation, while in the middle dialogues, he develops a hypothetical method 
which permits him to reach positive conclusions, and in the later dialogues 
he refmes this process through the application of the technique of collection 
and division. 
If we look more carefully we can distinguish some constants in 
Plato's dialectic in such a way that the fundamental notion of dialectic 
remains the same. First we realise that there are always at least two 
interlocutors in the conversation; and second that we always get positive 
results of some kind (or if not something positive is always aimed at). What 
is important to evidence is that under the consideration of these constants 
there are some variables in which Plato shows us the possible ways to 
develop his arguments through a philosophical conversation. Whatever the 
way that Plato presents his arguments, it always corresponds to dialectical 
means and aims: the rational, dialogic and unselfish search for the truth. In 
other words: there is a phenomenon called Platonic dialectic that comes in 
different forms and is represented in different ways. 
Focusing our attention on the different ways that Plato represents his 
arguments we notice that the figure of Socrates is usually central for 
showing these variations. We fmd some conversations in which Plato 
portrays mainly Socrates and another interlocutor in a process of question 
and answer. In this inquiry Socrates tests and challenges the respondent's 
thesis. Normally, Socrates presents himself as an ignorant person. His 
ignorance has two inter-related sides: on the one hand, the acceptance that 
he does not know, and on the other hand the willingness to examine things, 
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to learn and to test his interlocutor's thesis. Sometimes, the conversation 
leads to an aporia in which either Socrates' interlocutor has to accept that 
he is contradicting himself and that h~ has to change his stated position, or 
the joint search concludes in a provisional answer in the form of an open 
new question that needs further examination.20 The role of aporia in Plato's 
dialogues is central because it is a state of perplexity in the course of the 
conversation which stimulates a new beginning: the interlocutors realise that 
they do not know what they thought they knew. This state of perplexity 
permits us to re-order our thoughts and to try to provide a new, and better 
founded explanation for ourselves. The Lysis is a good example of this, and 
above all in the way that the dialogue concludes: 
Socrates.- '''... Now we've done it, Lysis and Menexenus -made fools of 
ourselves, I, an old man, and you as well. These people here will go away saying that 
we are friends of one another- for I count myself in with you- but what a friend is we 
have not yet been able to find OUt.,,21 
Another way in which Plato presents Socrates in conversation IS 
through the positing of tentative hypotheses. The process of examination in 
this case consists in testing and providing reasons about which of them is 
the most viable. The development of the dialectical process consists mainly 
in an interchange in which Socrates and his interlocutor reflect and 
deliberate on the pros and cons of the provisional hypotheses proposed. The 
Meno contains examples of this type: 
Meno.- "Can you tell me, Socrates, can virtue be taught? Or is it not teachable 
but the result of practice, or is it neither of these, but men possess it by nature or in 
some other way? 
20 We can find examples of this in the Charmides, Protagoras and Euthydemus. 
21 Lysis, 223 b4-8.(S. Lombardo's translation). See also Meno, particularly 84 if. 
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Socrates.- Before now, Meno, Thessalians had a high reputation among the 
Greeks and were admired for their horsemanship and their wealth, but now, it seems to 
me, they are also admired for their wisdom, not least the fellow citizens of your friend 
Aristippus of Larisssa. The responsibility for this reputation of yours lies with Gorgias, 
for when he came to your city he found that the leading Aleuadae, your lover Aristippus 
among them loved him for his wisdom, and so did the other leadipg Thessalians. In 
particular he accustomed you to give a bold and grand answer to any question you may 
be asked, as experts are likely to do. Indeed, he himself was ready to answer any Greek 
who wished to question him, and every question was answered. But here in Athens, my 
dear Meno, the opposite is the case, as if there were a dearth of wisdom, and wisdom 
seems to have departed hence to go to you. If then you want to ask one of us that sort of 
question, everyone will laugh and say: 'Good stranger, you must think me happy indeed 
if you think I know whether virtue can be taught or how it comes to be; I am so far from 
knowing whether virtue can be taught or not that I do no even hav~ any knowledge of 
what virtue itself is. ' 
I myself, Meno, am as poor as my fellow citizens ih this matter, and I blame 
myself for my complete ignorance about virtue. If I do not know what something is, 
how could I know what qualities it possesses? Or do you thing that someone who does 
not know at all who Meno is could know whether he is good-looking or rich or well-
born, or the opposite of these? Do you think that is possible? ,,22 
As the foregoing passage illustrates, Socrates puts to his interlocutor 
different hypotheses. These will be the connecting thread of the whole 
dialogue and will be developed by means of the dialectical form of question 
and answer. 
There are two other particular occaSlOns when Plato presents the 
dialectical process that deserve special consideration: the Phaedrus and the 
Symposium. In the Phaedrus Plato shows us the difference between 
dialectic, as a question and answer process, and rhetoric, as involving long 
speeches. The dialectical process itself is described in terms which include 
a pupil challenging a dialectician. Plato portrays also a criticism of written 
22 Meno, 70 a~71b8 (Grube's translation). 
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texts (and set speeches) and the privileged place that he ascribes to living 
conversation for the developing of philosophical arguments. Socrates 
himself appears giving two long discourses. In them, Plato shows us the 
difference between the authentic rhetorical method and the mere 
unsubstantial speech. 23 Dialectically speaking the dialogue concludes with 
the idea that the teacher is the ideal philosopher or dialectician insofar as he 
is able to sow a philosophical seed in his pupils and bear fruit. 24 In relation 
to dialectic the Phaedrus shows us the way that two people in conversation 
can still search for the truth, despite the fact that the topic chosen can 
present many complexities and the interlocutors have to take a very long 
way around before they can arrive at some positive results. By implication, 
even the best rhetoric -and perhaps even written "dialectic" - is an unfruitful 
mode of communication. 
In the case of the Symposium it seems that Plato breaks with his 
conventional way of presenting the dialectical process. Furthermore: it 
seems that in the dialogue the interlocutors agree that they will compete with 
each other presenting individual discourses with the aim that one of them 
wins the competition, but with a not very clear interaction among them. In 
my judgement, what is clear is that certainly Plato is presenting his dialectic 
in a heterodox way, but there is still an elenctic process with a different 
mode of interaction among the guests. Plato organises his argument in a 
very interesting form of elenctic dialectic. There, Socrates plays a pivotal 
and interconnective role in order to develop Plato's arguments. Plato 
presents five speakers -other than Socrates- in a party who will give their 
own account in a long discourse about the topic decided for conversation. 
Socrates is at the beginning just a listener, but then gives his own account. 
23 See Phaedrus. 263 d ff. and 266 a. 
24 See ibid., 276 e-277a. 
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This account is preceded by a conversation through questions and answers 
with Agathon, at the end of which Agathon has to admit his ignorance 
about the topic. Afterwards, Plato resorts to introducing through Socrates 
the figure of Diotima in a fictional conversation in which Diotima plays the 
role of the questioner and Socrates plays the role of the respondent. At a 
certain point, the dialogue is turned into a evocative description of 
Diotima's teaching which constitutes the climax. Then the conversation 
concludes with the appearance of a drunken Alcibiades, who changes the 
line of the conversation and develops an encomium of Socrates. The 
conversation at the party starts to die with the irruption of more drunken 
people who hamper the development of a conversation. The [mal scene 
presents just Socrates sober and active, talking and putting questions to 
Agathon and Alcibiades who are forcing themselves to keep awake. 
Finally, everybody falls asleep and just Socrates stays himself, ready to start 
a new nonnal day. Socrates' role is central throughout the dialogue because 
he tries to keep a permanent dialectical disposition either as a listener or as a 
speaker. 
Another way in which Plato likes to represent the dialectical process 
is by putting prominent figures on stage. The aim of these "historical" 
conversations is to examine and to test other people's theses and, often, 
make use of them as a good "philosophical excuse" to develop Plato's 
arguments in relation to a specific topic. Here the figure of Socrates is 
central again because the fictional conversation and development of the 
argl1ment make a particular impact when a person who has a certain 
intellectual reputation is tested by Socrates or vice versa. The question and 
answer process and the series of agreements and disagreements throughout 
the dialogue are an exhibition of what a philosophical conversation must 
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be?5 A clear example of this process can be found in the Parmenides. 26 
There, Plato presents the figures of Zeno and Parmenides. First Zeno is 
questioned by a young Socrates. Afterwards Pannenides exposes the 
difficulties that Socrates' position involves. In the next step Pannenides 
takes the leading role and proposes a method of analysis in order to solve 
these difficulties. This dialogue also exposes what sort of consequences 
follow from asserting or denying posited hypotheses. The way that Plato 
deals with the idea of hypothesis as a reasonable assumption gives a 
dynamic to the dialogue because it is a starting point but at the same time an 
issue that has to be put to the test. The rest of the dialogue is dedicated to 
Parmenides' presentation and demonstration of the analysis of different 
hypotheses with Socrates as his interlocutor, in the presence of a young 
Aristotle. 27 
Sometimes, as he commonly does in some of the so called late 
dialogues, he resorts to use again a historical dialectic, but in an indirect 
way, when it is necessary for the purposes of the argument and to provide 
us with another lesson about how the dialectical method could be practised. 
Let me explain. If we analyse the dialogic form of the Sophist and the 
Statesman, in both cases Socrates plays an introductory role only and the 
main conversation will take place between two other figures: 28 the Young 
Socrates and the Eleatic Visitor, in the case of the Statesman, and 
Theaetetus and the Eleatic Visitor, in the case of the Sophist. It is worth 
noticing that the role of both interlocutors is very active and there are mutual 
25 Some of course are demonstrations of what dialectical exchange is not, e.g. Gorgias, 481 b-527e and 
Hippias Major. 
26 Another example of a dialectical exchange through a prominent figure appears in the Protagoras, 356 c 
if in which Protagoras plays a very positive and outstanding role. 
27 Not necessarily the Aristotle. 
28 In the Sophist and in the Statesman Plato shows us how the Socratic-Platonic method is fertile and 
produces its best fruits in Theaetetus, the Young Socrates and the Eleatic Visitor who are able to have a 
philosophical conversation in which Socrates does not lead it or does not play a pre~minent role. 
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challenges throughout the conversation. Plato makes use of paradigms for 
presenting his thesis, searching for a clear formula about the object into 
question and at the same time for exhibiting the dialectical method and the 
dialectician's work through a laborious process of collection and division. 
In short: as we have said, Plato's ways of representing his dialectical 
method in written form involve a variety of modes of carrying on 
conversations. His technical resources are wide enough to present different 
sorts of interlocutors and possible routes to explore. He also represents the 
different complications that any philosophical conversation implies in 
accordance with his philosophical project of a dialogic search for the truth. 
Plato's insistence on expressing philosophy as a communicative act is a 
constant philosophical stimulation for reftning, rethinking and conversing 
rigorously and clearly. His masterly written display of philosophy as a 
dialectical act must be a permanent source for new historical conversations 
with other philosophers and for the understanding of the nature of the 
philosophical act. 
§9. DIALECTIC IN THE SOPHIST 
The second thesis of this part III is as follows: the philosopher's activity, 
through dialectic, is a search for authenticity and improvement that leads 
to self-knowledge, knowledge of human nature and knowledge of reality. 
Philosophy is a communicative act. For Plato reality is not dialectical -as 
Hegel said- but dialectic is the philosophical method for searching and for 
discovering what reality is. As an illustrative case, we will describe how 
dialectic works in the Sophist. 
There has been long speculation about a supposed trilogy that Plato 
seems to have had at one point in mind: the Statesman, the Sophist and the 
Philosopher. We think that the Philosopher is in effect contained in the 
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other two dialogues because in them Plato will show us what a philosopher 
is. 29 In the case of the Sophist the real irony is that Plato is going to display 
what a real philosopher (dialectician) is and what philosophy is (dialectic) in 
the dialectical (Philosophical conversation) process of the defmition of 
(hunting down) the Sophist. The dialogue will exhibit, as a game of 
contrasts, what the philosopher is and what he is not. 30 What the Sophist 
shows us is that dialectic is essential for grasping the truth. 31 
29 See M. L. Morgan, "Philosophy in Plato's Sophist', in 1. 1. Cleary and W. Wians (edd.), Proceedings of 
the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, Volume IX (1993), University Press of America, 
Boston, 1995, p. 84. See also N. Notomi, The Unity of Plato's Sophist. Between the sophist and the 
philosopher, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 21-27 and 239. 
30 Cj N. Notomi, op. cit., Preface, XII. Throughout this §9 we will make reference to Notomi's book 
very frequently and when it is pertinent to do so. Any resemblance or resonance ofhis thesis is just this, a 
mere resemblance or resonance because we are dealing with the same topic, but our positions are very 
different. We cannot deny that the greatest merit of Notomi's book is to return the philosophical 
discussion of the Sophist to its real core and unity (and to try to put an end to obsessive microanalysis): to 
establish the difference between the philosopher and the Sophist. First of all, Notomi does not show clarity 
about the difference between the historical antecedents of philosophy and its related activities, and the 
historical Greek beginning of philosophy and the conditions and principles that make it possible as a 
differentiated and new scientific activity. Secondly, Notomi thinks that the possibility of philosophy -as the 
Sophist illustrates-depends on sophistry (as its subtitle indicates). We think exactly the opposite: for Plato 
the real category is philosophy and sophistry is not possible without its confrontation with philosophy. 
Thirdly, Notomi considers that philosophical thinking is in the Sophist -and for Plato in general- inner 
dialogue. In fact, for Notomi the key for the definition to the Sophist resides in two points: in the 
differentiation between true and false appearances -for Notomi to seem or to appear are in opposition to 
being- but mainly in the permanent inner dialogue and confrontation of our own epistemic state that 
permits us to recognise our own falsities. For him the Sophist is "within us". That is the reason that for 
Notomi the dividing line between the Sophist and the philosopher is very fine and the permanence of 
philosophy so weak. There are no objective criteria to differentiate the Sophist and the philosopher: just 
these inner dialogues and the performance of dialectic -which he understands as a refutative process of 
cross-examination and as mere combination of kinds. Any other sorts of philosophical conversations are 
subject to the final criterion of our internal dialogues. In contrast we think that philosophy began in 
Greece with the Presocratics who were the first in asking rationally and systematically for the essence of 
things. We are not denying that there were different antecedents that make philosophy possible and that 
there were related activities, but when philosophy was born it starts as a new, differentiated and self-
conscious science that searches for the truth and that has a universal scope. Philosophy crystallises with 
the Socratic-Platonic dialectical project. We also think that Plato's dialectical project involves the idea of 
philosophy as a comrnunictive act: philosophy is a dialogic activity -one of its variants is internal dialogue 
in the act of thinking that finally will be externalised. In the case of the Sophist the key for the definition of 
the Sophist, in clear contrast to the philosopher, lies in the following distinctions: the Sophist seems to be 
wise, but he appears as he is, as an impostor and what he communicates to us is a false representation of 
things. The essence of the Sophist is in his appearance. The difference and boundaries between the 
philosopher and the Sophist are well established insofar as the latter is not a dialectician: the Sophist does 
not care for the truth and does not search in an unselfish, dialogic, methodical, rational, systematic and 
objective way for what things are. The permanence of philosophy depends on this faithfulness to objective 
truth through an intersubjective philosophical -elenctic- exchange. 
31 Cj ibid, Preface, XIII, p. 299. 
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The connecting thread of the Sophist that provides unity to the 
dialogue is the search for the defmition of the Sophist. In order to do that 
Plato has fIrst to defme what a philosopher is. Because his philosophical 
project is defmed in dialectical terms, in order to fulfil the task of defming 
the Sophist in contrast to the philosopher he has to make explicit what the 
nature of philosophy is and to deal with fundamental philosophical 
problems such as: the contrast between reality and images, the possibility of 
falsehood, the ontological and epistemological status of being and not being, 
what dialectic is, and the way that the dialectical method operates in the 
process of collection and division and in the combination of kinds. The 
Sophist gives an illustration of what the philosophical task is. That is the 
reason that the Sophist is a key dialogue because Plato reveals his idea of 
the nature of philosophy: philosophy is a rational, self-conscious science 
that asks and defmes its essence and aims. The philosopher is the 
dialectician who is in clear opposition to the eristic Sophist. The question 
for the essence of philosophy is a permanent philosophical question. 
Philosophy is defmed as the science that asks questions and tries to provide 
us with rational answers about the essence of things. 32 
The third thesis of this part is as follows: Plato presents the Sophist's 
attitude, as deliberate sorcery. In our judgement the Sophist's activity 
involves a quadruple kind of prejudice: 1. Ontological predisposition and 
epistemological distortion: because the Sophist presents to his audience a 
blurred representation of things which superimposes on and disguises their 
nature. This predisposition and distortion prevents a clear and transparent 
presentation and possible knowledge of things as they real~y are. 2. Ethical 
and human distortion: because with his attitude of pretending to know 
everything, the Sophist is destroying the initial disposition of good faith that 
everybody ought to have to make possible a dialogue without prejudices. 
32 Cj ibid., Preface, XI-XIII and p. 25. 
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3. Ethical and methodological distortion: the Sophist is preventing the open 
and unselfish search for the truth or the search for the examination of 
things as they really are themselves, independently of any personal or 
group interest. 4. Dialectical distortion: because the Sophist is hampering 
and breaking off the honest historical dialogue and interaction (historical 
exercise of dialectic) with other philosophers in the past in the sense that he 
atomises and reduces the search for the truth to his personal interest and 
circumstance. 
Throughout these sections we will show the following: 
Plato exercises in the Sophist different levels of dialectic in order to 
defme the Sophist in contrast to the philosopher: i) fIrstly, and most 
evidently the common interaction between the interlocutors in an elenctic 
dialectic; ii) secondly, a historical, and clearly elenctic, dialectic when he 
introduces Parmenides' theses and some other previous philosophers' theses 
in order to criticise them; iii) thirdly, the application of the dialectical 
method as a process of collection and division and as science of 
combination of kinds. 
We will treat the topic of dialectic in the Sophist in the following 
sections. 
a) The nature and .justification of the form of the Sophist as 
dialogue, the seven definitions of the Sophist and the process of 
division 
The structure of the dialogue is as follows: 
1. 216-221c: fIrst we see Theodorus introducing the Eleatic Visitor 
and getting an agreement in relation to the topic of dicussion. They agree to 
converse about how to get a clear formula about the Sophist. The Eleatic 
Visitor nronoses the auestion and answer method. recallinQ it as 
.a. :...... ,-
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Parmenides' method, and chooses Theaetetus as his interlocutor. The two 
interlocutors consider that it is convenient to apply the question and answer 
method to a small model or paradigm. They apply the process of collection 
and division in order to get a defInition of the angler. 
2. 221 c-231 a: the interlocutors will apply the same method of 
collection and division in order to defme the Sophist. They get six initial 
defmitions: a) the Sophist as a hired hunter of rich young men (221c-223b); 
b) the Sophist as a trader in knowledge (223c224c ); c) the Sophist as a retail 
dealer (224d); d) the Sophist as a manufacturer and salesman of information 
(224e); e) the Sophist as an eristic (224e-226a); f) the Sophist as a cross 
questioner (226a-231 b). At the end of this section there is a recapitulation 
of the six defmitions. 
3. 232a-249c: they will center their attention on the productive art and 
on a seventh defmition of the Sophist that emerges from it as a maker of 
false conceit of wisdom. The Sophist appears as a creator of images or 
semblances. That is the reason that the interlocutors will discuss the status 
of both. The existence of images involves the existence of not being, 
breaking Parmenidean principles. They will put in question Parmenides' 
principles. From there, they will try to demonstrate that not-being exists and 
co-exists with being. They reject the Parmenidean thesis and make a 
dialectical review of the materialist and idealist positions in relation to the 
topic of being. 
4. 249d-259d: the interlocutors state their position in relation to the 
possible combination of kinds and defme dialectic as the science of 
interrelationships between kinds. They specify also a defmition of not-
being as the different and not as the contrary of being. 
5. 259d-268d: Finally they deal with the problem of the relationship 
between not-being and falsity with thought, discourse, and judgement in 
order to classify the Sophist's activity. All of this will permit them to defIne 
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false judgement as that which says something different from what is. With 
all these elements they will take up again the seventh attempt to defme the 
Sophist and collect all the features that permit them to defme the Sophist as 
a magician who produces illusions and fantasies in his discourse. 
In this first section we will develop the idea that from the beginning 
of the dialogue the characters' deliberate choice is of dialectic as the proper 
method to do philosophy, that is, as a cooperative dialogue in which the 
interlocutors make a real contribution in the search: in this particular case, to 
study and to bring the nature of the Sophist into a clear formula by the 
method of Collection and Division applied to the angler. There is an 
analogical process that Plato uses to talk about the six initial defmitions of 
the Sophist and the important role that they will play at the end of the 
dialogue in the fmal "hunting down" of the Sophist. That is the Sophist 
always appears "like something". 
The dialogue starts with an introductory conversation (216a-218d) 
when Theodorus with Theaetetus and the young Socrates meet Socrates for 
further discussion as it had been agreed. With them -they emphasise- there 
is a real philosopher, a Visitor from Elea. Theodorus and Socrates launch a 
fIrst problem: are the Sophist, the Statesman and the Philosopher a single 
type, or two, or are they three types each with a corresponding name? 
(217a). 
Socrates and the Eleatic Visitor talk about the method that they will 
use to carry out the conversation. 33 There are two options: 1. an unbroken 
long speech; 2. or a conversation through questions. The Visitor's choice is 
for the second one. That decision shows us the Visitor's philosophical 
character: he is a di(llectician. Next is the choice of interlocutor. The 
V isitor opts for Theaetetus as his ideal interlocutor insofar as he has 
33 Regarding the topic of the. choice of the question and answer form over a long and uninterrupted 
discourse see Protagoras, 329 band 337 a-338a; Gorgias, 448 d and 449 c; Republic J, 337 a. 
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conversed with him before and (because the topic will be difficult) he is 
mature enough to tackle the joint search. Theaetetus will appear throughout 
the dialogue as a very active, cooperative and sharp interlocutor. First of all 
the Visitor of Elea and Theaetetus try to defme the topic: to study and to 
bring the nature of the Sophist into a clear formula (218). 
The dialectical exercise starts with a process of selection -and the 
correspondent divisions- of a model or paradigm (the angler). On these 
grounds they apply the method of collection and division which culminates 
in six initial attempts to defme the Sophist. 
One key passage that makes explicit the purposes of the dialogue is 
221 c6-7, where the Eleatic Visitor says that by applying the method of 
division to the angler they are trying to fmd what the Sophist is: "cptpe oTt, 
KU't<l 'tOU'to 'to 1tapaonYJlU Kat 'tOY O'ocptO''tllV E1ttxnpOOJlev eupetv on 
1to't' EO'n v." 
Why are the first seven defmitions of the Sophist so important? 
There are two lines of interpretation. The first considers that only the 
seventh defmition grasps the Sophist rightly and therefore that not all of 
them are equally valid. The second possible interpretation is that all 
divisions get something right because all of them are looking at the Sophist 
from different perspectives. We will support the latter interpretation. We 
think that the six defmitions are central because it is the first fish that the 
two interlocutors catch in the conversation. These first defmitions show us 
why for Plato primary evidences are very important as a methodological and 
epistemological starting point. The seven defmitions represent the different 
ways in which the Sophist presents himself and appears before us as he 
really is. All of them will be crucial at the end of the dialogue when the 
[mal recapitulations and defmition of the Sophist will be presented. 34 
34 Cj N. Notomi, op. cit., pp. 78-94 and F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge. The Theaetetus 
and the Sophist of Plato. Translation with a running commentary, Routledge and Kegan and Paul, 5th, 
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Methodologically speaking the long process of divisions that these six initial 
attempts to grasp the essence of the Sophist involves also illustrates how 
this process works in detail. 
The scheme is as follows -including the seven defmitions: 35 
Art of angling (218a-221c) 
I 
art of atquisition 
I I 
by exchange by capture 
I 
hunting 
~g~ 
I 
art of sepclrating 
I 
learning 
and knowing 
I 
contention 
prodhctive art 
Sophist as Sophist as Sophist as Sophist as 
II. trade in 1. hired hunter V. Eristic VI. Cross VII. maker of a 
knowlege of rich young (224e-226a) questioning false 
(223c-224c) men (221c-223b) 226a-231b conceit of 
III. retail dealer (Sophistry of wisdom 
IV. manufacturer noble lineage) (235b-236d; 
and salesman of taken up again 
information at 265a-268d) 
(224d-e) 
It is important to clarify that what perplexes the interlocutors is how it 
is possible that a man -i.e., the Sophist- who appears as a master of many 
different 'tEXVat possesses and is named according single one. The 
following dialectical step that the interlocutors assume is to try to fmd where 
the unity of these different modes of appearing of the Sophist is and how to 
express it in a clear and consistent formula (232 al-6). We emphasise that 
Impression, London, 1957, pp. 186-187. See W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, Volume 
V The later Plato and the Academy, Cambridge University Press, Reprint, 1996, pp. 133-134. 
35 Taken -with some modifications- from F. M. Cornford, op. cit. p. 171. For detail tables of this divisions 
see R. Bluck, Plato's Sophists. A commentary (G. Neal ed.), Manchester University Press, 1975, pp. 55-
57. 
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Plato gives all the importance and weight to the different ways that the 
Sophist appears because they are the first clue that has to be analysed 
carefully. None of them will be discarded. The essence of the Sophist 
resides in his appearance. Plato is not making a difference between the 
different ways that the Sophist present himself and the essence of him. 
Plato simply is trying to collect the first data and primary evidences that we 
get from reality about the Sophist and which constitute a firm starting point. 
The common interpretations of this passage of the Sophist tend to 
apply a Parmenidean and Kantian metaphysical criterion -mutatis mutandis-
that distinguishes two ontological levels of reality: the phenomenal and the 
noumenal. That is how they explain the presence of a second stage, saying 
that Plato rejects the six initial defmitions because they just have a 
phenomenal value, but not a real or noumenal content which permits us to 
defme the essence of the Sophist, i.e., not in his appearance or in the 
different ways that he presents himself. 
In accordance with this beginning the aim of the dialogue -as we will 
see- is to discover the nature of the Sophist through the concrete applicaton 
of the dialectical method of collection and division and the combination of 
kinds. One interesting remark that the Eleatic Visitor suggests is that the 
method of collection does not reject any object. Everything is liable to be 
studied (227 alO-b4). That point sl,lggests an initial but clear difference in 
attitudes between the philosopher and the Sophist. The philosopher -as a 
dialectician- is open to inquiry about the essence of everything. The 
Sophist's starting point is his "knowledge" of everything. 
The Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus realise the great difficulty that is 
involved in "hunting down" the nature of the Sophist because of his 
evasiveness and the multiple ways of he has presenting himself: he appears 
as an expert at many things an he is called by a single name. The Eleatic 
V isitor mentions the other opposite possibility as an open question: is it not 
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possible to call him by different names because he possesses many different 
skills? (232 a). 
Considering the complexity of the case they decide to fix their 
attention on one clear feature of the Sophist that they got hold of before in 
the fifth division: the Sophist as a controversialist (aVttAoYtlCOC;) or a 
person engaged in disputes. Now the idea of the Sophist as a 
controversialist will comprehend a wider sense: the Sophist as a lover of 
disputations (aJl<Ptcr~ll'tll'ttl(OC;) which includes also private and public 
debates. 
The Sophist as a lover of disputes appears as having a kind of conceit 
of knowledge of everything, but not truth (233c). That is a crucial assertion 
because it permits us to discern clearly that what the Sophist practises is not 
the Socratic method (divisions V and VI).36 What characterises the Sophist 
is his deceptive procedure that hampers objective knowledge and education 
because he cannot distinguish the real nature of things from mere false 
beliefs. With this wider definition of the Sophist the interlocutors are 
including among these "hunters" the mere creators of persuasion (division 
I), and the pseudo-teachers of virtue (divisions II, ill and IV) (234c-d). The 
Sophistic practice of controversy involves any sort of knowledge and 
allegedly they make their pupils able to dispute about any subject-matter 
without really having knowledge about it (234e-235a). In short: the Sophist 
seems to know all subjects, but not reality. Sophists are "like" philosophers 
or seem to be philosophers, but they are not philosophers. 
Throughout the dialogue Plato will insist on a parallel and contrast 
between the Sophist's practice and the philosopher as a dialectician. For the 
moment it is clear that the enterprise of chasing the Sophist's nature is 
difficult because of his many different ways of appearing and because of his 
evasive way of presenting himself. 
36 Cj Notomi, pp. 60-68. 
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The next step in the search for the deflnition of the Sophist takes 
place when the interlocutors decide to concentrate on the seventh division. 
Because this division describes the Sophist as a creator of images, it will be 
necessary to defme what an image is. That will be crucial for establishing 
the connection with the ontological and epistemological elements that the 
defmition of the Sophist includes as a creator of images: falsehood and the 
metaphysical status of being and not being. 
b) Reality and images. The possibility of falsehood. The 
ontological and epistemological status of being and not being 
Now the Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus focus on a seventh division, that is, 
in the productive class which describes the Sophist as a "maker of false 
conceit of wisdom" (233d ff.). The central idea is that the Sophist is a 
creator of images or semblances. But he is a particular kind of producer of 
images: he is a creator of illusions. Let me explain. The Sophist describes 
himself as a man who is able to produce all things with his single skill. 
Because he creates illusions by means of discourse, making his listeners 
believe that what he presents is the truth and that he is the wisest of men, 
the interlocutors have to discover how he can do this imitation of real things 
and how he can present himself as a real philosopher. That means the main 
question that emerges in the dialogue is how et()CJ)"'u are possible and if they 
are, what sort of existence they have. In a sort of flctional dialogue the 
Eleatic Visitor considers the possible way that the Sophist can defend 
himself against these charges. The Sophist would put forward his case as 
follows: he is an expert in semblance-making (<puv'tua'ttlCn). He creates 
unreal images, and unreal things cannot exist in any way. Theaetetus and 
the Eleatic Visitor have to demonstrate that "what is not" has a sort of 
existence and that thinking and saying something "what is not" (false) is 
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PQssible. In fact, Qne Qf the clues fQr the definitiQn Qf the SQphist's activity 
(241 a-b) emerges frQm this discussiQn: the SQphist's practice cQnsists in an 
act Qf attributing nQt-being to, facts o'r being to, what is nQt a fact. At the 
same time, Plato, will shQW Qne O,f his key QntQIQgical ideas, that is, that 
"what is nQt, in SQme respect has being, and cQnversely that what is, in a 
way is nQt" (241d). In shQrt: in the search fQr the QntQIQgical status Qfbeing 
and nQt-being, it is necessary to, defme what "real" means. These mQves in 
the dialo'gue are crucial in Qrder to, defme clear bQundaries between the 
SQphist and the PhilO,sQpher. With the PQssibility Qf falsehQQd Plato, reveals 
the essence Qf any epistemQIQgical act in dialectical terms: we can discQver 
in a philo'SQphical cQnversatiQn if sQmething is false in a clear and Qbjective 
cQnfro'ntatio'n with things and in an agreement abQut that. Let us take this 
step by step.37 
If we IQQk at 235 the cQnclusio'n O,f it is that the SQphist is a "wizard" 
(eau~a'to1tot6~) because he is an imitatQr Qf real things. FurthermQre, he 
dQes nQt Po'ssess genuine knQwledge Qf all the things that he "seems" to, 
dispute about. Here we can nQtice that the SQphist's attitude is a deliberate 
SQrcery. The cQnsequence is that he presents things to, his audience in such 
a way that he creates a certain predisPQsitiQn to, see reality in a peculiar and 
wrQng way.38 This allegQry Qfthe SQphist as a eau~a'to1tot6~ permits us to, 
understand the essence O,f his practice frQm its ro'Qts: he is generating -in a 
premeditated way- a misrepresentatiQn Qf what things really are putting 
eau~a'ta between us and things. As a cO,nsequence Qf that he is hampering 
a direct, fresh and philQsQphical approach to, things and the PQssibility Qf 
37 See forward p. 217. 
38 Cornford (see op. cit., p.195) thinks that the passages 235b and 268d are comparable with Republic VII, 
514b in two aspects: a) because the Sophist is a kind ofeau~a'to1tot6<; and b) because in the Sophist -as in 
the Republic- the Eleatie Visitor is trying -like Socrates in the Republic with the prisoners- to bring 
Theaetetus and his friends closer to realities. That is related to our argument because it helps to illustrate 
the different epistemological attitudes of the Sophist and the philosophers. See also R. Patterson, Image 
and Reality in Plato's Metaphysics, Hackett, Indianapolis, 1985, pp. 33-34. 
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knowing them as they really are. He is breaking the initial ethical condition 
for a philosophical conversation: the willingness and good faith of the 
interlocutors to search for the truth. 
The next dialectical agreement among the characters is that the 
Sophist is an imitator. They will work on this point using a dialectical 
process of division. There are two forms of imitation: 1. the making of 
likenesses (etKaO"'ttKll) and 2. the making of semblances (<pav'taO"nKll). 
The argument goes as follows: the Sophist creates £lornA-a, in his discourse, 
but it is a malicious production in so far as it involves a deliberate deceit 
and illusion addressed to his audience. The Sophist is not presenting and 
representing things as they really are. What is important to stress is that 
Plato, from the beginning, insists on exposing the Sophist's hypocrisy in its 
deliberated twisted sort of imitation in contrast to the transparent, unselfish 
and unequivocal attitude of the philosopher before things. 
Regarding the topic of false judgement: this topic comes into the 
conversation because the Sophist is an image-maker; he creates a world of 
particular fictions which purport (pret~nd) to be the real things. The 
metaphysical originality in Plato is that he is trying to show us how non-
being can be in certain way and the logical, ontological and epistemological 
consequences that follow if we accept this assertion. The questions that 
emerge in the dialogue are: what is the relationship between the £lornA-a that 
the Sophist produces and the problem of false judgement and otherness? 
Another question relating to this is: what is the ontological, epistemological 
and logical status of non-being and how are negative statements and 
thoughts possible?39 
In the next step -237b-239c- the EleaticVisitor will show us that 
there are things that have some sort of existence. That is, the term "what is 
39 It is worth noticing that the introduction of some of the Parmenidean theses -up to 259- permits Plato to 
display a historical dialectic, in parallel with the main argument of the dialogue. 
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not" is applicable to "something", but it is not used by itself or in isolation 
from everything that exists. To talk about the existence of "what is not" is -
in Platonic terms- a matter of putting thing in relationship. We fmd this part 
crucial, because Plato will also be rejecting the possibility of thinking, 
speaking or conceiving absolute nothingness without self-contradiction. 
Here there is a connection with Parmenides. This link is as follows: 
With the acceptance that false judgements, false beliefs and not -being 
exist in a context of relationships about things, Theaetetus and the Eleatic 
V isitor are making a very refmed point about dialectic: reality is a matter of 
relationships and we have to discover what sort of similitudes and 
differences there are among things if we search to grasp them. On these 
ontological and epistemological grounds the interlocutors get the dialectical 
key for establishing what sort of relationship would be possible between the 
philosopher and the Sophist. 
Nevertheless, the Sophists' objection is still very powerful: they say 
that they are not practising the art of semblance-making (<puv'tua'ttK'll, 239 
c9) and creating unreal images, because unreal things cannot exist. The 
Visitor remarks that the same objection will be put forward against the 
possibility of thinking or saying "what is not", that is, what is false. 
After a short dialogue, Theaetetus and the Visitor can state the 
following conclusion: things that are not (falsehoods) are things which are 
contrary to facts (or contrary to the things that are). It is interesting that 
Plato is appealing to reality or facts as the ultimate criterion of truth. The 
possibility of defming falsehood in objective terms will be one of the key 
epistemological points for hunting down the Sophist. Philosophy is an 
inter-subjective act that has the aim of discovering what is objectively true 
or false: 
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Eleatic Visitor.- "And what now? How can we define his art without 
contradicting ourselves? 
Tbeaetetus.- How do you mean? What sort of contradiction do you fear? 
Eleatic Visitor.- When we say that he deceives with that semblance he spoke of 
and that his art is a practice of deception, shall we be saying that, as the effect of his art, 
our mind thinks what is false, or what shall we mean? 
Theaetetus.- Just that. What else could we mean? 
Eleatic Visitor.- And false thinking, again, will be thinking things contrary to 
the things that are? 
Tbeaetetus.- Yes. 
Eleatic Visitor.- You mean, then, by false thinking, thinking things that are not? 
Tbeaetetus.- Necessarily.,,40 
That is the reason that in the next couple of passages (240d-e) the 
interlocutors make clear that it is possible to defme what an error is, and that 
Sophists are doing something when they produce simulations: false beliefs 
are equivalent to one particular kind i.e., images or semblances. 
The next agreement between the Visitor and Theaetetus is that 
falsehoods exist in thoughts and in statements. We can qualify the Sophists' 
activity -at least provisionally- as an act of attributing not-being to facts or 
being to what is not a fact (241a-b). Here the contrast between the Sophist 
and the philosopher starts to emerge: the philosopher for Plato is fIrst and 
foremost a very careful observer of reality and therefore, a person who 
deliberates at length before he makes his judgements because he searches 
for the truth. The Sophist's world is a fIctional one that does not correspond 
to what things really are. He does not care for the truth. 
What has just been agreed permits the Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus 
to commit a kind of parricide against Parmenides since "what is not, in 
some respect has being, and conversely that which is, in a way is not" 
40 Sophist, 240 c7-d7 (Cornford's translation). 
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(24Id). We think that the Platonic revolution ill metaphysics IS 
concentrated in this phrase.41 
To amplify their ontological position -from 242b to 243c- the 
interlocutors make a general review of what earlier philosophers consider 
real things in combination with Parmenides' unitarian thesis about what is. 
Some questions emerge: is there one or are there several real things (ov'ta)? 
What is the meaning of "real" or "the real"? What do we express when we 
state of a thing that "it is"? Dialectically speaking this passage shows us 
again what historical conversations with other philosophers imply in the 
search for the clarification of the main topic of the dialogue -the definition 
of the Sophist- and how to develop a real dialogue with fictional 
interlocutors. 
Eleatic Visitor.- "The general run of these expressions we will consider later, if 
we so decide. We must begin now with the chief and most important of them all. 
Theaetetus.- Which is that? Of course you mean we ought to begin by studying 
'reality' and finding out what those who use the word think it stands for. 
Eleatic Visitor.- You have hit my meaning precisely, Theaetetus; I do mean that 
we must take this line. Imagine them here before us, and let us put this question: 'You 
who say that Hot and Cold or some such pair really are all things, what exactly does 
this expression convey that you apply to both when you say that they both are "real" or 
each of them is 'real? How are we to understand this "reality" you speak of? Are we to 
suppose it is a third thing alongside the other two and that the All is no longer, as you 
say, two things, but three? For surely you do not give the name "reality" to one of the 
two and then say that both alike are real; for then there will be only one thing, 
whichever of the two it may be, and not two. '" 
Theaetetus.- True.,,42 
41The question is: why do many philosophers ignore Plato's thesis and continue to insist on the possibility 
of thinking, speaking and qualifying absolute nothingness despite the fact that it involves a contradiction? 
The cases of Hegel and Heidegger are good examples of that. 
42 Sophist, 243 clO-e7 (Cornford's translation). 
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The most prominent feature of the foregoing passage is that it 
provides us with the ontological basis for establishing the dialectical process 
of comparison between the philosopher and the Sophist. Let me make 
myself clear. Philosophers and Sophists are a real pair of things among the 
universe of objects that constitute reality. Insofar as both coexist, we have 
to fmd and to interweave the elements that will establish the similarities and 
differences between them. 
In short: in the search for the ontological status of being and not-
being, it is necessary to defme what "real" means and involves. But it is 
important to keep track of the plot of the conversation: because the Sophist 
is dealing with falsehood, we have to know how falsehood is objectively 
possible and in that way to put the Sophist in contrast to the philosopher. 
That is the the context of the analysis of the positions of the Giants and 
Gods that constitutes the next step of the dialogue. 
c) The Battle of Gods and Giants: a case of elenctic dialectic 
This section of the Sophist is also important because it permits Plato to 
show us two things: 1. The Battle of the Gods and Giants is a clear example 
of how a historical conversation with other previous philosophers has to be 
developed as an elenctic dialectic that has the main aim of searching for an 
objective truth. 2. The Battle of the Gods and Giants exhibits how two 
extreme positions are put in contrast and in comparison. This comparative 
process provides an analogy to the main parallel between the philosopher 
and the Sophist 43 It is a kind of prelude to Plato's position in this respect: 
there are clear boundaries between the philosopher and the Sophist. There 
is a clear dividing line between them but we have to discover the way that 
they relate to each other. 
43 CI Notorni, pp. 211-221. 
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The search for the defInition of the real will be carried out through an 
examination of "Materialistic" (Giants) and "Idealistic" (Gods) positions on 
reality. At the same, Plato will examine his position in relation to motion 
and rest. Let us see see how this historical examination is a clear and long 
extended example of the way that Plato introduces another dimension of 
dialectic in the context of the dialogue. 44 
The elenctic process is as follows. At the beginning the Materialists 
accept that they identify the real with visible and tangible body (24 7b). 
Nevertheless, when the Visitor and Theaetetus start the fIctional challenge to 
them some problems emerge about keeping on this extreme position. If we 
talk about any sort of goodness or badness and, above all, the soul that gives 
them existence, it is unavoidable that we should accept the reality of 
bodiless realities. The Giants have to make a concession: there is a real, 
incorporeal dynamis or agent that permits that things affect or be affected. 
This concession also involves the assertion that permanence is not 
. incompatible with change and being because things are susceptible of 
producing an effect or being affected: 
Eleatic Visitor.- "Let us question them further, then; for it is quite enough for 
our purpose if they consent to admit that even a small part of reality is bodiless. They 
must now tell us this: when they say that these bodiless things and the other things 
which have body are alike 'real', what common character that emerges as covering both 
sets of things have they in view? It is possible they may be at a loss for an answer. If 
that is their state of mind, you must consider whether they would accept our suggestion 
a description of the real and agree to it. 
Theaetetus.- What description? Perhaps we can tell, if you will state it. 
Eleatic Visitor.- I suggest that anything has real being, that is so constituted as 
to possess any sort of power either to affect anything else or to be affected, in however 
44 L Brown calls this historical dialectic, "second hand dialectic", but not in a pejorative sense because she 
considers that it is also authentic dialectic; see "Innovation and Continuity. The Battle of the Gods and 
Giants, Sophist 245-249, in J. Gentzler (ed.), Method in Ancient Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1998, p. 182. 
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small a degree, by the most insignificant agent, though it be only once. I am proposing 
as a mark to distinguish real things, that they are nothing but power (ouvcxJ.l.1.C;). 
Theaetetus.- Well, they accept that, having for the moment no better suggestion 
of their own offer. 
Eleatic Visitor.- That will do; for later on both they and we perhaps may change 
our minds. For the present, then, let us take it that this agreement stands between us 
and the one party. 
Theaetetus.- It does. ,,45 
The introduction of the idea of ouvaJlt~ will play -in my judgement-
a key role in the next part of the dialogue because it provides us with the 
ontological condition for the combination of kinds and otherness. This idea 
permits us to state fmnly: that there is a relationship among things in terms 
of passive possibility (susceptibility) of being affected and in terms of active 
possibility (acting upon). This is central because it will permit us to mark 
out the way that philosophical activity affects sophistry and vice versa. 
Eleatic Visitor.- "We proposed as a sufficient mark of real things the presence 
in a thing of the power of being acted upon or of action in relation to however 
insignificant a thing. 
Theaetetus.- Yes. ,,46 
Turning now to the Friends of the Forms (Idealists): they support the 
thesis that: 1. There is a clear distinction between becoming and real being; 
2. Our relationship with becoming is via our body through sense, and our 
relationship with real being is via our soul through reflection. Real being is 
immutable and becoming is variable (248a). 
Despite the fact that the two interlocutors proposed the idea of 
ouvaJlt~ as a feature of things, they realise that the Friends of the Forms can 
45 Sophist, 247 c9-248a3 (Cornford's translation). 
46 Ibid., 248 c3-6 (Cornford's translation). 
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raise an other objection against this position: they can state that this power 
just belongs to becoming, but is not compatible with real being (248 c7-9). 
The Friends of the Forms (Idealists) have to concede that reality is not 
constituted as a whole only by unchangeable things because: 
Eleatic Visitor.- " ... what changes and change are real things.,,47 
and because if they do not concede that, it would imply to accept their false 
prerruse 
Eleatic Visitor.- " ... that a living thing (which has intelligence, life and soul) 
remains at rest in complete changelessness?,,48 
In this way Theaetetus and the Eleatic Visitor can reject the other 
extreme position that 
Eleatic Visitor.- " ... all things are moving and changing, on that view equally 
we shall be excluding intelligence from the class of real things. ,,49 
The Eleatic Visitor -in 249d-25Ia- makes explicit the conclusion of 
the elenctic process about the two positions that: I. Reality does not consist 
solely of unchangeable things because then nothing could be known; 2. but 
all reality is not reducible to things that are perpetually changing either 
because again intelligence and knowledege would be impossible, 3. 
Therefore, real things are both at once: changeable and unchangeable. 50 4. 
47 Ibid, 249 b3 (Cornford's translation). 
48 Ibid, 249 as-iO (Comford's translation with slight modifications). 
49 Ibid., 249 b5-10 (Cornford's translation). 
50 With this assertion we have to be extremely careful because some interpreters of Plato tend to associate 
it with the Hegelian idea of dialectic as the synthesis of opposites and the retroactive affiliation and origins 
of this that Hegel attributes to Heraclitus. It is one thing to say that Plato recognises the fact that change 
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Reality is not reducible to motion and rest, but motion and rest partake of 
realness:51 
Eleatic Visitor.- "On these grounds, then, it seems that only one course is open 
to the philosopher who values knowledge and the rest above all else. He must refuse to 
accept from the champions either of the One or of the many Fonus the doctrine that all 
Reality is changeless; and he must turn a deaf ear to the other party who represent 
Reality as everywhere changing. Like a child begging for 'both', he must declare that 
Reality or the sum of things is both at once -all that is unchangeable and all that is in 
change. 
Theaetetus.- Perfectly true." 52 
It is worth remarking that here too the Eleatic Visitor stresses one 
initial and fundamental feature of the philosopher's attitude: the philosopher 
cares above all for knowledge of reality. This point will be crucial for 
making a clear and objective distinction with the closed mind of the Sophist 
in his epistemological attitude to things. 
The next step -250c-25 la- shows us the two interlocutors in a state of 
perplexity that is part of the elenctic search too. Reality is revealed as not 
reducible to rest and movement. They launch some questions: what does 
"real" mean?; what does "unreal" mean?, and how can we apply the name 
"unreal"? 
Eleatic Visitor.- "And now we are in no less perplexity about reality? 
Theaetetus.- In even greater, I should say, sir, if that be possible. 
Eleatic Visitor.- Let us take it, then that our difficulty is now completely stated. 
But since reality and unreality are equally puzzling, there is henceforward some hope 
and pennanence cohabit in things and it is another totally different to say that this assertion is included in 
his idea of dialectic and that he says -as Hegel did- that reality is dialectical. 
51 See Comford, p. 241. 
52 Sophist, 249 c lO-d5. 
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that any light, whether dim or bright, thrown upon the one will illuminate the other to 
an equal degree; and if, on the other hand, we cannot get sight of either, at any rate we 
will make the best we can of it under these conditions and force a passage through the 
argument with both elbows at once. 
Tbeaetetus.- Very good. ,,53 
This epistemological state of aporia opens us to an state of euporia in 
relation to our main argument: the dialectical way of defIning the Sophist 
will be in a relation of contiguity and opposition to philosophy. The notion 
of ouva~t<; is central to the possiblity of KotV(J)Vta. That is the reason that 
the interlocutors should demonstrate clearly how the dialectician operates 
his science of combination of kinds. 54 
d) The combination of kinds. The definition of the science of 
dialectic 
Gradually the interlocutors have been showing how the conditions for being 
a philosopher are defmed in dialectical terms and in clear opposition to the 
Sophist's practice: the unselfish, essentially cooperative attitude in relation 
to things, which has the aim of searching for the truth, remains fIrm. 
At this point of the conversation the interlocutors provide an explicit 
defmition of the science of dialectic emphasising one of its methodological 
features: the ability to discern and to combine kinds. The only reason (i.e., 
to illustrate the nature of dialectic, but it is also to establish the possibility of 
sophistry) they will introduce the topic of the combination of kinds in one 
dialogue. The argument goes as follows. A 'tEXVll or science is needed 
which shows us how to discern and combine kinds, and dialectic emerges as 
this sort of indispensable philosophical tool: dialectic is a process of 
53 Ibid., 250 el-25Ia4. 
54 Cf Notomi, p. 237. 
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philosophical conversation that is always attempting the search for the truth, 
and dialectic is the philosophical method of discerning kinds. In other 
words: the process of collection and division has to take place through 
dialectic or to take the form of OtaA£YEcr9at. To put things in comparison 
and to discern similarities and differences among things involves a joint 
process of detailed analysis of them through objective (i.e., because aimed 
at the truth) agreements or disagreements between the interlocutors in a real 
dialogue. 
The second feature that this defmition of dialectic stresses is that the 
philosopher is someone who has a "free man's knowledge". This point we 
will treat in a comparative way, that is, as a description in which we can 
fmd the key of the opposition between the philosopher's and the Sophist's 
activity. 
The interlocutors treat fIrst -m 25la-259d- the topic of the 
combination of kinds and the problem of negativ~ statements. The purpose 
of this section is to clear up the confusions that appear in relation to 
negative statements. We think that Plato will illuminate his idea of 
otherness, and make explicit in what sense that "which is not" exists or has 
being. After that there is going to be a long discussion about the 
combination of kinds. In the middle of the discussion, there is a description 
of dialectic, and the task of the philosopher. The section -i.e., 251a-259d-
will be dedicated to the relationship between the kinds themselves, and what 
will be reflected in true statements that we can construct about them. This 
section is crucial because it will provide us with the methodological and 
epistemological tools which will permit the interlocutors to fIx clear 
boundaries between the Sophist and the philosopher. Let us take it step by 
step. 
The opening problem is to be about the interweaving of kinds -25la-
252e. In this passage the interlocutors try to show us that it is impossible to 
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support either of the opposite theses of the complete interdependence of 
kinds or their complete independence. With the first position we will 
provide an inaccurate map of reality; with the second position we would 
imply talking about a kind of atomised reality and denying the OUVUl1tC; that 
inheres in things. The conclusion is: there is blending of kinds, but some 
kinds combine each other, others do not. 
The combination of kinds (KOtVroVtU YEVroV) depends on the way that 
things affect each other (ouVUl1tC;).55 In the same way, the definition of the 
Sophist depends on the manner that he affects, or relates to philosophical 
practice. The Sophist can only be defined in contrast to a positive 
proceeding: philosophy. Sophistry is not possible without philosophy. 56 
The fact that some kinds will blend and some not means that there are 
some affirmative and some negative statements about kinds that are true. 
The true statements will shape philosophical discourse. The exercise of 
philosophical discourse involves a 'tEXVll or a science that shows us how to 
discern kinds. After that, the Eleatic Visitor will compare the pattern of 
philosophical discourse with the configuration of sounds in speech and 
music. In both cases there are going to be combinable and uncombinable 
elements. Dialectic provide us with rational means to discern kinds ill 
permanent relation to what things are. 
We think that this passage is crucial because it is a kind of preamble 
about the necessity of a dialectical method, as a 'tEXVll that permits us to 
know the combination of kinds and which kinds will be central for a clear 
description of reality. Plato insists that a science is necessary -maybe the 
most important science- for establishing which kinds are combinable and 
which not: 
56 Cj Notomi, Preface, XII, pp. 53-54; 71-73; 166; 204. 
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Eleatic Visitor.- "And what name shall we give to this science? Or -good 
gracious Theaetetus, have we stumbled unawares upon the free man's knowledge and, 
in seeking for the Sophist, chanced to find the Philosopher first? 
Theaetetus.- How do you mean? 
Eleatic Visitor.- Dividing according to Kinds, not taking the same Form for a 
different one or a different one for the same -is not that the business of the science of 
Dialectic? 
Theaetetus.- Yes. 
Eleatic Visitor.- And the man who can do that discem~ clearly one Form 
everywhere extended throughout many, where each one lies apart, and many Forms, 
different form one another, embraced from without by one Form; and again one Form 
connected in a unity through many wholes, and many Forms, entirely marked off apart. 
That means knowing how to distinguish, kind by kind, in what ways the several kinds 
can or cannot combine. 
Theaetetus.- Most certainly. 
Eleatic Visitor.- And the only person, I imagine, to whom you would allow this 
mastery of Dialectic is the pure and rightful lover of wisdom. 
Theaetetus.- To whom else cold it be allowed? 
Eleatic Visitor.- It is, then, in some such region as this that we shall find the 
Philosopher now or later, if we should look for him. He too may be difficult to see 
clearly; but the difficulty in his case is not the same as in the Sophist's. 
Theaetetus.- What is the difference? 
Eleatic Visitor.- The Sophist takes refuge in the darkness of Not-being where 
he is at home and has the knack ('tptl3ft) of feeling his way; and it is the darkness of the 
place that makes him so hard to perceive. 
Theaetetus.- That may well be. 
Eleatic Visitor.- Whereas the Philosopher, whose thoughts constantly dwell 
upon the nature (toea) of reality ('toi) ovtoC;), is difficult to see bec~use his region is so 
bright; for the eye of the vulgar soul cannot endure to keep it gaze fixed on the divine. 
Theaetetus.- That may well be no less true. 
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Eleatic Visitor.- Then we will look more closely at the Philosopher presently, if 
we are still in the mind to do so; meanwhile clearly we must not loosen our grip on the 
Sophist until we have studied him thoroughly. 
Theaetetus.- I entirely agree. ,,57 
The speech of the Eleatic Visitor in 253c is central because the 
description of the science of dialectic is a description of the philosophical 
task. First of all, the search for the defInition of the Sophist takes place 
through dialectical agreements. And second, there is dialectic as a 
philosophical method of discerning kinds, that permits us to distinguish, in 
the nature of things, which are compatible and which not. The result of this 
process of division is the philosophical production of interconnections and 
disconnections expressed in affirmative or negative statements about what 
things really are. 
Plato gives -in the passage that we have just quoted in extenso- an 
explicit description of the science of dialectic. Dialectic is a 'tExvll that 
implies both science and art, that is, technical knowledge and an ability to 
employ that knowledge. It is an art of philosophical conversation. This art 
involves a technique which can be described as process of discernment of 
kinds that has as its aim a knowledge of reality. 
Suddenly, the Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus realise that by a sort 
amazing coincidence, in seeking the Sophist they have grasped first what a 
philosopher is. Plato is treating the philosopher as someone with a "free 
man's knowledge", 'trov EAEU9EProv E1ttG'tTtJlllV58. 
The competence of the dialectician who practises this SCIence IS 
described as follows: 1. he knows how to discern compatible and 
incompatible kinds; 2. he can distinguish clearly one common kind that is 
57 Sophist, 253 c4-254b7 (Cornford's translation). 
58 We will return to this point later. 
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extended throughout many where each one lies apart; 3. he can discern 
many kinds, different from one another, but included in one greater kind; 4. 
he differentiates one kind connected in a unity through many wholes and 
many kinds completely apart and separate. In short: practising the science 
of dialectic implies coming to know how to distinguish things, kind by kind 
and in what ways the several kinds can or cannot blend. 5) The person that 
has the mastery of dialectic is identified with the philosopher (lover of 
wisdom). 
After that, there is a comparison between the philosopher and the 
Sophist: the philosopher is in a region of clarity (being) and that is the 
reason that it is easier to grasp the essence of his activity. Philosophy 
appears as a positive category and practice. The Sophist, as far as he is 
concerned, takes refuge in the hideout of darkness (not-being). There, he 
feels at home because it is a suitable terrain for his empirical practice (skin 
in argument). It is precisely the blurred nature of the context of his activity 
that makes him so hard to grasp. Nevertheless, the philosopher, who is 
constantly thinking and expressing his thoughts about the nature (iota) of 
reality ('to'\) ov'toc;), is complex to define because his region is too bright, 
and "the eye of the vulgar soul" cannot bear to fix its eyes on the divine. 
It is only possible to defme the Sophist in comparison with the 
philosopher. The Sophist's practice is heavily dependent on the relation of 
alterity that he has with the philosopher: his practice is an anti-practice, he is 
a non-philosopher. The Sophist is in a region of darkness because he 
refuses to start a serious conversation about real things with the aim of 
finding its possible interconnections. He takes refuge in his own falsities 
about things and builds a fictional world about what things are not. In 
opposition, the philosopher's attitude is clearly communicative: he is open 
to conversation with others and he is open to discovering what combinations 
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among things are really possible. The clarity of the philosopher resides in 
his unselfish attitude towards searching for the truth. 59 
On the reference to the philosopher as having a free man's knowledge 
m 253c: we think that it is important to go deeper because with this 
description we can fmd another key to the opposition between the 
philosopher's and the Sophists' activity. 
1. Plato refers to free men in Theaetetus 172 clO-d2: those who are 
experts in court from their youth look like slaves, if you compare them with 
free men, that is, those who are educated in philosophy (and similar things). 
Socrates.- "Well, look at the man who has been knocking about in law-courts 
and such places ever since he was a boy; and compare him with the man brought up in 
philosophy, in the life of a student. It is surely like comparing the up-bringing of a 
slave with that of a free man". 60 
2. 172d3-173b6: philosophers can spend as much time as they want -
at peace and leisure- to put their arguments together without any external 
engagement or pressure except to attain the truth. 
Experts in courts are under the pressure of time (in a hurry), tackling 
specific and imposed cases, without the possibility of any deviation: 
Socrates.- "As a result of this the speaker becomes tense [violent] and crafty; 
they know how to wheedle their master with words and gain his favor by acts, but in 
their souls they become mean and warped. This slavery deprives their souls of 
magnanimity [growth], honesty and freedom; they are compelled to act against love of 
justice and love of truth. In this way they become bent and stunted. [ ... ] Consequently 
59Cj Notomi, pp. 299-300. 
60 Iheaetetus, 172 c2-7 (translated by M. 1. Levett, revised by M. Burnyeat, Hackett, 
Indianapolis/Cambridge, 1990). 
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they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness of mind in them, but they think 
they have become clever and wise. ,,61 
3. 173b7-174b8: philosophers are not interested in acquiring a good 
public reputation, but in the search for the nature of everything and above 
all in answering the question about what human nature is. 
The reference at Sophist 253c can be understood if we put it face to 
face with the Theaetetus 172c ff. passage, with Republic 537d ff and 492 
ff and Gorgias 492e ff as a bridge. Again, we think that it is important to 
go deeper with these passages because they can throw light on our original 
point about the philosopher as having a free man's knowledge and the 
contrast with the Sophist. 
Republic 537d-53ge: the topic is dialectic and the idea that at the 
beginning, dialectic has kind of "negativeH role. Plato is trying to defme 
what a dialectician is: 
1. A dialectician can VIew things in their mutual connections 
(interweavings). 2. He is searching for being itself and for the truth. 3. 
Dialectic is at the beginning a process of recognition that flatterers are 
flatterers and that they corrupt your mind and l1eo~. Dialectic is initially a 
process of purification. 4. 539b-c is about sophistry: the habit of 
confutation only leads to a public discredit of refuters and philosophy itself. 
5. 539c-d: But a mature person will be aware of dialectic and will choose to 
imitate its true practitioners: 
Socrates.- " 'But an older man will not share this craze', said L 'but will rather 
choose to imitate the one who consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who 
61 Ibid. 172 e7-173b7 (Fowler's translation with some modifications, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.,lLondon, 1994). 
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makes ajest and sport of mere contradiction, and so he will himself be more reasonable 
and moderate, and bring credit rather than discredit upon his pursuit.' ,,62 
What is crucial here is that Plato is opposmg sophistry for the 
dishonour that this practice can give to philosophy. But Plato's hope for the 
pennanence of philosophy resides in the fact that mature people can imitate 
real philosophers who care and are faithful to the elenctic-dialogic search 
for the truth. 
Why are Sophists corrupt? The public corrupt the young through 
their applause. The real corrupting forces are the many. They are the real 
Sophist. Sophists, orators and poets, insofar as they listen to public opinion, 
become corrupted. 63 
Philosophy is impossible for multitudes: they are always going to 
condemn philosophical activity because the search for the truth is not a 
matter of unanimous approval, but a surrender to what things objectively 
are. 64 
Finally in the Gorgias:65 1. Socrates criticises the powers of flattery 
and rhetoric. 2. The worst of evils: having one's soul full of injustice. 3. 
Public men, tyrants, kings and potentates are the authors of the most 
impious crimes because they have the power to do them. 4. Real virtue is 
the most important thing to achieve in public and private life. The best 
thing, if a man is to become just, is to avoid any kind of flattery of himself 
as well as of others, of the few or of the many. Rhetoric can be used 
correctly and any action should be with a view to justice. 
62 Republic. VIT. 539 c4-d2 (paul Shorey's translation). 
63 See Republic. VI 492 ff. 
64 See ibid., 493e-494. 
65 See Gorgias. 522d-527c. 
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There are some conclusions and questions about all these interrelated 
passages: 1. Sophistry has many different guises. 2. Philosophers do not 
have constraints in their activity. Orators and Sophists are slaves because 
they are constrained. 3 . We can only understand Sophistry in relation to 
philosophy or, in other words, we need to do philosophy in order to discover 
the nature of the Sophist. It is clear again that the real category is the 
philosopher and the Sophist is just an anti-category. 4. One key question is: 
who or what is the corruptor? We think, that according to Plato, there are 
three sources of corruption: the misuse of power, public opinion (the many) 
and flattery. 
Our main point is about the ethical conditions of dialectic or why a 
philosopher is a free man. We think that the key is in the text: the 
philosopher is qualified as having a free man's knowledge. He is a person 
with a free mind. This freedom allows him to search for the truth which 
will result in a better understanding of reality and oneself. In that sense, 
dialectic, considered as a whole, is paideia par excellence. Education for 
Plato involves an elenctic dialectic: an examination of everything including 
oneself. If the Sophist is an impostor because he distorts whatever he 
touches, the philosopher's activity, through dialectic, is a search for 
authenticity and improvement that leads to self-knowledge, knowledge of 
human nature and knowledge of reality. 66 
To return to the Sophist: for Plato the expert in dialectic will guide 
the philosophical conversation in the process of Collection and Division 
with mastery (art and science) because he knows how to discern and to 
bring order into the kinds which constitute reality. He can understand the 
structure of this articulation of kinds and make it explicit in a self-consistent 
philosophical discourse that expresses truth. This expression of truth will 
66 With regard to this point, in the Alcibiades 1,135 c4 and 6 Socrates says: " ... vice is appropriate for a 
slave; ... virtue is appropriate for a free man." 
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communicate itself in affIrmative and negative statements about kinds. 67 
Plato's dialectic shows that he is realist. The philosopher as a dialectician 
addresses his thoughts and conversations to the nature of reality. 
After this description of the science of dialectic, the dialogue will 
concentrate on the structure of the kinds and on how and in what sense a 
kind is both one and many. The generic kind and the specific are complex, 
i.e., both are one and many. The generic kind comprises all the species and 
its nature permeates them all. The lowest species comprises the nature of 
the genus and all the related differences. 
On these grounds Plato will provide us with many ontological keys in 
the dialogue. In this way he show us how the aim of dialectic is to get a 
complete map of reality. First of all, the interlocutors arrive at the 
conclusion -254b-d- that the universe of the real is not reducible to the 
phenomenal world. Second, Theaetetus and the Eleatic Visitor agree that 
there are different possibilities of combination of kinds: some will combine 
with one another and some will not; some combine to a small extent, others 
with a large number. They will choose three very important kinds to serve 
as examples: existence, motion, and rest. The aim is to try to clarify, as 
much as possible, what being and not being are, and in what senses not-
being exists. 
Further on -at 254d-e- the Eleatic Visitor introduces two new kinds: 
sameness and difference, and shows us, in detail, that neither of these two 
can be identifIed with any of the previous three: existence, motion and rest. 
67 We find Cornford's explanation of what dialectic is very clear because he makes some important 
distinctions. First: for Plato dialectic is not logic [ifby logic we are going to understand the science either 
of logoi (reasons, thoughts) or logismos (reasoning in general)]. Dialectic is the study of the structure of 
the real world of kinds. It is a 'tEXVll of Collection and Division of this world of kinds. "It is a method for 
which some rules are laid down; but these are rules of correct procedure in making Divisions; they are not 
laws of inference or laws of thought" (p. 265). Second: dialectic is not formal logic, it is ontology 
because the kinds are realIties (ov'tco<; ov'tu) and dialectic is the science which studies the structure of 
reality. "In Plato's view the study of patterns of statements we make would belong to Grammar or to 
Rhetoric. There is no autonomous science of Logic, distinct on the one hand from Grammar and Rhetoric 
and the other from Ontology" (p. 266). 
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There are now five distinct irreducible kinds, whose combinations we can 
study. 
Existence, motion and rest are different from sameness and 
difference, but the same as themselves. 
The Eleatic V isitor concludes that because motion and rest are 
contraries, neither of them can be identical with anything that we say of 
both of them in common, but both partake of sameness and difference. 
With all these elemens the defmition of otherness is grasped in these 
terms: what is different is always different from and in reference to another 
thing. Difference -like existence- is dispersed over real things. 
In the same way that the Eleatic Visitor takes the five kinds one by 
one and makes some statements about them -255e8-256c9- we can infer 
some simple statements and combinations relating the philosopher and the 
Sophist and their correspondent practices: 
1. The Sophist exists, because he partakes of existence, but 2. The 
Sophist is not the philosopher (or is different from the philosopher). 3. The 
Sophist is not a dialectician. 4. Sophistry does not care for the truth. 5. 
Sophistry is different from philosophy. 
Ontologically speaking, with all these elements the interlocutors can 
state some general points about: (1) alterity (otherness), that is, a thing that 
is, is its single self, but is is not all indefmite number of other things, and (2) 
the community of kinds. 
In the case of every one of the kinds there is much that it is and there 
is an indefinite number of things that are not. 
What is clear now is that the interlocutors have refuted Parmenides' 
thesis that "what is" cannot-be in any way and that not-being is impossible 
because there are an unlimited number of negative statem~nts that are true 
of any existent or of existence itself. 
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Equally, there are any number of true statements asserting that "what 
is not" in a sense "is". What Plato makes clear is that when he is talking 
about "that which is not", he is not referring to something that does not 
exist, but only to something that is different. The nature of the different 
(not-being) is in relation to something that is; "that which is not" is a thing 
that has a nature of its own: difference is as much a reality as existence 
itself. In the same way, the nature of the Sophist and of sophistry are 
defmed in relation to something that is clearly different from them: the 
philosopher and philosophy. But both the Sophist and the philosopher are: 
Eleatic Visitor.- " ... we have seen that the nature of the Different is to be ranked 
among things that exist, and, once it exists, its parts also must be considered as existing 
just as much as anything else. 
Theaetetus.- Of course. 
Eleatic Visitor.- So, it seems, when a part of the nature of the Different and part 
of the nature of the Existent (existence) are set in contrast to one another, the contrast 
is, if it be permissible to say so, as much a reality as Existence itself; it does not mean 
what is contrary to 'existent', but only what is different from that Existent. 
Theaetetus.- That is quite clear. 
Eleatic Visitor.- What name are we to give it, then? 
Theaetetus.- Obviously this is just that 'what-is-not' which we were seeking for 
the sake of the Sophist. 
Eleatic Visitor.- Has it then, as you say, an existence inferior to none of the rest 
in reality? May we now be bold to say that 'that which is not' unquestionably is a thing 
that has a nature of its own -just as the Tall was tall and the Beautiful was beautiful, so 
too with the not- Tall and the not-beautiful-and in that sense 'that which is not' also, on 
the same principle, both was and is what-is-not, a single Form to be reckoned among 
the many realities? Or have we any further doubts with regard to it Theaetetus? 
Eleatic Visitor.- None at all. ,,68 
68 Sophist, 258 a7-258c5 (Cornford's translation). 
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With the defmition of the real character of not-being Plato 
establishes: 1. The possibility and the senses of not-being; 2. The nature of 
the different as real and distributed throughout the whole field of existent 
things with reference to one another. 
Eleatic Visitor.- "You see, then, that in our disobedience to Parmenides we 
have trespassed far beyond the limits of his prohibition. 
Tbeaetetus.- In what way? 
Eleatic Visitor.- In pushing forward on our quest, we have shown him results in 
a field which he forbade us even to explore. 
Tbeaetetus.- How? 
Eleatic Visitor.- He says, you remember, 
'Never shall this be proved, that things that are not, are, but keep back 
thy thought from this way of inquiry'. 
Theaetetus.- Yes he does say that. 
Eleatic Visitor.- Whereas we have not merely shown that things that are not, 
are, but we have brought to light the real character of 'not-being'. We have shown that 
the nature of the Different has existence and is parcelled out over the whole field of 
existent things with reference to one 8:nother; and of every part of it that is set in 
contrast to 'that which is' we have dared to say that precisely that is really 'that which 
is not'. 
Theaetetus.- Yes, sir, and I think what we have said is perfectly true. ,,69 
Some other ontological conclusions emerge: the sense of "is not" as 
referring to nothing at all is ruled out, at least in this context (lu.LEt<; yap 
1tEpt ~f:V Evuv'tiou 'ttVOC; Ulncp XUiPEtV neXAUt AEYO~EV, Et't' EO''ttV Et'tE 
JJ:h, AOYOV EXOV ft Kat nav'tunaO"t v aAoyov-). 70 According to the 
acceptable use here of not-being it is possible to conclude: a) The kinds 
blend with one another; b) existence and difference pervade them all, and 
69 Ibid, 258 c6-e5 (Cornford's translation). 
70 Sophist, 258 e6-259b8 
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pervade one another~. c) difference, by p(lrtaking of existence, is by virtue of 
that participation, but on the other hand is not that existence in which it 
partakes, but is different; d) since it is different from existence, quite clearly 
it must be possible that it should be "a thing that is not"; e) existence, 
having a part in difference will be different from all the rest of the kinds; f) 
because it is different from them all, it is not anyone of them nor yet all the 
others put together, but is only itself; g) existence is not many other things, 
and all other kinds in the same way, whether taken severally or all together, 
in many respects are and in many respects are not. 
The two keys that permit us to establish the dynamic relationship of 
contiguity, but of clear difference between the philosopher and the Sophist 
are the iiuvaJ,w; that inheres in things (i.e., because of the relationships 
between kinds) and the positiveness of not-being -as alterity and difference 
and as a pervasive kind in reality- and its combination with existence. 
Now with all these elements the Eleatic Visitor can make -in 259b9-
d8- the connection between difference and the search for the defInition of 
the Sophist and put philosophy and sophistry in clear contrast: he is very 
emphatic in specifying the difference between real philosophical 
argumentation, which makes clear distinctions of cases, and eristic that does 
not. Obviously the Eleatic Visitor is referring to the apparent contradictions 
which follow from the assertion of not-being. He contrasts all this 
philosophical process that shows and specifIes the possible ways that not-
being can be with the mere and unspecifIc (unphilosophical) way of using 
contradiction that asserts that the different is the same or conversely, in clear 
opposition to reality. 71 
71 The presence of divisions V (the Sophist as an eristic -and as a contradiction-monger) and VI (the 
practice of mere cross examination without clear aims -i.e., searching for the truth-) are clear here again. 
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e) True and false statements, the communication of kinds: 
8t<xvot<x/8D~U, "-Dyoe;, and <pUVtucrtU 
The next move in the dialogue 72 -and according to the same 
connecting thread of defming the Sophist in contrast to the philosopher- is 
central because it relates the interweaving of kinds with the objective 
possibility of false statements. The link is possible because kinds are 
referents of common names and they form part of the meaning of all 
statements. In such a way it will be possible to give a sense to false 
statements without resorting to non-existent things or facts for them to refer 
to.73 
The argument is as follows: 1. If we deny the interweaving of kinds 
any discourse is impossible and therefore, philosophical discourse as well. 
Furthermore: to support a complete discordance among kinds represents the 
"crudest defiance" against philosophy. 74 This point is crucial because it 
gives us another clue to defming philosophy in accordance with dialectical 
terms, and contrasting it with the Sophist's practice. 2. It is important now 
to come to an agreement about the nature of discourse. Every statement or 
judgement implies the use of two kinds, at least. That is crucial because the 
admission that kinds are "parts of' the meaning of all statements will solve 
the problem about the possibility of false speech and thinking. 3. The next 
move is: "not-being" is a single kind among the rest, dispersed over the 
whole field of realities. Now the interlocutors should consider whether not-
being blends with thinking and discourse. If it does not blend with them, 
everything must be true; but if it does, we shall have false thinking and 
72 See ibid, 259d-261a4. 
73 In relation to the topic of the possibility of false discourse see D. O'Brien, Le Non-Eire. Deux etudes 
sur Ie Sophiste de Platon, Academia Verlag, Sank Augustin, 1995, pp. 72-88. 
74 259 d9-e2: Kat yap, hya8£, 'to yE 1taV a1tO 1tav'tos E1ttXEtPEtV a1toXOlpi~EtV O:AAOlS 'tE O\)J( E~~EA.E<; 
Kat 1tav'ta1taO"lV a~ouaou nvo<; Ka1. a<ptAOaoqlOU. Cj also Notomi, op. cit., pp. 247 ff. 
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discourse~ the possibility of thinking or saying "what is not" is equivalent to 
falsity in thought and speech. 75 If falsity exists, deception is possible. If 
deception exists, images, likenesses and appearance will be able to pervade 
everything. (The Sophist had taken refuge somewhere in that region, but 
then he had denied the existence of falsity, because "no one could either 
thiilk or say 'what is not"'; "what is not" never has any sort of being). But 
because "what is not" has been found to have share in existence, it is 
possible to think and to say "what is not". In spite of that the Sophist can 
put another objection: some things partake of not-being, some do not, and 
AOYOr;, (speech) and oosa (thinking) are among those that do not. He might 
contend that the 'tEXVT) of creating images and semblances -where the 
Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus say he is to be found- has no existence at all. 
Therefore, for him AOYOr;, and oosa have no share in not -being, and without 
that combination there is no such thing as falsity: 
Theaetetus.- Certainly, sir, what we said at the outset about the Sophist seems 
true: that he is a hard sort of beast to hunt down. Evidently he possesses a whole 
armoury of problems, and every time that he puts one forward to shield him, we have to 
fight our way through it before we can get at him. So now, hardly have we got the 
better of his defence that 'what is not' cannot exist, when another obstacle is raised in 
our path: we must, it seems, prove that falsity exists both in speech and thought, and 
after that perhaps something else, and so on. It looks as if the end would never be in 
sight. 
Eleatic Visitor.- A man should be of good courage, Theaet{(tus, if he can make 
only a little headway at each step. Ifhe loses heart then, what will he do in another case 
where he cannot advance at all or even perhaps loses ground? No cjty, as they say, will 
surrender to so faint a summons. And now that we have surmounted the barrier you 
speak of, we may have already tak~n the highest wall and the rest may be easier to 
capture. 
75 Cornford thinks -see pp. 300 ff- that from 260b-261c Plato is partially misled by all the complexities 
that not being involves, but that he recovers the thread of the conversation and the argument immediately. 
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Theaetetus.- That is encouraging. ,,76 
That is the reason that the Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus begin by 
investigating the nature of 'A0yoc.n aosa/auxvota and cpaV'tacria: 77 in order 
to understand their combination with not-being and so prove that falsity 
exists. By that means, they hope to hunt down the Sophist there. If not they 
will have to pursue the search in some other way. 
What is worth noticing is the emphasis that Plato puts on the different 
directions that the philosophical search can take. The dialectical method is 
an open search that is just guided by the requirements that the object in 
question makes on the development of the conversation. Furthermore: if for 
Plato the search for the truth is a conversational act, the discovery and the 
awareness of falsity is objectively possible in dialectical terms and through 
dialectical means too. We should test and examine what we are thinking 
about things in a philosophical challenge with one or more interlocutors. If 
they do not pass the test, we are likely to be thinking and expressing false 
judgements and its corresponding verbal statements to our interlocutors. 
We are communicating falsities. 78 Here we will fmd the key for defIDing 
the Sophist. Ironically, the chase for the Sophist in contrast to the 
philosopher is a dialectical act. 79 
The Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus propose -at 261c-262e- to 
consider 'Aoyor, (speech and statement) and a~sa Gudgement) at ftrst, to 
establish clearly whether not-being has any point of contact with them, or 
whether both are altogether true and there is no possibility of falsity in 
either. They propose that the signs we use in speech to signify are of two 
76 Sophist, 261 a5-c5 (Cornford's translation). 
77 1. A6yoC;: statement, discourse or speech; 2. 06~a/oulvow.: thinking or judgement. The first one 
accompanied by sound, the second one is soundless. 
78 Cj Notomi, pp. 200-201 and 260-261. 
79 C.f ibid., pp. 239-240 and 246. 
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kinds: names (6v6~.ux'ta) and verbs (pllJla'ta). A verb is an expressIOn 
which is applied to actions. You cannot have a statement with sounds 
uttered with meaning until you combine verbs with names: 
Eleatic Visitor.- "The moment you do that, they fit together and the simplest 
combination becomes a statement of what might be called the simplest and briefest 
kind."so 
Every statement is complex: those signs of speech that do fit (because some 
do not fit) make a statement. 
At 262a Plato defmes a word as a vocal sign (Q"llJlEtOV 'tile; <pffivile;) 
that makes reference to being (1tEpt 'tnv oUQ"tav <>llAffiJla). That implies 
that every word signifies or means something. Even in a false statement, 
there is no meaningless element. 
Now they can put all these elements together and prove some points. 
Theaetetus and the Eleatic Visitor arrive at the conclusion that every 
statement is about something and is either true or false. The true statement 
asserts things that correspond to what they are. The Eleatic Visitor defmes 
the false statement as what states about the object things different from the 
things that are; it states things that are-not as being: 
Eleatic Visitor" ... so that what is different is stated as the same or what is not as 
what is -a combination of verbs and names answering to that description finally seems 
to be really and truly a false statement. 
Theaetetus.- Perfectly true."Sl 
80 Sophist, 262 c5-7 (Cornford's translation). 
81 Ibid, 263 dl-5 (Cornford's translation). 
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We think that it is important to emphasise that the whole section in 
the dialogue on combination of kinds is openly dedicated to supplying the 
key to false statement. Plato makes this clear at 259 e5-6 when he says: 
" ... all discourse depends on the weaving together of kinds. ,,82 
And if the Sophist's discourse implies a combination of verbs and names 
that does not correspond to what reality is, his production is a false 
discourse. This real, but objectively false practice is in clear opposition to 
the dialectician's 't'£XVT): he knows how to combine kinds according to 
reality and the aim of the process is to try to present an accurate map of 
connections and interconnections of things and to communicate it. 
The next moves -at 263d6-264b 1 0- are an extension of the previous 
conclusion. Thinking, judgement and appearing (ouxvoux, oo~a and 
cpav'tacria): all these things that occur in our minds can be either false or 
true. Thinking and discourse are the same thing, with the exception that we 
call ouxvota: 
" the inward dialogue carried on by the soul with itsylf without spoken 
d ,,83 soun. 
and "-010C;: 
" ... the stream which flows from the mind through the lips with sound is called 
discourse. ,,84 
82 ... out yap 'tl}V aA.AllA.coV 'trov eiowv c:r1)~1tA01(l}V (; AOYOC; Y£YOVF.V TJlltv. 
83 Sophist, 263 e3-5 (Cornford's translation). 
84 Ibid, 263 e 7-9 (Cornford's translation). 
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Assertion and denial occur in discourse. There is judgement when assertion 
and denial occur in the mind in the course of silent thinking. And if we 
suppose that there is a judgement occurring by means of perception, this 
state of mind is called "appearing". The key to the nature of false 
judgement and false statement resides in the following: the Eleatic Visitor 
and Theaetetus have seen that there is true and false statement, and they will 
combine them with these three mental processes they were talking about, 
that is, thinking as a dialogue of the soul with itself, judgement as the 
conclusion of thinking and what "appears" as a blend of perception and 
judgement. From this combination it follows that these three mental 
processes are of the same nature as statement and must be, therefore, either 
true or false. If it is possible to hunt down the Sophist it is because he is 
communicating false thoughts, false judgements and false appearings and 
uttering them in a discourse of false statements that express what reality is 
not. The contrast between the philosopher and the Sophist is absolutely 
clear. 85 
In short: with all these elements it is possible to conclude that any 
epistemological act or state is a dialectical act or state that is not completed 
until we communicate it to another subject or subjects in verbal statements. 
On these grounds the Eleatic Visitor concludes with Theaetetus: 1. 
False statement and false judgement exist. 2. It is possible that there should 
be imitations of real things; and the existence of these imitations gives 
grounds for positing the existence of a -pseudo- 'tEXVll of deception. 3. 
They agree that the Sophist does come under one or other of the two kinds 
mentioned -either the making of likenesses or the making of semblances: 
Eleatic Visitor.- "Then let us not lose courage for what remains to be done. 
Now that these matters are cleared up, let us recall our earlier divisions by kinds. 
85 Cj Notomi, pp. 199-201 and 230. 
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Theaetetus.- Which do you mean? 
Eleatic Visitor.- We distinguished two kinds of Image-making: the making of 
likenesses and the making of semblances. 
Theaetetus.- Yes. 
Eleatic Visitor.- And we said we were puzzled to tell under which of these two 
we should place the Sophist. 
Theaetetus.- We did. 
Eleatic Visitor.- And to increase our perplexity we were plunged in a whirl of 
confusion by the apparition of an argument that called in question all these terms and 
disputed the very existence of any copy or image or semblance, on the ground that 
falsity never has any sort of existence anywhere. 
Theaetetus.- We did. 
Eleatic Visitor.- But now that we have brought to light the existence of false 
statement and of false judgment, it is possible that there should be imitations of real 
things and that this condition of mind (false judgment) should accollIlt for the existence 
of an art of deception. 
Theaetetus.- Yes it is. 
Eleatic Visitor.- And we agreed earlier that the Sophist does come under one or 
other of the two kinds mentioned. 
Theaetetus.- Yes. ,,86 
1) Recapitulations and final definition of the Sop~ist 
The last part of the dialogue is crucial because it explains through dialectic 
in action how false judgement and the combination of kinds are related to 
the main aim of the dialogue: to define the Sophist and to show what a 
philosopher can achieve with dialectic. 
The Eleatic Visitor and Theaetetus take up again the seventh division, 
deriving from the productive 'tEXVll, that is, the Sophist as an image maker 
or as a maker of false conceit of wisdom. In an exhibition of dialectical 
86 Ibid, 264 bl1-dl1 (Comford's translation with some modifications). 
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method, they continue with the subdivisions, until they get all the elements 
which contain the definition of the Sophist. 
There are two forms of production: divine or human, and both can be 
divided horizontally and with respect to two kinds of products: production 
of originals (actual things, a:o'toupytK6~uu'to1totll'tuc6C;) and production of 
images (some sort of likenesses, £iOroA01tOt£tV). 
Of this production of images -they recall- there were to be two kinds, 
one producing likenesses (£iKUO"'ttK1l), the other semblances (<puv'tuO"nK1l), 
if falsity was to be shown to be something that really is false and of such a 
nature as to have a place among existing things. And because that has been 
shown, on that ground the distinction of these two kinds is indisputable. 
Dividing in two the kind that produces semblances: there is the 
semblance produced by means of tools (oPY<lvov) and another sort where 
the producer of the semblance takes his own person as an instrument 
(<lu'tou 1t<lpexov't0C; E<lU'tOV opyuvov), that is, mimicry (JltJll1o"tC;). 
Mimicry is of two sorts: some mimics know the thing they are 
impersonating [mimicry by acquaintance (J.1tJll1o"tC; to"'toptK1l)], and some do 
not, because they perform mimicry guided by opinion, that is, conceit-
mimicry (oo~oJltJll1nK1l). 
The Sophist is among those who practice conceit-mimicry. There are 
two types of conceit-mimicry: the simple-minded type (£U1lS11C;) who 
imagines that what he believes is knowledge, and an opposite type who is 
versed in discussion, which involves a pretended knowledge or real 
ignorance (£iproVtKOV JltJlll't1lv). That means that there is an honest and 
authentic mimicry (U1tAOUV JltJll1't1lV) which proceeds from the mimic with 
knowledge, and a false one -with two types- which proceeds from mimicry 
by opinion. 
The type of this conceit-mimicry that involves dissimulation 
(dproVtKoV JltJlll't1lv) is divided into two types: one is the type who can 
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keep up his dissimulation publicly in long speeches to a large assembly. 
The other uses short arguments in private and forces others to contradict 
themselves in conversation. The fIrst one is identifIed with the demagogue 
in opposition to the statesman; and the second one is classifIed as the 
Sophist in opposition to the wise. 
And now they can collect all the elements of the defInition of the 
Sophist from the end to the beginning: 1. he pretends to imitate a 'tEXVll 
resorting to contradiction-making; 2. he descends from the false kind of 
mimicry (conceit mimicry); 3. he practices semblance-making derived from 
human image-making production; 4. he is a juggler and charlatan because 
he presents a magic play of words. 87 
What is Plato trying to tell us with this fInal defInition of the Sophist? 
Semblances generate confusion. What the Sophist is doing is a 
premeditated and deliberated imposture. He is pretending to be wise and to 
educate people. He really practises a oo~o(m<pi(l and a OO~01t(ltOEU'tt1dl. 
He distorts the philosophical task and turns it into a mere game of words 
and a conceit of wisdom. His activity tergiversates real education into a 
mere conceit of virtue. If Plato presents throughout his work a very strong 
criticism of the Sophists' practice, it is because fmally they represent a real 
threat to philosophy and for philosophers. Plato defmes philosophy as an 
unselfIsh and loving search for the truth. The Sophist destroys this initial 
ethical principle and perverts from the beginning the nature of philosophy. 
The deliberate practice of a &>~oO"o<pi(l kills the motive power of the 
philosophical search. When Plato presents Socrates as the ideal philosopher 
he presents him fundamentally as a man who perpetually examines 
everything and himself. The main aim of this constant examination is -at 
87 Sophist 268 c8~d4: Tov 01) 'tfl~ EvaV'tt01tOtOtAOYl1(fl~ dpwvtlcou ~EPO,\)~ 'tfl~ oo~ao'ttKfl~ ~t~TJ'ttKOV, 
'tou <pav'taO"'ttKou YEVO,\)~ a1tO 'tfl~ dOWA01tOtlKflc; ou 8EtOV aAA' av8pw1ttlcoV 'tfj~ 1tOtl]OEWC; 
a<pWptO~EVOV tv A.6YO\.~ 'to 8a'\)~a't01tOUKOV ~6ptOv, "'tau'tTJc; 'tT]<; YEVEa~ 'tE Kat at~a'toc;" OC; av <PTI 
'tOY oV'tW~ O"Oq>tO"'tTJV EtVat, 1taAT\8to't<X'ta, cO~ EOtlCEV, tPEt. 
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least initially- to become self-aware about what you really know and what 
you do not know. The fIrst requirement for this process of examination is 
humility. By contrast, the Sophist assumes as a starting point an arrogant 
and antiphilosophical attitude: he pretends to know everything. It is 
important to distinguish the dialectical attitude of the philosopher who does 
not reject any object as unworthy of being studied,88 from the attitude of the 
Sophist, who pretends from the beginning to know everything and to kill in 
that way the essence of any philosophical search. 89 
The deliberate practice of a OO~01tatOEtYttK" devastates the ethical 
aims of philosophy. According to Plato the [mal purpose of philosophy is 
humanistic: with philosophy we are searching for self-improvement through 
knowledge of reality, knowledge of human nature and self-knowledge. The 
Socratic-Platonic method is a clear example of what human philosophical 
interchanges are and why they are have a formative aim: to enable us to be 
better human beings. In opposition to this philosophical project the Sophist 
pretends to educate when he is just defrauding his pupils. He is a merchant 
of information (divisions II to IV) and a hired hunter of rich young men 
(division J).90 
It is not merely incidental that at the end of the dialogue, at 267c -
given that the two characters in conversation were trying to hunt down the 
Sophist- that the Eleatic Visitor remarks that it is impossible, [mally, to 
impersonate knowledge of virtue by words and actions (to seem virtuous) 
when you are not really virtuous (to appear virtuous). What the Socratic-
Platonic project of philosophy pursues is the formation of virtuous men 
through a live, reflexive interchange that transforms our ways of acting. 
What Plato asks for from any real philosopher is consistency between 
88 See Sophist, 227 alO-b4. 
89 Cj Notomi, p. 300. 
90 Supra, pp. 210-211 and 213. 
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rigorous thoughts, clear words apd good actions. The Sophist's imposture 
reverses the vital essence and aims of philosophy. That is the reason that his 
practice cannot be philosophy any more. Now the demarcation between the 
philosopher's and the Sophist's practices is clear: sophistry does not care for 
the truth. The Sophist presents and represents a world of double and 
complementary falsities: the one that he impersonates -pretending to be a 
wise man- and the other that is a result of the erroneous image of what 
things are that he communicates to us. With his teaching and bad example 
he perverts his pupils' souls and the ethical aim of the philosophical task. 
We know that the word <paivEcr8at involves two meanings: 1. To 
appear, to be evident; and 2. to be apparent, to seem, to pretend to be. We 
think that the key to grasping the Sophist's activity is in the combination of 
these two significances. 91 It is precisely because the Sophist is clearly and 
evidently disingenuous, that we catch him seeming: his practices involve 
simulation,92 and so they are openly false. It seems that he is doing proper 
philosophy, but he appears clearly and distinctly as he really is: an impostor. 
Wehunt him down as he is an appears: as a charlatan. If Plato uses the 
metaphor of the Sophist as a 8UUjlU'to1tot6C; it is because it will reveal to us 
the essence of his practice: the false claim of knowing everything and of 
being a philosopher. 93 What the Sophist creates with his practice are 
"extraordinary" objects that misrepresent reality, i.e., falsehoods or what 
things are not. 94 
Plato is clear. The Sophist's imposture is not merely a matter of 
insincerity, it is a matter of falsity. Sincerity is a subjective disposition 
which does not necessarily coincide with truth. The search for the truth 
91 Supra, footnote 30. 
92 See Sophist, 268 a. 
93 Cf Notomi, pp. 87-]21; 163-204; 224-230 and 246-269. 
94 Cj ibid., p. 200. 
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involves a commitment to reality. This commitment implies a complete lack 
of personal motivations. You can be sincere, but at the same time 
objectively wrong, but you are ethically safe. If you make a mistake, you 
can correct it. The Sophist is treacherously deceiving, cheating, a trickster. 
He is a liar. He is ethically condemned: he has broken the philosophical 
ethos. He is betraying the community. Plato insists on the point that the 
search for the truth entails the risk of making mistakes and the possibility of 
becoming aware of them and trying to correct them. That is the reason that 
he defmes philosophy as a perpetual test of ideas with the readiness to take 
up again and restart the search with the same willingness to go into any 
subject in depth, with clarity and precision. Philosophy is a matter of 
putting ideas to the test and corroborating their sustainability. Sophistry is a 
practice that involves a deliberate ploy. The Sophist's aim is to use any 
trick to get his own way and to involve his audience in a false representation 
of things. In that sense the image that he presents of reality is distorted and 
the pretended knowledge that he seems to embody is just a mere game of 
d . al' 95 wor s, a mere person VIew. 
The Socratic irony96 is something totally different from the Sophistic 
dissimulation since it suggests that other people say that they know what 
they really do not know. That connect us with the Socratic ignorance that is 
a philosophical and necessary dialectical starting point: not to take anything 
for granted, with the aim of having an impartial, new and fresh encounter 
with things and trying to grasp them as they are. It is also a methodological 
"purification" that permits us to recognise what we really know and what 
we really do not know. 
That is the reason that Plato opposes the wise person to the Sophist. 
The activity of the philosopher necessarily entails the firm and permanent 
95 Cj ibid, pp. 192-204. 
96 See Republic, 337a ff. 
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love of wisdom. What Plato portrays permanently in the Socratic figure is 
the ideal philosopher who has this perpetual desire for knowledge, desire 
that is never completely fulfilled. 97 The wisdom that philosophy entails 
includes awareness of our own human limitations and awareness that the 
search for knowledge is never completed. This perpetual aspiration to 
knowledge provides us with the key to the essence of philosophy -according 
to the Socratic-Platonic idea- that is, an indefatigable, dialogic research for 
truth with the understanding that reality presents us permanently with new 
questions and motives to philosophise. The Sophist's activity just 
caricatures philosophy. This misrepresentation paralyses the permanent 
process of philosophical searching and creativity into a mere game of words 
and assumptions that do not correspond to what things are. If Plato defmes 
philosophy in dialectical terms it is because knowledge is fmally a 
communicative act. That explains to us why any abuse or misuse of words 
in an allegedly philosophical context misleads as to the sense of the original 
act. The Sophist is a contradiction-monger; he does not have any real thesis 
to present for a dialectical testing. He is not open to a dialogic examination 
or philosophical conversation. He does not care for the search for the truth 
at all. That is the reason that Plato defmes the Sophist's activity as a private 
dissimulation in short arguments which involves eristic (division V). His 
way of proceeding is characterised by disputation and its aim is to win a 
discussion regardless the truth. Furthermore: if Plato puts a clear line of 
demarcation between philosophy and Sophistry in dialectical terms it is 
because he was aware of the power of reason and words and the high and 
inevitable responsibility that a dialectican has in his task: the search for the 
truth by rational means and its expression in rational terms. 
Plato does not condemn the representation of things that resorts to the 
use of allegories or myths, so long as one is aware that it is a philosophical 
97 Cj Notomi, pp. 200-201 and p. 288. 
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resource that can provide us with some light for understanding what reality 
is. What he condemns in the Sophist's imitation is that it is a pretended or 
false imitation of the philosopher without the principles, conditions, 
requirements and initial willingness to be one and the audacity to present 
that image as real philosophy. The Sophist's hypocrisy is exposed by the 
contrast with the philosopher's transparent and unequivocal attitude 
Plato fulfils the difficult task that he has assigned to his interlocutors 
m the Sophist: to defme the Sophist in clear philosophical terms by 
dialectical means. The Sophist as a dialogue is dialectic in action, showing 
us through contrast what philosophy can do: hunt down the Sophist. That is 
the perfect irony of the dialogue. 98 
As soon as we know what the Sophist is we can state clearly that he, 
with his sophistical practice, does not pass the dialectical examination of 
claim to be a philosopher: he is not able to communicate clear, true thought 
in clear and true statements that correspond to what reality is. He is not a 
dialectician. 
It is impossible to defme the Sophist without having defmded 
philosophy first. The possibility of doing philosophy will remain so long as 
philosophers remain faithful to the permanent unselfish and rational task of 
asking for the essence of things with the aim of discovering the truth about 
it in a dialogic interchange that implies challenge and test. 99 
The Sophist is a philosophical opportunity to look back, to look 
forward and to grasp again the essence of the philosophical act, which 
involves a dialectical plan and purpose. Plato wants to build on the best of 
the Presocratic philosophical experience, but encourage a fresh approach 
98 The Sophist pretends to be wise, and the '.vise person is, or would be, the philosopher: the "imitation" is, 
as it were, at one remove. 
99 Cj Notomi, pp. 25; 62-63; 299. 
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and criticism where necessary. That is the reason that the contrast between 
the Sophist and the philosopher enhances the nature of philosophy itself. 100 
100 In relation to the following table of division cf Cornford, p. 324. 
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FINAL DIVISION 
(Ti:XVll) (expertise) 
I 
i ... AqUlsltlve 
likenesses 
(£tKacr'ttKTt) 
P 'd . ro uctlve 
Divine 
of originals 
cdYtoupyoe;) 
Human 
fimages 
(£tOCOA01toU:tV) 
of originals 
( a:Ut01tot 11'tt KOe; 
actual things) 
of images 
( £iOCOA01tot£tV 
some sort of 
1· enesses) 
semblances (<pavtaOttKTt) 
(falsity is possible and a real thing) 
by tools (painting, sculpture, music) 
( °PY<Xvov) 
by mimicry (autou 
~ i~ 110te;) 
( 1tapi:xovtOe; 
EaUtov 
opy<xvov) 
with knowledge (acting) (mimicry by 
(different from) 
ignorant (oo~o~ t~ 11'tt KTt) 
conceit -mimicry 
(mrcry by opinion) 
~crt~ icr~opt1ciD acquaintance) 
( I , (false) 
Honest, clear 
(a1tAOUV 
~t~l1tTtV) 
simple-minded (£UTt811e;) dissimulator (£ipCOVtKOV 
(he confuses his beliefs (versed in ~ t~ l1tTtV) 
with real knowledge) discussion) 
I I the wise) 
.-________ ... ' .. /(mimiC of 
The Demagogue ..... Statesman The Sophist ......... The wise 
(public dissimulation (private dissimulation in 
in long speeches) short arguments with eristic) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
I. The Socratic-Platonic idea of dialectic provides us with a historical and 
philosophical foundation for the idea of philosophy as a dialogic act. 
Plato's idea of philosophy as dialectic involves a complete methodological 
account of how a philosophical conversation must be carried on in order to 
achieve philosophical aims: to understand what reality is. The fact that for 
Plato philosophy is a communicative act entails important metaphysical and 
ethical consequences: the act of knowing is only completed (if it is 
completed at all) when two or more subjects who are searching in an 
unselfish way for the truth, achieve and give a complete verbal account of 
the object in question. The philosophical search for the truth is a 
transpersonal and intersubjective matter, even while truth itself remains 
something objective. 
Despite the fact that some philosophers disagree with Plato's 
dialectical project, they fmally -despite their disagreements- are included in 
Plato's philosophical universe: for him the act of thinking too is a dialogic 
act with oneself, and one that will be communicated. 
Aristotle's idea of dialectic implies a clear demotion from Plato's 
understanding of it and an affiliation to Zeno's method in that respect: 
dialogue will not be central for the search for the truth, dialectic will not be 
part of philosophy and dialectic will be associated with mere probable 
reasonings without scientific scope. This instrumental idea of dialectic will 
exert a defmitive historical influence on subsequent philosophy. 
II. The word OUlAE,,(Ea9ut (and its cognates) has a history before 
Plato use it. We have some antecedents of the Platonic employment of this 
set of words in Homer, Herodotus, Archilochus, Sappho, Alcaeus, 
Xenophon and Thucydides. Plato's originality consists in taking up these 
256 
antecedents and creating with them a new philosophical application of the 
word as a Ot<lAEK'ttKll 'tEXVTI which involves a whole philosophical project. 
We think that it is possible to fmd some clear literary antecedents of 
Plato's dialectical activity in Greek epic and lyric as dialogues in a sense 
and in tragedy as actual dialogue. Particularly so in the case of Euripides: 
we fmd in the way that he portrays legal debates in a process of question 
and answer a clear parallel of the elenctic Platonic dialectic. These Greek 
literary antecedents constitute the fIrst written record of poetic 
consciousness of our tragic and limited human condition. At the same time 
they provide us with an illustration of the means to overcome this 
insufficiency through dialogues among reflective characters and 
communication of this message to the audience and through the promotion 
of a model of humanity. 
There is a double source of the Platonic dialogical style of writing: its 
Greek literary antecedents and its philosophical origins in Presocratic and 
Socratic thought as a dialogic, rational and unselfish approach to things. 
III. Throughout the history of philosophy it is possible to distinguish 
three main ideas of dialectic: 1. The Socratic-Platonic idea in which 
dialectic is equivalent to philosophy: philosophical conversation that has the 
aim of searching for the truth. Then 2. there is the Aristotelian idea, along 
with, some Stoic approaches and the Medieval idea of dialectic which treats 
it as a logical tool or instrument that permits us to fmd erroneous arguments. 
3. The Hegelian and Marxist idea of dialectic in which dialectic is inherent 
in reality and the reason that provides us with an explanation of the 
dynamics of things as a permanent movement of synthesis of opposites. 
There are important points to stress about the different ancient ideas 
of dialectic. Plato's idea of dialectic is an organic philosophical project 
which involves the undesrtanding of philosophy as the highest science that 
searches for the truth in a methodical, objective, rational, systematic and 
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unselfish way through philosophical conversation. This dialogic process 
involves questioning and answering, exchange and challenge and putting 
ideas to the test. Philosophy is an intersubjective and educative act that 
involves progress towards and communication of knowledge among the 
interlocutors. The dialectician is the man who can provide us with a 
complete map of reality insofar as he has the capacity of looking at the one 
and the many and has related them through a methodical search for 
definitions, setting out of hypotheses or collecting and dividing things in a 
whole unity. 
Aristotle rejects Plato's idea of dialectic and starts a new project: 
dialectic is treated as an art that will give us access to the general common 
principles of all sciences by a method of questioning and answering and 
endoxa, but without any scientific capacity of its own. 
Plato's dialectical project is clearly distant from Zeno's and the 
Sophists' practices. Plato's main complaint is that eristics, antilogicians and 
Sophist do not care for the truth, and that in that way they put in 
considerable jeopardy the dialectical nature of the philosophical task. 
Nevertheless, in the c~se of Aristotle it is clear that because his idea of 
dialectic involves the use of endoxa he is on the way to vindicating Zeno's 
and his colleagues' practices to a certain extent. 
Aristotle's influence on the Stoic and Medieval ideas of dialectic is 
clear because dialectic tends to be treated as a tool, but not as philosophy 
itself. Nevertheless it is worth pointing out that the Stoic ideas of dialectic 
constitute a very complex issue. When dialectic is associated with the 
activity of the wise man who is in possession of an op8oC; 'Ao,,{oC;, that 
enables the dialectician to reason and to act correctly in accordance with the 
principle of the universe. In this way dialectic acquires a higher dimension 
and an interconnective role between logic, ethics and physics in the Stoic 
system. 
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Dialectic is in the Middle Ages the fundamental implement for 
philosophical argumentation. Dialectic is linked to the permissible use of 
reason to search and to clarify revealed truths, and to the exhibition of a 
logical mastery for disputing probable propositions or persuasive arguments 
in the Universities and among philosophers. 
The place that dialectic occupies in Kant's philosophical system, 
interconnects the ancient and the modem ideas of dialectic. For him 
dialectic has a double role: a negative one as a "logic of illusion" that is 
connected with Aristotle's concept of dialectic and a positive role as a 
"critique of dialectical illusion"that will constitute the basis of Hegel's 
dialectic. 
Hegel's dialectic involves a different approach in form and in 
content. Hegel understands dialectic as the dynamics of a synthesis of 
opposites that inheres in all existent things. That is the reason that dialectic 
explains all different kinds of movements and changes in the world and in 
our thoughts about it. 
Marx accepts Hegel's theoretical discoveries~ but he thinks that they 
do not succeed in describing reality. Marx proposes to make use of Hegel's 
dialectic by applying it to reality, men and nature, which should be 
understood in their material conditions. Marx thinks that the correct and 
concrete way of applying dialectic resides in the historical understanding of 
reality in terms of social and economic relations. 
IV. The nature of the Socratic-Platonic method has to be understood 
in terms of the inseparability of elenchos and dialectic. That is, any subject-
matter that is selected for a philosophical conversation has to be submitted 
to the dialectical agenda and has to be put to the test. The Socratic-Platonic 
dialectic is a single reality that has diverse and interconnected features: 
elenchos, hypothesis and collection and division. The elenctic process is 
fundamental for the whole of the Socratic-Platonic method and its essential 
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features are dialogue, examination, testing and challenge. That will permit 
Plato to fix clear boundaries between philosophy and sophistry insofar as 
the latter takes great delight in mere refutation and discussion regardless the 
truth. 
Plato's notion of dialectic remains constant throughout his dialogues; 
however, every dialogue tends to exhibit of the variable ways and different 
aspects in which dialectic can be represented. 
The Sophist is an excellent example for illustrating what dialectic is 
insofar as Plato there resorts to the irony of defming what philosophy is in 
clear contrast to Sophistry. Philosophy is a dialogic science that has the aim 
of carring on a loving search for the truth with the aim of expressing what 
things are in themselves. Philosophy is a communicative act insofar as it is 
a shared and communicated understanding of a common reality. 
The philosopher is a dialectician or the person who is in possession of 
the OtUAEK'ttK1l 'tEXVl1. The dialectician is the man who is able to ask for 
the essence of things, who searches through dialogic and rational means 
how to give a complete and true explanation of reality through a network of 
interconnections and who communicates these thoughts in clear judgements 
and statements. What the philosopher fmally aims at is an understanding of 
reality and an education of human beings through knowledge of human 
nature and self-knowledge. 
The Sophist, by contrast, is the person who exhibits with his 
discourse a pseudo-'tEXvl1 or false conceit of wisdom and virtue. He is a 
simrnulator who displays his practice through the commercialisation of 
knowledge and education, love of disputation, gaining unfair advantage 
from his pupils, pretending to know everything and communicating in 
erroneous thoughts, judgements and statements an objectively false 
representation of the world. 
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